Joseph Ku v. State Farm General Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedFebruary 26, 2024
Docket8:24-cv-00370
StatusUnknown

This text of Joseph Ku v. State Farm General Insurance Company (Joseph Ku v. State Farm General Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Ku v. State Farm General Insurance Company, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:24-CV-00370-DOC-JDEx Date: February 26, 2024

Title: JOSEPH KU V. STATE FARM GENERAL INS. CO.

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE

Karlen Dubon Not Present Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT: None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING CASE TO ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

The Court hereby REMANDS this case to Orange County Superior Court.

I. Background

In 2022, Plaintiff Joseph Ku discovered water damage behind the refrigerator in his home. Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 1-2) ¶ 10. He made a claim against his home insurance carrier, Defendant State Farm, but Defendant determined that the damage was not covered by his policy and denied coverage. Id. ¶ 11. After State Farm denied coverage, Plaintiff incurred $32,400 in out-of-pocket expenses to remedy the water damage. Id. ¶ 12.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Orange County Superior Court to recover the benefits allegedly due under the policy. Defendant then removed this case to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. See generally Notice of Removal (Dkt. 1-1). II. Legal Standard “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

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from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This statute “is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” and the party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Federal diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).

Generally, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2008). If the complaint affirmatively alleges an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, the jurisdictional requirement is “presumptively satisfied.” Id. A plaintiff who then tries to defeat removal must prove to a “legal certainty” that a recovery of more than $75,000 is impossible. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); Crum v. Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). This framework applies equally to situations where the complaint leaves the amount in controversy unclear or ambiguous. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1996).

A removing defendant “may not meet [its] burden by simply reciting some ‘magical incantation’ to the effect that ‘the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of [$75,000],’ but instead, must set forth in the removal petition the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992)). If the plaintiff has not clearly or unambiguously alleged $75,000 in its complaint or has affirmatively alleged an amount less than $75,000 CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

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in its complaint, the burden lies with the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699.

While the defendant must “set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum,” the standard is not so taxing so as to require the defendant to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages.” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (emphases added). In short, the defendant must show that it is “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. Id. Summary judgment-type evidence may be used to substantiate this showing. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2003); Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, defendants may make mathematical calculations using reasonable averages of hourly, monthly, and annual incomes of comparable employees when assessing the amount in controversy in a wrongful termination suit. Coleman, 730 F. Supp. 2d. at 1148–49.

If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action it takes is ultra vires and void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101–02 (1998). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either the parties or the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

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Related

Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka
599 F.3d 1102 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.
303 U.S. 283 (Supreme Court, 1938)
Gonzalez v. Crosby
545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
545 U.S. 546 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.
506 F.3d 696 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Richmond v. Allstate Insurance
897 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. California, 1995)
Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc.
730 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (C.D. California, 2010)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment
523 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
Joseph Ku v. State Farm General Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-ku-v-state-farm-general-insurance-company-cacd-2024.