RENDERED: JUNE 26, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0448-MR
JOSEPH EDGERTON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE REBECCA LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00162
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMNG IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: A Carroll County jury convicted Appellant, Joseph Edgerton
(“Edgerton”), of first-degree criminal abuse. The victim was Edgerton’s eighteen-
month-old son, F.E., whom he was determined to have scalded with water from a
bathroom sink. Multiple witnesses testified including medical professionals and
Edgerton himself. Upon conviction, Edgerton was sentenced by a Carroll County
Circuit Court to serve five years’ imprisonment, $1,000.00 in fines, $165.00 in costs, and an unspecified amount of jail fees. He appeals to this Court as a matter
of right and raises seven issues of alleged error. For the following reasons, we
affirm in part and vacate in part.
ANALYSIS
Edgerton’s primary issue on appeal alleges that the trial court erred by
not granting a directed verdict in his favor on the charge of first-degree criminal
abuse. In that vein, he further argues that he was entitled to lesser-included jury
instructions for first-degree criminal abuse. He also contends that his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by impermissible trial
testimony. Edgerton’s remaining arguments can be categorized as challenging the
trial court’s various monetary assessments. He concludes that cumulative error
occurred, and requests that his conviction be vacated or, in the alternative, that the
final judgment be corrected. He requests palpable error review pursuant to RCr1
10.26 as follows:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
. . . . For an error to rise to the level of palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-2- noticeable. Generally, a palpable error affects the substantial rights of the party only if it is more likely than ordinary error to have affected the judgment.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Ky. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). With this standard in mind, we turn to the record at
issue.
First-degree Criminal Abuse
Although Edgerton requested a directed verdict at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, he did not renew his motion at the close of his
case. See Exantus v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 871, 887 (Ky. 2020) (“If the
defense presents evidence after the Commonwealth concludes its evidence, failure
to properly renew a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence will
render the issue unpreserved.”). Because Edgerton’s first argument arises from an
unpreserved motion for a directed verdict, we review for palpable error.
Typically, we will reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for
directed verdict “if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt[.]” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d
186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983))
(emphasis added). When ruling on a directed verdict motion, the trial court must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Benham, 816
S.W.2d at 187. Our review is confined to the proof at trial and the statutory
-3- elements of the alleged offense. See Lawton v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 565,
575 (Ky. 2011). As previously stated, however, we must assess this alleged error,
if any, through the lens of RCr 10.26.
We agree with the Commonwealth’s assessment that Edgerton
presented evidence and expert testimony supporting his theory of the case: that
F.E. had crawled onto the bathroom sink, gotten stuck under the hot water, and
burned himself. This included Edgerton’s own testimony, wherein he completely
denied involvement in the incident. In contrast, the Commonwealth presented
evidence and expert testimony supporting its theory: that F.E.’s burn was an
intentional immersion burn. It was undisputed that F.E. was in Edgerton’s sole
custody when the burn occurred. Therefore, the jury was presented with two
versions of events, and yet chose to convict. There was no palpable error here.
Similarly, the trial court did not palpably err by not providing the jury
with lesser-included-offense instructions for first-degree criminal abuse. As the
Commonwealth convincingly asserts in its brief, “[a] complete denial defense does
not provide any evidence from which a jury could rationally conclude that a
criminal defendant is guilty of only a lesser offense.” See Parker v.
Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 1997) (“[T]he evidence presented
by Parker was a complete denial. If the jury had believed that defense, he would
have been exonerated . . . [u]nder the circumstances presented, the trial judge
-4- correctly refused to instruct on lesser-included offenses.”); see also Fairley v.
Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 800 (Ky. 2017) (“As Fairley denied knowing
that a robbery was ongoing, he lacked the requisite mental state to commit
facilitation to first-degree robbery. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied
Fairley’s requested jury instruction.”). Because Edgerton denied any involvement
in F.E.’s burn, a lesser mental state would not have been appropriate for the jury’s
consideration based on the evidence presented.
Confrontation
Dr. Jennie Green provided critical testimony. She explained that
when children are burned accidentally, their reflex is to “immediately pull it out”
as “any of us would do,” and “you don’t get this very crisp, clear line of flow.”
The latter reflected F.E.’s injuries which were memorialized in pictures presented
to the jury.
Dr. Green also referenced F.E.’s medical records which included notes from
two doctors—a pediatric emergency doctor and a pediatric surgeon. Both treated
F.E. prior to Dr. Green. One note stated that the F.E.’s injury was “consistent with
inflicted burn.” Another stated that F.E.’s injury “appear[ed] to be from a scald
immersion type of mechanism.” The medical records were entered into evidence
without objection. Edgerton now argues that Dr. Green’s recitation of these two
notes from those medical records constitutes a violation of his constitutional right
-5- to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. We disagree.
“[T]he Confrontation Clause precludes admission of the statements of
a witness unavailable to testify at trial if the witness’ out-of-court statements were
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RENDERED: JUNE 26, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0448-MR
JOSEPH EDGERTON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE REBECCA LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00162
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMNG IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: A Carroll County jury convicted Appellant, Joseph Edgerton
(“Edgerton”), of first-degree criminal abuse. The victim was Edgerton’s eighteen-
month-old son, F.E., whom he was determined to have scalded with water from a
bathroom sink. Multiple witnesses testified including medical professionals and
Edgerton himself. Upon conviction, Edgerton was sentenced by a Carroll County
Circuit Court to serve five years’ imprisonment, $1,000.00 in fines, $165.00 in costs, and an unspecified amount of jail fees. He appeals to this Court as a matter
of right and raises seven issues of alleged error. For the following reasons, we
affirm in part and vacate in part.
ANALYSIS
Edgerton’s primary issue on appeal alleges that the trial court erred by
not granting a directed verdict in his favor on the charge of first-degree criminal
abuse. In that vein, he further argues that he was entitled to lesser-included jury
instructions for first-degree criminal abuse. He also contends that his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by impermissible trial
testimony. Edgerton’s remaining arguments can be categorized as challenging the
trial court’s various monetary assessments. He concludes that cumulative error
occurred, and requests that his conviction be vacated or, in the alternative, that the
final judgment be corrected. He requests palpable error review pursuant to RCr1
10.26 as follows:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
. . . . For an error to rise to the level of palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-2- noticeable. Generally, a palpable error affects the substantial rights of the party only if it is more likely than ordinary error to have affected the judgment.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Ky. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). With this standard in mind, we turn to the record at
issue.
First-degree Criminal Abuse
Although Edgerton requested a directed verdict at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, he did not renew his motion at the close of his
case. See Exantus v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 871, 887 (Ky. 2020) (“If the
defense presents evidence after the Commonwealth concludes its evidence, failure
to properly renew a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence will
render the issue unpreserved.”). Because Edgerton’s first argument arises from an
unpreserved motion for a directed verdict, we review for palpable error.
Typically, we will reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for
directed verdict “if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt[.]” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d
186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983))
(emphasis added). When ruling on a directed verdict motion, the trial court must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Benham, 816
S.W.2d at 187. Our review is confined to the proof at trial and the statutory
-3- elements of the alleged offense. See Lawton v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 565,
575 (Ky. 2011). As previously stated, however, we must assess this alleged error,
if any, through the lens of RCr 10.26.
We agree with the Commonwealth’s assessment that Edgerton
presented evidence and expert testimony supporting his theory of the case: that
F.E. had crawled onto the bathroom sink, gotten stuck under the hot water, and
burned himself. This included Edgerton’s own testimony, wherein he completely
denied involvement in the incident. In contrast, the Commonwealth presented
evidence and expert testimony supporting its theory: that F.E.’s burn was an
intentional immersion burn. It was undisputed that F.E. was in Edgerton’s sole
custody when the burn occurred. Therefore, the jury was presented with two
versions of events, and yet chose to convict. There was no palpable error here.
Similarly, the trial court did not palpably err by not providing the jury
with lesser-included-offense instructions for first-degree criminal abuse. As the
Commonwealth convincingly asserts in its brief, “[a] complete denial defense does
not provide any evidence from which a jury could rationally conclude that a
criminal defendant is guilty of only a lesser offense.” See Parker v.
Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 1997) (“[T]he evidence presented
by Parker was a complete denial. If the jury had believed that defense, he would
have been exonerated . . . [u]nder the circumstances presented, the trial judge
-4- correctly refused to instruct on lesser-included offenses.”); see also Fairley v.
Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 800 (Ky. 2017) (“As Fairley denied knowing
that a robbery was ongoing, he lacked the requisite mental state to commit
facilitation to first-degree robbery. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied
Fairley’s requested jury instruction.”). Because Edgerton denied any involvement
in F.E.’s burn, a lesser mental state would not have been appropriate for the jury’s
consideration based on the evidence presented.
Confrontation
Dr. Jennie Green provided critical testimony. She explained that
when children are burned accidentally, their reflex is to “immediately pull it out”
as “any of us would do,” and “you don’t get this very crisp, clear line of flow.”
The latter reflected F.E.’s injuries which were memorialized in pictures presented
to the jury.
Dr. Green also referenced F.E.’s medical records which included notes from
two doctors—a pediatric emergency doctor and a pediatric surgeon. Both treated
F.E. prior to Dr. Green. One note stated that the F.E.’s injury was “consistent with
inflicted burn.” Another stated that F.E.’s injury “appear[ed] to be from a scald
immersion type of mechanism.” The medical records were entered into evidence
without objection. Edgerton now argues that Dr. Green’s recitation of these two
notes from those medical records constitutes a violation of his constitutional right
-5- to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. We disagree.
“[T]he Confrontation Clause precludes admission of the statements of
a witness unavailable to testify at trial if the witness’ out-of-court statements were
‘testimonial,’ unless the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.” Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Ky. 2009) (citation
omitted). “[T]he threshold examination to determine a Confrontation Clause
violation is whether the proffered out-of-court statement was testimonial . . . .” Id.
at 243. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). “The Supreme
Court’s post-Crawford decisions . . . distinguished between testimonial medical
records and records intended for medical treatment.” Little v. Commonwealth, 422
S.W.3d 238, 246 (Ky. 2013). The medical records at issue here were non-
testimonial. In any event, they were cited sparingly during Dr. Green’s testimony
and were duplicative of her conclusions. There was no palpable error here.
Monetary Assessments
We will first address jail fees and then court costs and fines. The
circuit court’s order imposing jail reimbursement fees stated:
The Defendant shall be responsible for any and all jail fees incurred as a result of this case, which shall include but not be limited to booking fees; daily incarceration fees; medical expenses; dental expenses; drug testing fees The Defendant shall pay any of the aforesaid jail fees directly to the Carroll County Detention Center. It shall
-6- be the duty of the Carroll County Detention Center to collect said fees in accordance with Kentucky Law.
KRS2 441.265(1)(a) states: “A prisoner in a county jail shall be
required beginning from the prisoner’s booking date to reimburse the county for
expenses incurred by reason of the prisoner’s confinement as set out in this section,
except for good cause shown.” Before its 2022 amendment, that subsection
provided: “A prisoner in a county jail shall be required by the sentencing court to
reimburse the county for expenses incurred . . . .” KRS 441.265(1)(a) (2000)
(amended 2022) (emphasis added).
Building upon this statutory language, the Kentucky Supreme Court
has reiterated and emphasized that “to impose jail fees against a criminal defendant
during sentencing, there must be some evidence presented that a jail fee
reimbursement policy has been adopted by the county jailer with approval of the
county’s governing body in accordance with KRS 441.265(2)(a).” Capstraw v.
Commonwealth, 641 S.W. 3d 148, 161-62 (Ky. 2022) (footnote omitted). In the
absence of such evidence, the Court concluded that “the portion of the judgment
whereby jail fees are imposed against him is hereby vacated.” Id. at 162.3
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3 This Court has consistently applied Captstraw and vacated the improper imposition of jail fees based on palpable error in Daniels v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0212-MR, 2022 WL 17724283, at *2 (Ky. App. Dec. 16, 2022); Campbell v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0690- MR, 2021 WL 1051590, at *5 (Ky. App. Mar. 19, 2021), review denied (Aug. 18, 2021); and
-7- And as to whether the amended statute at issue here forecloses a trial
court from issuing jail fees entirely, this argument was recently addressed in Coyle
v. Commonwealth, where the Court reasoned as follows:
This is an overreading of the amended statutory language. The decision to substitute “beginning from the prisoner’s booking date” for “by the sentencing court” was merely a clarification that jail fees begin accumulating as soon as an inmate arrives at the jail.
No. 2024-SC-0520-MR, 2025 WL 2999176, at *5 (Ky. 2025). Critically, however,
the Supreme Court did not expressly address the tension in its previous decisions
regarding whether the assessment of jail fees is a jurisdictional sentencing error or
a procedural error. Coyle, 2025 WL 2999176, at *4-6. The difference is mostly
academic. Whether an objection to the imposition of jail is properly preserved
does not foreclose appellate courts from applying palpable error review—which,
appears to be the trend. Until the General Assembly or Supreme Court instruct
otherwise, we will apply palpable error review.
In the absence of any evidence of a county jail fee policy in this case,
we must reverse. Ford v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.3d 203, 206 (Ky. 2025) (“[i]f
the Commonwealth does not put on evidence demonstrating the existence of such a
policy with the concomitant approval, then the evidentiary burden for jail fees is
Hill v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0391-MR, 2023 WL 5311834, at *1 (Ky. App. Aug. 18, 2023).
-8- not met and they cannot be imposed.”). See also Alderson v. Commonwealth, No.
2022-SC-0071-MR, 2023 WL 4037704, at *15 (Ky. Jun. 15, 2023) (Observing that
evidence could be “as simple as the Commonwealth Attorney providing a copy of
the relevant ordinances.”). Therefore, the imposition of jail fees resulted in
palpable error, and the portion of order imposing jail fees is vacated.4
Edgerton also asserts that the circuit court committed error by
assessing $1,000.00 in fines and $165.00 in court costs. The alleged error here is
that he was indigent as evidenced by appointment of DPA counsel.
The assessment of court costs in a judgment fixing sentencing is illegal only if it orders a person adjudged to be poor to pay costs. Thus, while an appellate court may reverse court costs on appeal to rectify an illegal sentence, we will not go so far as to remand a facially- valid sentence to determine if there was in fact error.
Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Ky. 2014). Edgerton was
represented by private counsel during trial. His financial status for purposes of
receiving the representation of a public defender on appeal does not automatically
mean that he is indigent or too poor under the law to pay the attendant costs and
fines here. Thus, the assessment of fines and court costs was not erroneous, and
certainly not palpably so.
4 We also note that this entire exercise may be academic because no specific amount of jail fees was ordered here. However, in the absence of any explanation or objection by the Commonwealth—and due to the apparent confusion continuing to surround jail fees—we are obliged to issue the present decision.
-9- Lastly, Edgerton asserts that cumulative error occurred, i.e., “the
doctrine under which multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be
deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally
unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). The only
error that occurred here was the imposition of jail fees. As to the remaining issues,
there was no error. Thus, no cumulative error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Edgerton’s conviction and sentence of
incarceration for first-degree criminal abuse is AFFIRMED. His assessment of
fines and costs is AFFIRMED. The imposition of jail fees resulted in palpable
error, and the order of the Carroll Circuit Court imposing jail fees is VACATED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert Yang Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Graham Pilotte Assistant Solicitor General Frankfort, Kentucky
-10-