Joseph Lawson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0745
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0745-MR

JOSEPH LAWSON APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00006

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Joseph Lawson (“Lawson”) appeals a circuit court

order denying his motion to quash a show cause hearing for restitution after he

completed his sentence. After review, we affirm the Washington Circuit Court.

BACKGROUND

Joseph Lawson broke a window, unlawfully entered the home of his

former girlfriend, Katherine Hanson (“Hanson”), and caused extensive damage to

her car. On April 26, 2023, he pled guilty to first-degree criminal mischief and criminal trespass. In accordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced to one

year in prison, probated for three years. The judgment and sentence also imposed

an obligation upon him to pay $1,575.00 in restitution to Hanson at a rate of

$200.00 per month and to have no contact with Hanson. The circuit court

discussed these and other conditions of the sentence with Lawson and advised him

that restitution payments would be required to begin on June 1, 2023, and continue

until the total amount was paid, with a review date scheduled in July 2023.

In August 2023, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Lawson’s

probation, alleging he had failed to report to his probation officer; failed to appear

in court in July 2023; and failed to make the restitution payments as ordered to

Hanson. He was in custody on another charge (although that predated his

probation case). At the revocation hearing in November 2023, taking into account

his credit for time previously served, Lawson agreed to stipulate to the violations

and to serve the remainder of his sentence. At this hearing, the court reiterated the

violations and confirmed Lawson’s stipulation to having his probation revoked for

absconding and for not paying restitution. The court again advised Lawson that he

would still be responsible for restitution once he had served his sentence.

Based upon Lawson’s time previously served, it was anticipated that

he would be released in late April or early May 2024. The circuit court set the

matter for a status hearing on May 22, 2024 to review and then determine his

-2- ability to pay once he was released. If still incarcerated, the court explained, the

matter would be continued for another six months. Lawson did not object to this

review of his continuing restitution obligation.

Six months later, just prior to the review date, counsel for Lawson

filed a motion to quash the show cause order for the hearing in May. Counsel

submitted documentation that Lawson had been “administratively released” from

his one-year sentence on May 1, 2024. In the motion, Lawson argued the circuit

court had lost jurisdiction to continue the restitution obligation “because his

previously suspended one (1) year sentence ha[d] been revoked. [And,] [p]ayment

of restitution was an express condition of his sentence remaining suspended.”

Further, he argued, “[b]ecause Mr. Lawson [was] no longer on probation, and

because his sentence [was] no longer suspended, there [was] nothing else for [the]

Court to revoke.” Finally, he concluded that because his “probation ha[d] been

revoked, he ha[d] been sentenced to serve his one (1) year sentence, and there

[was] no applicable statute which extend[ed] [the] Court’s jurisdiction[.]”

At the hearing on May 22, 2024, it was apparent that Lawson

remained incarcerated, although now on other charges. The circuit court denied

Lawson’s motion, stating that it disagreed with his interpretation of the law and

concluding that it still had jurisdiction to enforce restitution. However, Lawson

-3- could not pay while still incarcerated, and the case was set for review again on

May 21, 2025. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In his appeal brief, Lawson does not refer us to any case law, but

instead relies solely upon Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 532.032 and

532.033 (Kentucky’s general restitution statutes) and KRS 533.020 to argue the

circuit court could not enforce the restitution order after he completed his

incarceration. Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo.

Jefferson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ. v. Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Ky. 2012) (citation

omitted). “[T]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what

the legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its

interpretation on any other method or source.” Maysey v. Express Servs., Inc., 620

S.W.3d 63, 71 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d

644, 648 (Ky. 2017)).

This Court has stated that KRS 532.032 is the generally applicable

restitution statute. Fields v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Ky. App.

2003). Restitution is not an additional punishment, but rather “a system designed

to restore property or the value thereof to the victim.” Vaughn v. Commonwealth,

371 S.W.3d 784, 785 (Ky. App. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bailey, 721

S.W.2d 706, 707 (Ky. 1986)).

-4- KRS 532.032 mandated an award of restitution in this case.

(1) Restitution to a named victim, if there is a named victim, shall be ordered . . . in addition to any other part of the penalty for any offense under this chapter. The provisions of this section shall not be subject to suspension or nonimposition.

...

(3) If probation, shock probation, conditional discharge, or other alternative sentence is granted, restitution shall be a condition of the sentence.

(4) If a person is sentenced to incarceration and paroled, restitution shall be made a condition of parole.

(Emphasis added.)

Then, when a judge orders restitution, KRS 532.033 states, in relevant

part, that the judge shall:

(1) Order the restitution to be paid to a specific person or organization through the circuit clerk, who shall disburse the moneys as ordered by the court;

(3) Set the amount of restitution to be paid;

(4) Set the amount and frequency of each restitution payment or require the payment to be made in a lump sum;

. . . and

(8) Not release the defendant from probation supervision until restitution has been paid in full and all other aspects of the probation order have been successfully completed.

-5- Commonwealth v. Adams, 566 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Ky. App. 2018). Finally, KRS

533.030(3) provides that when there is a named victim who has suffered monetary

damages, the circuit court must order restitution “in addition to any other penalty

provided for the commission of the offense.”

Here, the circuit court complied with all the due process requirements

of KRS 532.033, providing the details for payments to Hanson. Lawson agreed to

these terms as part of his plea agreement. As noted above, KRS 532.033 requires

the court to perform monitoring to ensure that payments are occurring; to hold a

hearing if restitution is not being paid; and finally, to not release the defendant

from probation until restitution is paid in full. KRS 532.033(5)-(8). In this case,

the court followed those steps, until Lawson absconded, failed to pay, and

stipulated to revocation of his probation.

He now argues that the restitution obligation was only a condition of

his probation, and once his probation was revoked, the restitution component of his

judgment and sentence was also terminated. Lawson claims that pursuant to KRS

533.020(4) the trial court was required to issue “a separate restitution order”

and extend his probationary period to enforce payment of his restitution obligation.

We disagree.

KRS 533.020(4) states:

The period of probation . . . shall be fixed by the court and at any time may be extended or shortened by duly entered

-6- court order or as modified by the Department of Corrections through the application of probation program credits under KRS 439.268. . . . Upon completion of the probationary period . . . the defendant shall be deemed finally discharged, provided no warrant issued by the court is pending against him, and probation . . . has not been revoked.

(Emphasis added.) KRS 533.020(4) does not “deem[] [a defendant] finally

discharged” when probation is revoked, as happened here. KRS 533.020(4)

provides that for a probationer to be finally discharged, two condition precedents

must occur. There can be no pending warrant against the probationer, and the

probation must not have been previously revoked. Whitcomb v. Commonwealth,

424 S.W.3d 417 (Ky. 2014). Therefore, the procedures of KRS 533.020(4) do not

apply to this case.1

1 Unlike Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 S.W.3d 606 (Ky. 2013), the circuit court timely revoked Lawson’s probation. In Wright, “six days after the expiration of Wright’s probationary period, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke Wright’s probation based upon his failure to pay restitution.” Id. at 608. The issue was whether KRS 533.020 and/or KRS 532.033(8) automatically extended or enlarged the probationary period, when a probationer failed to pay his restitution obligation before his probationary period expired; thus, allowing a court to revoke probation due to failure to pay restitution, even after the probationary period had elapsed. Id. at 609-614. In Wright, the circuit court, this Court, and our Supreme Court answered that question with a resounding no. Id. at 608. KRS 533.020(4) is inoperative in this case because the circuit court timely revoked Lawson’s probation and ordered him to serve out his one-year sentence of incarceration. Thus, Lawson did not “complet[e] [his] probationary period . . . [to] be deemed finally discharged[.]” See KRS 533.020(4). Accordingly, the circuit court had no need to extend Lawson’s probationary period. Likewise, our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Ellery, No. 2023-SC-0228-DG, 2025 WL 1197837 (Ky. Apr. 24, 2025), is distinguishable. In Ellery, the majority held that the circuit court failed to “enter an order extending Ellery’s probation under KRS 533.020(4),” and subsequently lost jurisdiction pursuant to that statute. Id. As we have stated, here, upon the timely revocation of Lawson’s probation, KRS 533.020(4) no longer applied.

-7- Lawson appears to argue that because KRS 532.032(2)-(4) makes

restitution a mandatory condition of continuing to serve an alternative sentence to

incarceration, the inverse must be true. That is to say, Lawson believes that his

restitution obligation is dependent on him remaining on probation. However,

while KRS 532.032(2)-(4) requires an individual serving a sentence other than

incarceration – such as probation – to comply with a restitution order, the statute

does not make compliance with a restitution order dependent on serving the

alternate sentence. We will not deviate from the plain language of KRS 532.032 to

add such a requirement. See Maysey, 620 S.W.3d at 71 (Ky. 2021) (quoting

Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d at 648). Although Lawson’s probation was in part

contingent on paying restitution, paying restitution was not contingent on him

remaining on probation.

Our statutes do not preclude restitution from being ordered by the trial

court “when a defendant is also ordered to serve a term of imprisonment.”

Commonwealth v. O’Bryan, 97 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Ky. 2003).

[W]e opine that it is not only logical but it is consistent with the statutory scheme to read KRS 532.032(1) as requiring both payment of restitution and imprisonment. KRS 532.032(2), (3) and (4) cover all of the possible sentencing scenarios other than a defendant being required to serve the prison sentence. Thus, KRS 532.032(1) can reasonably be interpreted to apply to the defendant who must serve the prison sentence. Consequently, we hold that the language of KRS 532.032(1) which states that “[r]estitution . . . shall be ordered . . . in addition to any

-8- other part of the penalty . . .” requires the trial court to order payment of restitution to the named victim even if imprisonment is also ordered.

O’Bryan, 97 S.W.3d at 457; see also Bailey, 721 S.W.2d at 707 (“It would be an

anomaly to permit restitution to a victim as a part of the probation process of a first

offender, which is recognized as available, and then to deny such restitution when

the criminal, because of his own conduct, is ineligible for probation.”).

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated that a “trial court retains subject-matter

jurisdiction over restitution after entry of the final judgment.” Commonwealth v.

Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 725 (Ky. 2013). In Steadman, “restitution was raised

as part of the criminal sentence, and as such was subject to all the time limits that

affect the sentence.” Id. The same is true here.2

Lawson argues that his restitution obligation was only a condition of

his probation and “once his probation was terminated, the restitution component of

the judgment was also terminated[,]” but we do not agree. To interpret a trial

court’s order, “we apply substantially the same principles of construction as we do

2 Lawson argues vaguely that the trial court “lost jurisdiction” to continue monitoring restitution. If Lawson is challenging subject matter jurisdiction (the court’s authority to determine ‘this kind of case’), that argument fails because a trial court retains subject matter jurisdiction over restitution after entry of the final judgment for a felony offence. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d at 725. If Lawson is challenging the court’s jurisdiction of the particular case (a court’s power to affect its own judgment within ten days of entry), that argument fails as well because he did not challenge the judgment itself (and the restitution obligation within it) within ten days. See Steadman, at 721, 725. (“[A] trial court loses jurisdiction of a case ten days after entry of a final order or judgment.” And, when “restitution was raised as part of the criminal sentence, . . . [it] was subject to all the time limits that affect the sentence.”).

-9- in interpreting statutes[,]” i.e., “where the language of the order is clear and

unambiguous, we will construe the order according to its plain terms.” Wright,

415 S.W.3d at 609 n.2 (quoting Crouch v. Crouch, 201 S.W.3d 463, 465-66 (Ky.

2006)). Here, the trial court’s order is clear and unambiguous.

In the judgment and sentence, the court sentenced Lawson to

restitution and imprisonment. The judgment and sentence states that Lawson was

sentenced to: (1) pay $1,575 in restitution, (2) begin restitution payments on

June 1, 2023 in the amount of $200 per month; (3) pay through the circuit court

clerk with the 5% service fee; and (4) serve a maximum term of one year

imprisonment, probated for three years. Clearly, restitution and incarceration are

separate and distinct aspects of his sentence. True, the judgment states that

Lawson “shall not be released from probation supervision until restitution has

been paid in full[,]” but that does not negate the fact that the restitution was also an

independent, explicit part of Lawson’s sentence.

Further, the judgment and sentence met the statutory requirements for

an order of restitution and, thus, became a valid restitution order. See KRS

532.033.3 As noted above, KRS 532.033 requires the court to perform monitoring

3 We note, for distinction, Rollins v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. App. 2009). In Rollins, the plea agreement and judgment mentioned restitution, but the judgment and sentence never determined the amount of restitution or otherwise established a valid restitution order. Id. at 464-66. The Commonwealth waited seven years, “once Rollins had ‘served out’ his sentence, . . . [to] file[] a motion to establish the amount of damages.” Id. at 464. By that time, “there [was] no applicable statute which would have extended jurisdiction to the court[.]” Id. at 466.

-10- to ensure that payments are occurring; to hold a hearing if restitution is not being

paid; and finally, to not release the defendant from probation until restitution is

paid in full. KRS 532.033(5)-(8). In this case, the court followed those steps until

Lawson absconded, failed to pay, and stipulated to revocation of his probation.

Moreover, Lawson’s judgment and sentence were a result of a plea

deal, in essence, a contract with mutually agreed-upon, enforceable promises. See

Commonwealth v. Morseman, 379 S.W.3d 144, 149-50 (Ky. 2012). Further, the

court verbally informed Lawson of his continued, mandatory restitution

requirement – without his objection – at his sentencing, probation revocation

hearing, and the May 22 status hearing. Essentially, Lawson is now contesting an

aspect of his plea deal/sentence that he previously agreed to and repeatedly,

subsequently acknowledged. Simply, he is not arguing he did not agree to

restitution, but only that he should not be held to his agreement (and judgment and

sentence) because he fulfilled one of the two terms of his sentence. We do not find

this “I changed my mind” argument to be persuasive.

The judgment and sentence explicitly provided that Lawson would not

be released from supervision “until restitution was paid in full” and all other

aspects of probation were completed. He then violated his probation, stipulated

Here, the circuit court’s original judgment and sentence satisfied the requirements of KRS 532.033 and established a valid restitution order.

-11- that he had done so, and agreed to serve his sentence. The circuit court

emphasized and wrote on the docket sheet from the hearing that a restitution

hearing would occur upon completion of the sentence. All of this took place

within the probationary period and within the trial court’s jurisdiction. By serving

his time, after violating his probation, Lawson completed only part of the total

sentence given by the circuit court. Therefore, we find no error.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Washington Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jennifer Wade Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Stephanie L. McKeehan Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-12-