Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson v. Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings and Underwood Law Office

CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 18, 2020
Docket19-1079
StatusPublished

This text of Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson v. Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings and Underwood Law Office (Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson v. Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings and Underwood Law Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson v. Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings and Underwood Law Office, (W. Va. 2020).

Opinion

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson, FILED Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners September 18, 2020 EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS vs.) No. 19-1079 (Cabell County 17-C-149) OF WEST VIRGINIA

Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings, and Underwood Law Office, Defendants Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioners Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson, self-represented litigants, appeal the October 21, 2019, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County awarding judgment as a matter of law at the close of petitioners’ evidence to Respondents Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings, and the Underwood Law Office (collectively, “respondents”) and the circuit court’s November 1, 2019, order denying petitioners’ motion for a new trial. Respondents, by counsel Kevin A. Nelson and Arie M. Spitz, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s orders. Petitioners filed a reply.

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s orders is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Petitioners retained respondents to represent them in a proceeding before the West Virginia Court of Claims (“Court of Claims”).1 According to the Court of Claims’ January 20,

1 The West Virginia Court of Claims is now known as the West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission. State ex rel. Ladanye v. West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission, 242 W. Va. 420, __, 836 S.E.2d 71, 78 (2019) (citing W. Va. Code § 14-2-4 (2019)). The function of this legislative body is to make “a recommendation to the Legislature based upon a finding of moral obligation, and the enactment process of passage of legislation authorizing payments of claims recommended by the court is at legislative discretion.” Id. (quoting W. Va. Code § 14-2- 28 (2014)). As we noted in Ladanye, “[o]ur State constitution provides sovereign immunity protections and does not allow for suits to be brought against the State. Id. at __, 836 S.E.2d at 76-77 (citing W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 35).

1 2014, decision, petitioners filed a claim against the West Virginia Division of Highways (“DOH”) alleging that the DOH was “responsible for the maintenance of the roadway and the culvert that abuts [petitioners’] property located” on Aracoma Road in Huntington, West Virginia, and that “runoff from Aracoma Road clogged or crushed a culvert which caused or contributed to damage to [petitioners’] [p]roperty.” Petitioners and the DOH reached a settlement in the amount of $85,000 in “a full and complete satisfaction of any and all past and future claims that [petitioners] may have against [the DOH] arising from the matters described in said claim.” Pursuant to the settlement, petitioners agreed that:

Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) of the settlement sum is expressly earmarked for [petitioners] to hire a contractor of their choosing to clear the culvert that abuts [petitioners’] [p]roperty and [petitioners] shall be solely responsible for directing such work and shall defend, protect, and indemnify [the DOH] from and against any such claims or liabilities arising from such work. [Petitioners] further agreed that the sum to be paid herein shall forever bar [petitioners] or any future owners of the [p]roperty from any claim against the [DOH] arising from the [d]amages as identified in the parties’ stipulation.

Based on the settlement of petitioner’s claim against the DOH, the Court of Claims recommended to the Legislature that it authorize an award of $85,000 to petitioners. As respondents’ fee, respondents received 40% of the $85,000 subsequently awarded to petitioners.

On March 3, 2017, petitioners filed the instant civil action against respondents in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, alleging that respondents breached a fiduciary duty that they owed to petitioners in settling petitioners’ claim against the DOH. Petitioner sought $400,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. On March 30, 2017, respondents filed a motion for a more definite statement, which was granted by an order entered on May 25, 2017. On June 22, 2017, petitioners filed a supplemental complaint specifically alleging that respondents failed to inform petitioners that the settlement with the DOH would bar future claims against the DOH regarding the culvert abutting their property. On July 13, 2017, respondents filed an answer. The parties disputed whether petitioners’ claim was for breach of a fiduciary duty or for legal malpractice.

Prior to trial, respondents challenged petitioners’ service of process on the individual respondents, prompting the circuit court to provide petitioners with additional time to complete service of process, and petitioners thereafter successfully served each respondent. On July 24, 2019, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil action, alleging that petitioners were engaging in serious litigation misconduct by threatening respondents, their attorneys, and potential witnesses. By order entered on September 5, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion.

The circuit court held the trial on September 4 and 5, 2019. After petitioners rested their case, respondents moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that no reasonable jury could find in petitioners’ favor based on the evidence they presented. After argument by the parties, the circuit court awarded judgment as a matter of law to respondents. By order entered on October 21, 2019, the circuit court found that petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to persuade a jury to find in petitioners’

2 favor because their evidence could not establish all of the elements of either a breach of fiduciary duty or a legal malpractice claim. On October 28, 2019, petitioners filed a motion for a new trial. By order entered on November 1, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion, thereby rejecting petitioners’ argument that they were not allowed to call all of the witnesses and introduce all of the documentary evidence that they wished to present during their case-in-chief.

Petitioners now appeal the circuit court’s October 21, 2019, and November 1, 2019, orders. We review the circuit court’s award of judgment as a matter of law to respondents pursuant to the following standard:

“‘The appellate standard of review for the granting of a motion for a [judgment as a matter of law] pursuant to Rule 50 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is de novo. On appeal, this court, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party, will sustain the granting of a [judgment as a matter of law] when only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict can be reached. But if reasonable minds could differ as to the importance and sufficiency of the evidence, a circuit court’s ruling granting a [judgment as a matter of law] will be reversed.’ Syllabus Point 3, Brannon v. Riffle, 197 W.Va. 97, 475 S.E.2d 97 (1996).” Syl. pt. 5, Smith v. First Community Bancshares, Inc., 212 W.Va. 809, 575 S.E.2d 419 (2002).[2] Syl. Pt. 1, Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 223 W. Va.

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Related

State v. LaRock
470 S.E.2d 613 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1996)
State Ex Rel. Peck v. Goshorn
249 S.E.2d 765 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1978)
Brannon v. Riffle
475 S.E.2d 97 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1996)
Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.
672 S.E.2d 345 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2009)
In Re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation
454 S.E.2d 413 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1995)
State v. Lilly
461 S.E.2d 101 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1995)
Simpson v. Stanton
193 S.E. 64 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1937)
Smith v. First Community Bancshares, Inc.
575 S.E.2d 419 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson v. Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings and Underwood Law Office, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-todd-hutchinson-and-jennifer-lynn-hutchinson-v-mark-forest-wva-2020.