Joseph Nicholas Ligidakis v. Unknown Warren, et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Joseph Nicholas Ligidakis, No. CV-25-00009-PHX-DLR (MTM)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Unknown Warren, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge 17 Eileen S. Willett (Doc. 17) regarding Plaintiff Joseph Nicholas Ligidakis’ motion to amend 18 the complaint (Doc. 11). The R&R recommends that the Court deny the motion. The 19 Magistrate Judge advised the parties that they had fourteen days from the date of service 20 of a copy of the R&R to file specific written objections with the Court. (Doc. 17 at 4.) 21 Movant filed an objection to the R&R on November 13, 2025 (Doc. 21), Defendants did 22 not file a reply. The Court has considered the objections and for the following reasons 23 sustains them in part and overrules them in part. 24 I. Background 25 This is a pro se civil rights action filed by an Arizona inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983. Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges that following his transfer to the Rynning 27 Unit in June 2024, Inmate J.M., who is seriously mentally ill and had previously assaulted 28 other inmates, was placed in his cell. Plaintiff further alleges that on September 10, 2024, 1 J.M. hit Plaintiff on the head with a metal immersion heater, causing serious injury to 2 Plaintiff’s eye, pulled one of Plaintiff’s fingers out of its socket, and bit Plaintiff. 3 Plaintiff brough suit in January 2025. (Doc. 1.) On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 4 1915A(a), the Court dismissed Counts II and IV without prejudice and dismissed 5 Defendants Unknown Correctional Officer, Unknown Correctional Officer III, Negron, 6 Unknown Deputy Warden, and Thornell without prejudice. The screening order required 7 Defendants Warren and Pomerantz to answer Counts I, III, and V. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff now 8 moves to amend the complaint (Doc. 11) and has lodged a proposed first amended 9 complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 12). The proposed FAC does not change Counts I and III but 10 adds defendants to Count V. (Doc. 11 at 2.) Additionally, the proposed FAC amends 11 Counts II and IV and adds Counts VI and VII. (Id.) The R&R recommends denying 12 Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 17 at 4) to which Plaintiff objects, arguing that the 13 amended counts should survive (Doc. 21 at 2, 5, 6). 14 II. Standard of Review 15 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), a party objecting to a 16 Magistrate Judge’s R&R must state “specific written objections to the proposed findings 17 and recommendations.” The Court must then “determine de novo any part of the magistrate 18 judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). General 19 objections are insufficient. “The Court is relieved of any obligation to review a general 20 objection to the R&R.” McDowell v. Richardson, No. CV-11-0716-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 21 393462, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2012); see also Martinez v. Shinn, No. CV-19-04481-PHX- 22 DGC-ESW, 2020 WL 6562342, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 2020) (“Because de novo review 23 of the entire R&R would defeat the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection 24 has the same effect as would a failure to object.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 25 omitted). 26 III. Discussion 27 A. Objection 1 28 Plaintiff’s first objection is to the R&R’s finding that Count II of Plaintiff’s 1 proposed FAC, an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, does not allege specific 2 facts showing that each named defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of 3 serious harm. (Doc. 21 at 2.) The R&R finds the FAC, like the original complaint, fails to 4 “allege specific facts to support that these Defendants (i) actually knew, or should have 5 known, any of these facts and (ii) had the authority to transfer J.M. elsewhere or had any 6 reason to believe that J.M. would assault Plaintiff.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) The Court disagrees 7 regarding one defendant. 8 “A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to 9 an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 10 “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 11 inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 12 excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 13 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 14 must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Liability may follow only if a prison official 15 “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by 16 failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. “[A]n official’s failure to 17 alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not . . . cannot under our 18 cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. 19 In Count II of the proposed FAC Plaintiff alleges that J.M. was placed in Plaintiff’s 20 cell after J.M had previously committed an unprovoked assault at another unit. (Doc. 12 at 21 8.) Plaintiff further alleges that J.M. had a history of mental illness and violence and was 22 designated seriously mentally ill. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that J.M. had a 23 classification score of 60/47 while Plaintiff only had a score of 30/19. (Id.) 24 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Warden Staci Ibarra “was responsible for the overall 25 safety and supervision of inmates and staff at Rynning Unit.” (Id. at 9.) Because all the 26 allegations taken together do not support that Ibarra knew of the risk J.M. posed and then 27 disregarded that risk, Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable Eighth Amendment failure-to- 28 protect claim against Ibarra. 1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Deputy Warden Romney “was responsible for 2 housing and classification dec[i]sions.” (Id.) This allegation asserts that Romney knew of 3 Plaintiff and J.M.’s respective classifications and the potential risks of housing them 4 together, and decided to house them together anyway. Thus, as to Romney, Plaintiff has 5 alleged a cognizable Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. 6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unknown COs John/Jane Doe “were officers on 7 duty at Rynning Unit on September 10, 2024, responsible for monitoring cells and 8 responding to call buttons.” (Id.) As best as the Court can tell, Plaintiff included these 9 defendants in relation to the allegation that he “pressed the emergency call button 10 repeatedly before officers opened the door allowing him to escape.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff 11 does not sufficiently allege that these defendants deliberately disregarded a risk by failing 12 to take reasonable measures and thus Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable Eighth 13 Amendment failure-to-protect claim against unknown COs John/Jane Doe. 14 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant CO II Smith “was responsible for housing inmates 15 at Rynning Unit.” (Id. at 9.) That Smith “was responsible for housing inmates” is vague 16 and does not provide enough to support that Smith had the necessary knowledge of any 17 substantial risk to Plaintiff. This stands in contrast to the allegations against Defendant 18 Romney, who Plaintiff alleged was responsible for both housing and classification and 19 responsible for the actual decision making. This is insufficient to allege a cognizable Eighth 20 Amendment failure-to-protect claim. 21 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Director Ryan Thornell “is responsible for 22 operations of state correctional institutions in Arizona.” (Id. at 9.) The proposed FAC 23 alleges no facts showing that Thornell knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious 24 harm to Plaintiff by housing him with J.M. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a 25 cognizable Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Thornell. 26 Plaintiff’s first objection is sustained in part and overruled in part. Count II may 27 proceed against Defendant Romney. 28 B. Objection 2 1 Plaintiff’s second objection is to the R&R’s finding that Count IV of Plaintiff’s 2 proposed FAC, a Fourteenth Amendment claim, is vague and conclusory. (Doc. 21 at 5.) 3 The R&R finds the allegations “vague and conclusory” because the proposed FAC “fails 4 to allege specific facts showing what each defendant knew about J.M.’s dangerousness or 5 what role each played in J.M.’s classification decisions.” (Doc. 17 at 3.) The Court 6 disagrees in part. 7 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s status as an inmate means that his claim necessarily 8 arises under the Eighth rather than Fourteenth Amendment. “Inmates who sue prison 9 officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under the Eighth Amendment’s 10 Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or, if not yet convicted, under the Fourteenth 11 Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Castro v. City of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067– 12 68 (9th Cir. 2016). And when “a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 13 provision, such as the . . . Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the 14 standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 15 process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (citing Graham v. Connor, 16 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)) The Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claim as stating a claim for 17 relief under the Eighth Amendment. Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 18 2017) (“A pro se complaint must be ‘liberally construed,’ since ‘a pro se complaint, 19 however clumsily pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 20 drafted by lawyers.’”) 21 As in Count II, Count IV of the proposed FAC alleges that Defendant Thornell was 22 “responsible for the operation of state correctional institutions in Arizona. (Doc. 12 at 15.) 23 Again, the proposed FAC alleges no facts showing that Thornell knew of and disregarded 24 a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff by housing him with J.M. and Plaintiff has 25 not alleged a cognizable claim against Thornell. 26 Plaintiff alleges that Central Classification Committee Members John/Jane Doe 27 “were responsible for approving housing and override decisions for inmates transferred to 28 Rynning Unit.” (Id.) It further alleges that these defendants overrode classification 1 recommendations to approve both Plaintiff’s and J.M.’s placement at Rynning. (Id.) Lastly, 2 Plaintiff alleges that these defendants knew that J.M was severely mentally ill and violent 3 and knew that Plaintiff was a lower custody inmate. (Id.) The allegations describe the role 4 that these defendants played and what they knew about Plaintiff and J.M. This is sufficient 5 to state a claim. 6 Plaintiff’s second objection to the R&R is sustained in part and overruled in part. 7 Count IV may proceed against Defendants Central Classification Committee Members 8 John/Jane Doe. 9 C. Objection 3 10 Plaintiff’s third and final objection is to the R&R’s finding that Counts VI and VII 11 of Plaintiff’s proposed FAC, Eighth Amendment claims, are vague and conclusory. (Doc. 12 21 at 6.) The R&R finds the proposed FAC “does not identify which specific conditions 13 violated the Constitution, which defendants were responsible for those conditions, or what 14 each defendant knew or did regarding the allegedly unconstitutional conditions.” (Doc. 17 15 at 3.) The Court agrees. These counts are vague, conclusory, and largely repetitive of facts 16 and claims contained elsewhere in the proposed FAC. Plaintiff’s third objection to the R&R 17 is overruled. 18 IV. Conclusion 19 The Court sustains Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R in part and overrules them in 20 part and so accepts in part and does not accept in part the R&R. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 21 motion to amend the complaint is granted in part and denied in part. The amended, now 22 operative, complaint stands as follows: Count I against Defendant Warren; Count II against 23 Defendant Romney; Count III against Defendant Pomerantz; Count IV against Defendants 24 Central Classification Committee Members John/Jane Doe; and Count V against 25 Defendant Warren. No other counts against no other defendants may proceed. 26 Defendant Romney must answer Count II. 27 Defendants Warren and Pomerantz previously filed an answer to Plaintiff’s 28 complaint. (Doc. 19.) Because the proposed FAC does not amend Counts I, III or V, the 1 || Court will not require Defendants Warren and Pomerantz to file another answer but rather 2|| will construe their existing answer as operative against the FAC. KST Data, Inc. v. DXC 3|| Technology Company, 980 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A defendant is not required to file a new answer to an amended complaint when the allegations in the amended complaint 5 || do not ‘change the theory or scope of the case.’” (quotation omitted)). Additionally, there 6 || are two dispositive motions pending before the Court: (1) Defendants’ motion for partial 7 || summary judgment (Doc. 29) and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 47). 8 || Because the proposed FAC does not amend the relevant counts, the Court will not require 9|| Defendants Warren and Pomerantz to refile these motions but rather will construe both as || operating against the FAC. See id. 11 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Objections (Doc. 21) to the R&R are SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part, and the R&R (Doc. 17) is 13 | ACCEPTED in part and NOT ACCEPTED in part 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (Doc. 11) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as explained herein. The Clerk of the Court is directed to file the document lodged at Doc. 12. 17 Dated this 13th day of May, 2026. 18 19 -

21 Do L. Rayes 0 Senior United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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