Joseph Gonzalez v. Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 1, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-04729
StatusUnknown

This text of Joseph Gonzalez v. Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee (Joseph Gonzalez v. Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Gonzalez v. Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSEPH GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, 25-CV-4729 (LLS) -against- DUTCHESS COUNTY JUSTICE AND ORDER TO AMEND TRANSITION CENTER; THERESA LEE, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at Elmira Correctional Facility, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that during his detention at the Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center, he slipped on a wet floor in the facility and fractured his elbow, and that he was denied adequate pain medication thereafter. By order dated August 1, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which names as Defendants the

Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center (“DCJTC”) and DCJTC Superintendent Therse Lee.2 On September 7, 2024, Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, “slipped in water that had pooled in the Rec Yard. The water pooled as a direct result of poor drainage and floor coating.” (ECF 1 at 4.) After the incident, Plaintiff “was taken to the hospital and treated” for a fractured elbow, but he further asserts that he “was denied adequate pain medication and suffered to date.” (Id. at 4- 5.) Plaintiff claims that Superintendent Lee “failed to provide a safe and slip resistant floor.” (Id. at 4.) He seeks money damages. (Id. at 5.) DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 claims Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his confinement that posed a serious threat to his health or safety. As Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. during the events giving rise to his claims, the claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). To state a conditions-of-confinement claim, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently

serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that the officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Id. The objective element requires a showing that “the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety, which “includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.’” Id. at 30 (quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)). The mental element requires a showing “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 35.

The mere negligence of a correctional official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). Slippery floors “District courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that, standing alone, a claim that a prisoner fell on a slippery floor and injured himself fails to satisfy the first prong of a conditions- of-confinement claim.” Strange v. Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-CV-9968 (NSR), 2018 WL 3910829, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (collecting cases); see also Pinto v. Annucci, No. 20-CV-4490 (CS), 2022 WL 523628, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022) (holding that courts in this Circuit routinely find that an accident, even if arising from a risky condition, does not rise to the level of a sufficiently serious deprivation) (collecting cases)). Moreover, where a plaintiff fails to allege that a correction officer showed “deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and dependent upon

him,” Morales v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Corr., 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988), the plaintiff fails to state facts showing that the mental element of a condition-of-confinement claim is satisfied, see, e.g., Garland v. City of New York, No. 22-CV-10947 (LTS), 2023 WL 2898625, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2023) (holding that any Section 1983 claim “requires proof of a mens rea greater than mere negligence”); Strange, 2018 WL 3910929, at *1 (holding that the plaintiff had failed to show deliberate indifference where he alleged that he had slipped and fell upon exiting his cell shower and “he did not have a shower mat to protect him from slipping”); Fredricks v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-3734 (AT), 2014 WL 3875181, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (holding that “[a] prisoner’s bare complaint about a slippery floor, without more, does not state an arguable claim of deliberate indifference.”); Seymore v. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 11-CV-2254 (JGK), 2014

WL 641428, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014) (holding that “plaintiff ha[d], at most, alleged that various defendants were negligent in failing to correct conditions, not that any defendant obdurately and wantonly refused to remedy a specific risk to the plaintiff.”). But see Fredricks, 2014 WL 3875181, at *5-6 (concluding that plaintiff with known disability who was subjected to slippery floor stated a constitutional claim).

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Joseph Gonzalez v. Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-gonzalez-v-dutchess-county-justice-and-transition-center-theresa-nysd-2025.