Joseph Vance Arabie v. Jeffrey McAfee and Brent Hatch
This text of Joseph Vance Arabie v. Jeffrey McAfee and Brent Hatch (Joseph Vance Arabie v. Jeffrey McAfee and Brent Hatch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Alaska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
JOSEPH VANCE ARABIE, Plaintiff, Case No. 4:24-cv-00025-SLG v. JEFFREY MCAFEE and BRENT HATCH, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL On September 9, 2025, the Court ordered self-represented litigant Joseph Vance Arabie (“Plaintiff”) to file a status report to update the Court as to the status of his state criminal case within 14 days of the date of the order.1 The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to timely file a status report would result in dismissal of this case without further notice to Plaintiff.2 To date, Plaintiff has not responded or otherwise contacted the Court.
DISCUSSION Rule 41(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal due to a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with a court order. In deciding whether to dismiss on this basis, a district court considers five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3)
1 Docket 6. 2 Docket 6. See also Docket 5 at 12. the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”3 Here, the first two factors—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket—weigh in favor of dismissal.4
Plaintiff’s failure to respond within the specified timeline suggests Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently.5 Further, a presumption of prejudice to a defendant arises when the plaintiff unreasonably delays prosecution of an action.6 Because Plaintiff has not offered any justifiable reason for failing to meet the Court’s deadline, the third factor also favors dismissal.7 The fourth factor usually
weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits.8 “At the same time, a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party's failure to comply with deadlines ... cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits.”9 The fifth factor is comprised of three subparts, which include “whether the
3 Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants.”). 5 Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that a plaintiff has the burden to move toward disposition at a reasonable pace and to refrain from dilatory and evasive tactics). 6 Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). 7 See, e.g., Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 401 (reiterating that the burden of production shifts to the defendant to show at least some actual prejudice only after the plaintiff has given a non-frivolous excuse for delay). 8 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 9 In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). Case No. 4:24-cv-00025-SLG, Arabie v. McAfee, et al. court has considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the [uncooperative] party about the possibility of case-dispositive sanctions.”10 The Court warned Plaintiff of the potential dismissal of this action without further notice to Plaintiff in the event of noncompliance.11
Based on the foregoing, this case must be dismissed for failure to prosecute.12 The dismissal shall be without prejudice so as to preserve Plaintiff’s ability to seek relief.13 The Court finds no other lesser sanction to be satisfactory or effective in this case.14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice. 2. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. 3. The Clerk of Court shall issue a final judgment and close this case. DATED this 23rd day of October 2025, at Anchorage, Alaska. /s/ Sharon L. Gleason SHARON L. GLEASON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 11 Docket 6. See also Docket 5 at 12. 12 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A district court's warning to a party that his failure to obey the court's order will result in dismissal can satisfy the consideration of alternatives requirement.”) (citation and quotations omitted). 13 Id. 14 See, e.g., Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives) (internal citation omitted). Case No. 4:24-cv-00025-SLG, Arabie v. McAfee, et al.
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