Joseph Kelsey v. SCDPPPS

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
DecidedAugust 2, 2023
Docket2020-001473
StatusPublished

This text of Joseph Kelsey v. SCDPPPS (Joseph Kelsey v. SCDPPPS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Kelsey v. SCDPPPS, (S.C. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Joseph G. Kelsey, #217218, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001473

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court Harold W. Funderburk, Jr., Administrative Law Judge

Opinion No. 6020 Heard April 4, 2023 – Filed August 30, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Gerald Malloy, of Malloy Law Firm, of Hartsville; Jonathan Edward Ozmint, of The Ozmint Firm, LLC, of Greenville; and Hannah Lyon Freedman, of Justice 360, John H. Blume, III, of Law Office of John Blume, and Whitney Boykin Harrison, of McGowan Hood Felder & Phillips, of Columbia, all for Appellant.

Matthew C. Buchanan, of South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Allison Elder, of Root & Rebound, of Greenville, for Amici Curiae Former Correctional Agency Heads, Correctional Administrators, and Prison Wardens. THOMAS, J.: Joseph G. Kelsey appeals the order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC), which affirmed the denial of parole by the Parole Board of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (the Board), arguing, inter alia, the Board is required to give putative parolees access to their files. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Kelsey was denied parole in November of 2015 and in November of 2017. He appealed his third denial of parole, dated November 15, 2019, to the ALC. The ALC affirmed. In January and March of 2018, Kelsey requested the Board's reports concerning his "suitability for parole, likelihood of reoffending, etc., and any assessment tools applied to [him] and their results." The Board never responded to Kelsey. At the most recent parole hearing, the Board noted that some, but not all, of its members had received a copy of Kelsey's prehearing packet. Only five of the six members of the Board were at Kelsey's hearing, and the vote was three to two in favor of parole, or sixty percent; however, parole for a violent offense required "yes votes" from at least two-thirds, or sixty-seven percent, of the members of the Board. 1 Because Kelsey received only sixty percent, he did not meet the sixty-seven percent requirement. Thus, the Board denied parole. Kelsey filed two letters requesting reconsideration and a revote before the full Board. Kelsey also argued the Board acknowledged that some members had not received his prehearing packet, and he should be permitted an opportunity to provide additional information.

Kelsey submitted the packet to the ALC. Among other things, the packet included (1) a list of Kelsey's jobs while incarcerated, including chaplain assistant and teaching assistant; (2) a letter from a prison minister indicating Kelsey was continuing his education in pursuit of a Bachelor's degree and he had housing at Jump Start, if paroled; (3) numerous letters of support and awards indicating

1 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 2022) (defining murder as a violent crime); S.C. Bd. of Paroles and Pardons, Policy & Procedure Manual 28 (2019), https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/209320/4885043/file/Board+of+Parol es+and+Pardons+11062019.pdf ("In the case of violent offenders whose offenses occurred after January 1, 1986, the vote to grant parole must be by at least two- thirds of the members of the Board members present; however, only a quorum must be present to conduct business."). academic achievement and participation in the Greenwood Crisis Stabilization Unit; (4) a psychological evaluation indicating extensive family support, a low risk of reoffending, a proposal to move in with his fiancée, if paroled, and good physical, mental, and emotional health; and (5) the letters exchanged between Kelsey's attorneys and the Board in advance of and after his parole hearing. Kelsey also filed prior denials of parole, a transcript of his parole hearing, a transcript of his co-defendant's parole hearing, and transcript portions of Kelsey's trial hearing. The Board filed a response, arguing in part that Kelsey had no right to view his parole files.

By order filed October 7, 2020, the ALC found the Board erred in "mistakenly believ[ing] that a parole applicant has no right to review his parole file." The ALC found that the requirement that an inmate notify the Board of an error in a file he had no right to see was "logically and legally absurd." The ALC further noted that documents could be redacted and/or submitted under seal. However, the ALC found the Supplemental Record on Appeal that was submitted provided it ample material for review and affirmed the Board. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

S.C. Code Ann. § l-23-610(B) (Supp. 2022) provides the applicable standard:

(B) The review of the administrative law judge's order must be confined to the record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the administrative law judge as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by other error of law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. "The decision of the [ALC] should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law." Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp., v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600, 604, 670 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ct. App. 2008). "The court of appeals may reverse or modify the decision only if the appellant's substantive rights have been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable and substantial evidence on the whole record, arbitrary or otherwise characterized by an abuse of discretion, or affected by other error of law." SGM-Moonglo, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 378 S.C. 293, 295, 662 S.E.2d 487, 488 (Ct. App. 2008).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Kelsey argues he is entitled to access his parole files. We agree.

In arguing inmates have no right to review their parole files, the Board relies on its own Form 1212, which lists the criteria for parole consideration and includes the following language:

In deciding whether or not to grant parole, the Parole Board considers, among other things, the inmate's record before incarceration as well as during incarceration. The record itself is prepared through investigations conducted for the Parole Board, and it becomes a part of the inmate's parole file. The files are maintained by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services and are, by the statute, privileged and confidential. The confidentiality of the parole file is far reaching; inmates themselves have no right to inspect the contents of their files. If the inmate thinks his/her file is somehow incomplete or contains some errors or other inaccuracy, he/she must notify the Board of the specific error or inaccuracy. The Board will investigate the inquiry and notify the inmate of the action taken.

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Related

Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp. v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
670 S.E.2d 674 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2008)
Sgm-Moonglo, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue
662 S.E.2d 487 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2008)
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.
518 S.E.2d 591 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
Joseph Kelsey v. SCDPPPS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-kelsey-v-scdppps-scctapp-2023.