Joseph Manuel Uresti v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 31, 2010
• Docket: 01-09-00977-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion to: SR TJ EVK ERA GCH LCH JB JS MM TGT

Opinion issued August 31, 2010                                                    

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-09-00977-CR

Joseph Manuel Uresti, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 351st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1166730

MEMORANDUM opinion

Appellant, Joseph Manuel Uresti, was convicted by a jury of failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements[1] and the jury assessed his punishment at five years imprisonment and a fine of five thousand dollars.  In two points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.  We affirm.

BACKGROUND

          On January 8, 2004, Officer Kimberly Fredrickson (Houston Police Department) met with appellant and informed him that following his release on parole,[2] he would have to register as a sexual offender once per year within thirty days of his birthday, as well as within seven days of changing his address.  At this initial meeting, appellant was told that the registration requirement commenced upon his release from prison and ended when he discharged his parole.

          Thereafter, appellant registered with Fredrickson six more times prior to the discharge of his parole, and in all but the final meeting, Officer Fredrickson confirmed appellant’s belief that the requirement to register would expire when he discharged his parole on April 7, 2007.  In their final pre-discharge meeting in October 2006, however, Officer Fredrickson explained that, due to a change in the law, appellant now had to register for life “pending a change in legislation,” and appellant signed a form by which he acknowledged his obligation to register for life.  In a March 2007 telephone conversation, Officer Fredrickson confirmed to appellant that nothing had changed and she reiterated that appellant was obligated to register for life.  Disturbed by the answer, appellant vowed a court challenge to the requirement that he register for life.  Appellant discharged his parole on April 7, 2007.

          Appellant and Officer Fredrickson met next on June 12, 2007, for their annual meeting.  Appellant registered his residence address as the same he used on his October 25, 2006 report.  This was the final registration meeting between appellant and Officer Fredrickson.

          On August 20, 2007, appellant contacted Sergeant G.D. Kuschel, the supervisor of the sex offender registration program, to inform him of appellant’s plans to move to a new address.  Appellant again stated his belief that his duty to register was set to soon expire, and the sergeant informed him of the lifetime registration requirement.  Following an investigation, Sergeant Kuschel discovered that appellant had already changed his address with both his employer and the U.S. Postal Service more than a month earlier, on June 24 and June 26, respectively, and that the lease agreement for appellant’s new apartment became effective on June 20, 2007.  Under cross examination at trial, appellant testified that he knew that he “was supposed to” register his new address in person and that he had “never not wanted to” comply with registration requirements but that registering was “not on [his] mind” because “there was a lot in [his] life at that time,” referring to his daughter’s prosecution for juvenile offenses.  Appellant testified that based upon his discussions with Officer Fredrickson, he expected a change in the registration law on September 1, 2007 that would obviated his need for registration and that the requirements would no longer apply to him.

          Due to appellant’s failure to properly register, the State charged appellant with failure to comply with the Texas Penal Code’s sex offender registration requirements on March 13, 2008.  After hearing testimony from appellant, appellant’s wife, Officer Fredrickson, Sergeant Kuschel, and others, the jury convicted appellant and assessed his punishment at five years imprisonment and a fine of five thousand dollars.  This appeal followed.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

In two points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.  Specifically, appellant contends that the undisputed evidence presented at trial is legally insufficient because it cannot establish the applicable culpable mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that he intentionally or knowingly failed to timely register his new address as required by the statute.  Appellant also contends that the evidence establishing mens rea is factually insufficient because the evidence is so weak as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.

When assessing the legal sufficiency of evidence we must consider the entire trial record to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed all essential elements of the offense.  See Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 861–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).  In so doing, we give deference to the fact-finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts.  Young, 283 S.W.3d at 861–62.  We determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable by considering the cumulative evidence, both direct and circumstantial.  Id. 

In reviewing the evidence on factual sufficiency grounds, following a neutral review of all the evidence, we will set aside the verdict only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  Under the first prong of Johnson, we cannot conclude that a conviction is “clearly wrong” or “manifestly unjust” simply because, on the quantum of evidence admitted, we would have voted to acquit had we been on the jury.  Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

The requisite culpable mental state of the offense charged was intentional or knowing breach of duty to register.[3]  The establishment of a culpable mental state is almost invariably grounded upon inferences to be drawn by the finder of fact from the attendant circumstances.  See Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).  The pertinent, attendant circumstances in this case are not in dispute.  Appellant testified that he fully complied with the statutory registration requirements between January 2004 and June 12, 2007.  Both appellant and Officer Fredrickson testified that the officer informed him prior to the discharge of his parole that he was required to register for life, pending any changes in legislation.  Appellant also testified that he appeared in person for his annual registration meeting on June 12, 2007—more than two months after he discharged his parole and approximately two weeks before he moved to a new address.  Although he knew that he “was supposed to” register his new address in person, appellant testified that he had certain family obligations and registering was “not on [his] mind” when he moved in late June 2007.  He also testified that he voluntarily reported a change of address on August 20, 2007 to the authorities. 

It is the factfinder’s role to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from “basic facts to ultimate facts,” Frost v. State, 2 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d), and it may accept one version of the facts and reject another.  Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).  The jury, as the fact finder in this case, apparently inferred from the circumstances that the appellant had the requisite mental culpability.  In drawing such necessary and reasonable inferences from the facts with respect to the required mental state of intent or knowledge, the jury acted well within its discretion to resolve any conflict of fact, to weigh any evidence, and to evaluate the credibility of any witnesses.  See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

Viewing the evidence cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably inferred that appellant had breached his duty to register with the required mental state of intent or knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even in considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the evidence was not so weak nor so outweighed by the great weight of contrary evidence as to make the verdict seem clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.  Thus, the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict.  Accordingly, we overrule points of error one and two.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          Jim Sharp

                                                          Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack, and Justices Bland and Sharp.

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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[1]           See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(2) (Vernon 2006).

[2]           On March 15, 1977, appellant was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to not less than five but not more than thirty-five years in prison.  Appellant was released in 1989 after serving almost twelve years of his sentence.  He returned to prison after he was subsequently convicted of another, unrelated crime in 1997.  Appellant was released on parole in late 2003.

[3]           See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a) (Vernon 2006) (definition of failure to register as sex offender does not specify culpable mental state); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02(b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (when definition is silent, culpable mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness is required, unless definition dispenses with any mental element); Reyes v. State, 96 S.W.3d 603, 605 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (stating that sex offender registry statute requires culpable mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a)-(b) (Vernon 2002) (defining culpable mental states of intent and knowledge).