Joseph Maywood Scott v. Williams, et al.

Opinion

JOSEPH MAYWOOD SCOTT, Case No. 1:25-cv-01460-JLT-BAM (PC) Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR v. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE WILLIAMS, et al., TO PROSECUTE Defendants. (ECF No. 11) FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE I. Background Plaintiff Joseph Maywood Scott (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 9, 2026, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 11.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (Id.) The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to obey a court order, and failure to prosecute. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the Court, and the deadline to do so has expired. II. Failure to State a Claim A. Screening Requirement and Standard The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff is no longer in custody. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Wasco State Prison. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Warden Amber Williams and (2) Correctional Officer Manchuka (also spelled “Machuka”). Plaintiff asserts claims for denial of access to the courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and mail tampering. Plaintiff alleges that on December 19, 2024, between 1700 and 1900 hours, Plaintiff submitted legal mail under prison mail regulations to Correctional Officer Machuka, who placed the mail in the mail bag by regulations. Later, Plaintiff saw Correctional Officer Machuka remove mail from the mail bag. Plaintiff saw Correctional Officer Machuka throw his mail in the trash. He received confirmation from the facility mail room that no legal was posted by him on the date he mailed. Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance (Log #761948), which was granted, confirming his complaint October 6, 2025. He claims that his legal mail to the state court was removed and or/destroyed by a correctional prison officer delaying adjudication of his criminal offense. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages. C. Discussion Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983. Linkage Requirement The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately link Warden Williams to a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not allege that Warden Williams took any affirmative act, participated in another’s affirmative acts, or failed to perform any act that caused any deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Indeed, Plaintiff does not include Warden Williams in the factual allegations of his complaint. Supervisory Liability Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff may be attempting to impose supervisory liability on Warden Williams. However, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir.2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that Warden Williams participated in or directed a violation of Plaintiff’s rights, knew of a violation of Plaintiff’s rights and failed to act to prevent it, or implemented a policy so deficient that it was the moving force of any constitutional violation. Plaintiff alleges that mail incident resulted from the actions or omissions of Correctional Officer Machuka, not as a result of any prison policies or the actions of the Warden. As noted above, Plaintiff does not include Warden Williams in the factual allegations of his complaint. First Amendment - Mail Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Machuka tampered with his outgoing mail on one occasion. Prison inmates enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a temporary delay or isolated incident of mail interference is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999); Zaiza v. Tamplen, No. 2:15–cv–0447–KJM–EFB P, 2016 WL 2930877, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2016) (“An isolated incident of mail interference or tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Machuka interfered with Plaintiff’s outgoing mail on one occasion are not sufficient to state a cognizable claim. Access to Courts Plaintiff also appears to claim that Defendant Machuka’s alleged destruction of his legal mail resulted in delayed adjudication of his criminal offense. The Court construes these allegations as an access to court claim. However, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim. Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have recognized that prisoners’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the courts without undue interference extend beyond the pleading stages”), overruled on other grounds as stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). However, the right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. In order to state a claim for the denial of court access, a prisoner must establish that he suffered an actual injury. Id. at 349. “[A]ctual injury [is] actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the ability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3); Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff has not identified a criminal appeal, habeas petition or civil rights action connected to this claim. He also has not alleged any actual injury from the purported delay in adjudication of his criminal charge. There is nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint to suggest that he was convicted of any charge as the result of the delay or a missed filing deadline. III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order A. Legal Standard Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). A. Discussion Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s April 9, 2026 screening order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to obey a court order, and failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 11.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. IV. Conclusion and Recommendation The Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action. These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE