Joseph Lewis Gibson v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida

Fifth Circuit

Joseph Lewis Gibson v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida

423 F.2d 1110, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10058

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMarch 31, 1970

Docket28037

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 423 F.2d 1110 (Joseph Lewis Gibson v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Joseph Lewis Gibson v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, 423 F.2d 1110, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10058 (5th Cir. 1970).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The respondent in the habeas corpus proceeding below appeals from the district court’s grant of petition. The petitioner-appellee plead guilty to murder in the second degree after having first plead not guilty to the indictment charging murder in the first degree. He received a life sentence to the state penitentiary on October 13, 1958.

The basis for the district court’s granting of the writ was its determination that the plea of guilt was coerced and was not voluntarily and understanding^ entered, principally upon Gibson’s testimony that his attorney (now dead) told him that he had talked with the trial judge and been assured that Gibson would be sentenced to twenty years confinement if he plead guilty. Gibson further said that his attorney warned him that if he did not plead guilty he likely would be sentenced to the electric chair. With the court reporter’s transcript of what occurred at the change of plea proceedings unavailable, and with an affidavit from the trial judge that he did not recall whether or not he gave Gibson any warning or whether or not he explored the voluntariness of the guilty plea, the trial judge made a permissible credibility determination that he would accept Gibson’s account of what occurred. We cannot conclude that this credibility choice, under these circumstances, was “clearly erroneous”. See Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.

The district court’s order further directed that Gibson either be retried within 120 days or released from custody. The respondent-appellant urges that we set aside this provision as improper. See Wainwright v. Simpson, 5 Cir. 1966, 360 F.2d 307. Inasmuch as a panel of this Court, shortly after this appeal was taken, stayed that portion of the district court’s order pending appeal, so that the state will have 120 days after our mandate comes down in which to decide whether to retry Gibson or release him, we do not find it necessary to pass upon this contention.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

The respondent in the habeas corpus proceeding below appeals from the district court’s grant of petition. The petitioner-appellee plead guilty to murder in the second degree after having first plead not guilty to the indictment charging murder in the first degree. He received a life sentence to the state penitentiary on October 13, 1958.

The basis for the district court’s granting of the writ was its determination that the plea of guilt was coerced and was not voluntarily and understanding^ entered, principally upon Gibson’s testimony that his attorney (now dead) told him that he had talked with the trial judge and been assured that Gibson would be sentenced to twenty years confinement if he plead guilty. Gibson further said that his attorney warned him that if he did not plead guilty he likely would be sentenced to the electric chair. With the court reporter’s transcript of what occurred at the change of plea proceedings unavailable, and with an affidavit from the trial judge that he did not recall whether or not he gave Gibson any warning or whether or not he explored the voluntariness of the guilty plea, the trial judge made a permissible credibility determination that he would accept Gibson’s account of what occurred. We cannot conclude that this credibility choice, under these circumstances, was “clearly erroneous”. See Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.

The district court’s order further directed that Gibson either be retried within 120 days or released from custody. The respondent-appellant urges that we set aside this provision as improper. See Wainwright v. Simpson, 5 Cir. 1966, 360 F.2d 307. Inasmuch as a panel of this Court, shortly after this appeal was taken, stayed that portion of the district court’s order pending appeal, so that the state will have 120 days after our mandate comes down in which to decide whether to retry Gibson or release him, we do not find it necessary to pass upon this contention.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

423 F.2d 1110, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10058, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-lewis-gibson-v-louie-l-wainwright-director-division-of-ca5-1970.

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