Joseph Luis Levin v. Warden, Columbia Correctional Institution – Annex

• Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01490
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOSEPH LUIS LEVIN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-1490-JEP-LLL

WARDEN, COLUMBIA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION – ANNEX,

Respondent. _______________________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case by filing a document titled “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Doc. 1), alleging he is being illegally detained. He moves to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). In his Petition, Petitioner explains that he originally was sentenced in 2015, but on September 26, 2023, the state court resentenced him, increasing his probationary period. See Doc. 1 at 2, 4. He acknowledges he previously challenged his judgment of conviction through a habeas corpus action under § 2254 but says his “resentencing constitutes a new factual predicate,” making relief under § 2254 “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Id. at 3–5 (citing § 2255’s “saving clause” as discussed in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999)). As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner’s reliance on § 2255’s “saving clause” is misplaced. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). “The saving clause

provides a federal prisoner relief . . . when his remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective . . . .” McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.- Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1085 (11th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner is a state prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. As such, he is subject to the restrictions governing petitions filed under § 2254. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003). Among those restrictions is a bar against filing a second or successive habeas

petition without first obtaining authorization from the appellate court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (requiring a petitioner to “move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider” the filing of “a second or successive application” under § 2254). See also Insignares v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that “[s]ubject to [certain] exceptions[,] . . . a district judge lacks jurisdiction to decide a second or successive petition filed without [the Eleventh Circuit’s] authorization”). Petitioner may not circumvent the restrictions governing the filing of

second or successive habeas petitions by filing his Petition under § 2241 because a state prisoner who files a habeas petition under § 2241 challenging 2 his state court judgment of conviction “is subject to the bar on second and successive petitions contained in § 2244(b).” Johnson v. Warden, Ga.

Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 805 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[The] requirement [set forth in § 2244(b)(3)(A)] cannot be evaded by characterizing the petition as one filed under § 2241 instead of § 2254.”). See also Medberry, 351 F.3d at 1060 (explaining that both §§ 2241 and 2254

“govern[] a single post-conviction remedy, with the § 2254 requirements applying to petitions brought by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”). Petitioner does not allege or demonstrate that he has obtained the

required authorization from the Eleventh Circuit to proceed on a second or successive habeas petition. See § 2244(b)(3)(A). Indeed, a review of the Eleventh Circuit docket shows that, on November 3, 2025, that court dismissed in part and denied in part Petitioner’s motion for leave to file a successive

petition for habeas corpus. See In re Levin, No. 25-13632 (11th Cir.). To the extent Petitioner implies his petition is not second or successive because the state court resentenced him and entered a new judgment, this Court has already considered and rejected this argument. See Case. No. 3:24-cv-1282-

MMH-LLL (Doc. 3).

3 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. 2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on December 11, 2025.

□ JORDAN E. PRATT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jax-6 C: Joseph Luis Levin