Joseph Markovits, Inc. v. United States

69 Cust. Ct. 214, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2454
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedDecember 19, 1972
DocketC.D. 4396
StatusPublished

This text of 69 Cust. Ct. 214 (Joseph Markovits, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Markovits, Inc. v. United States, 69 Cust. Ct. 214, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2454 (cusc 1972).

Opinion

Watson, Judge:

This protest places in issue the tariff classification of certain imported artificial fern leaves and bananas. The importations were classified pursuant to item 748.20 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, as modified by T.D. 68-9, as “ [artificial flowers * * * foliage, fruits * * * parts of the foregoing * * * [w] holly or almost wholly of plastics,” and assessed with duty at the rate of 26% per centum ad valorem. Plaintiff claims classification under item 774.60 of the TSUS, as modified by T.D. 68-9, as other articles not specially provided for, of rubber or plastics, dutiable at the rate of 15 per centum ad valorem.

The issue in this case has been confined to a single question regarding an “exclusion within an exclusion.”1 The headnote to subpart B of schedule 7, part 7, specifies certain articles which are to be excluded from the coverage of the provisions for artificial flowers (items 748.20 and 748.21). The language of this exclusionary headnote is as follows :

Subpart B headnotes:

1. The provisions of items 748.20 and 748.21 do not include—
(i) articles wholly or almost wholly of glass or ceramics;
(ii) articles (other than individual parts, such as pistils, stamens, ovaries, petals, calyxes, leaves, and flower heads, fruits, or vegetables without stems and foliage) which have been obtained in one piece from stone, metal, wood, or other material by molding, stamping, carving, forging, or other process;
[216]*216(iii) articles consisting of parts assembled otherwise than by binding with flexible materials such as wire, paper, textile materials, or foil, or by gluing, or by similar methods; or
(iv) headwear (see part 1 of this schedule).

Plaintiff, seeking to escape the coverage of the artificial flowers provision, claims the benefit of the exclusion set out in headnote 1 (ii), on the ground that the importations are “articles * * * which have been obtained in one piece from * * * other material by molding * * * ”

Defendant defends the classification in the artificial flowers provision on the ground that the importations are not within the scope of the exclusion contending they are “individual parts, such as * * * leaves, and * * * fruits * * * without stems and foliage * *

Plaintiff responds that the “individual parts” referred to are parts in the sense of components of a more complex article, something which the importations, by stipulation, are not. Defendant maintains that the phrase “individual parts” refers to parts in the botanical sense in which sense it would, under the stipulated facts, describe the importations.

The issue in this case therefore resolves itself into a question of the meaning of the phrase “individual parts” as used in the headnote under discussion. If it means parts in the sense of components, it does not describe the importations, which importations will therefore be excluded from the coverage of the artificial flowers provision. If, however, the phrase “individual parts” means botanical parts, it describes the importations and works to retain them within the scope of the artificial flowers provision, as classified.

When examined in isolation, the meaning of headnote 1 (ii) is not clear. On the one hand there is a tendency to read the word “parts” as it is read in numerous provisions of the tariff schedules, as defined in General Interpretative Eule 10(ij) as covering a product chiefly used as part of an article. On the other hand there are aspects of this headnote which appear to be at odds with such a routine reading. First, the word “parts” is preceded by the adjective “individual” which is an uncommon qualification. Second, the phrase “individual parts” is followed by an extensive listing of examples.2 These two considerations may lend support to the defendant’s position that “parts” is being used herein in the botanical sense of the examples given.

[217]*217When we enlarge our field of view to cover the entire headnote, there are still no specific indications of a legislative pattern which will clarify the parenthetical exception in headnote l(ii). However, at t.biH stage there does seem to emerge in the headnote an overall concern for materials and methods of manufacture and assembly which seems out of phase with a parenthetical exception confined to parts in their scientific, botanical sense.

Finally, in order to settle the confusion arising from this headnote and the ambiguity in the word “parts”, it is necessary to examine the legislative history of this provision, an examination I believe leads to considerable clarification of this headnote.

The Tariff Classification Study, prepared by the Tariff Commission for Congress as an aid in the revision of the tariff laws, gave close attention to the problems of classifying artificial flowers and related articles under paragraph 1518 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In its explanatory notes to the recommended new provisions, the Tariff Commission stated as follows at page 355:

It is believed that the primary coverage intended for these provisions in paragraph 1518 is with respect to those articles which at one time were chiefly the product of a handcraft industry and which are made by assembling individual parts, such as petals,_ pistils, and leaves, by binding with flexible material such as wire, paper, textile material, or foil, or by gluing or similar methods. In order to cut the knot of confusing tariff provisions now existí rig in paragraph 1518, the scope of the proposed provisions in this subpart is so limited. To this purpose, headnote 1 of this subpart excludes from the new provision—
(&) articles wholly or almost wholly of glass or ceramics,
(b) all articles which have been obtained m one piece from stone, metal, wood, or other material by molding, stamping, carving, forging, or other process,
(c) all articles consisting of parts assembled otherwise than by the manner described above, and
(d) headwear.
These categories of excluded articles cover a large part of the products which have produced classification problems under the present provisions. The Commission feels they are more appropriately classified in other parts of the schedules. [Emphasis supplied.]

It is my opinion that this crucial piece of legislative history clarifies both the unifying intention underlying the headnote and the mp.a.ning and source of the parenthetical phrase dealing with “individual parts”. The provision for artificial flowers must be viewed as centering on the coverage of those products which are made by the assembly of parts by binding, gluing or similar methods. The headnote is designed to effectuate this coverage by excluding products [218]*218made in other manners. Headnote 1 (ii) is accordingly directed to the exclusion of articles made in one piece. However, there is a clear danger of internal contradiction here absent the parenthetical phrase, since headnote 1 (ii) could, if read literally, cover parts of articles assembled by binding, etc., if those parts happen to be obtained in one piece from the indicated materials and by the named processes.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
69 Cust. Ct. 214, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-markovits-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1972.