Joseph E Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedNovember 21, 2024
DocketAT-0714-20-0161-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Joseph E Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Joseph E Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph E Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOSEPH ERNEST HARDING, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0714-20-0161-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: November 21, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Joseph Ernest Harding , Birmingham, Alabama, pro se.

Kimberly Kaye Ward , Esquire, and Glynneisha Bellamy , Esquire, Decatur, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his removal appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant was a Federal employee until he retired under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) in March 2017. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 6. Following his retirement, he received a competitive service appointment with the agency as a reemployed annuitant. Id. at 7. His salary in that position was offset for his FERS annuity payments. IAF, Tab 13. Effective November 22, 2019, the agency removed the appellant from his position and advised him that he could seek review of the action by appealing to the Board. IAF, Tab 3 at 1-4. The appellant did so. IAF, Tab 1 at 3. ¶3 The administrative judge held a status conference, during which the appellant stated that he was a reemployed annuitant. IAF, Tab 8 at 1. Based on the appellant’s representation, the administrative judge advised the parties that this raised a jurisdictional issue. Id. The administrative judge issued an order to show cause notifying the appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction to adjudicate his appeal if he was a reemployed annuitant receiving an annuity at the time of his removal. IAF, Tab 10. The appellant filed a response to the show cause order. IAF, Tab 12. The agency filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 3

jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6. The administrative judge subsequently issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing based on his finding that the appellant was a reemployed annuitant when he was removed and, therefore, had no right to appeal that action to the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID). ¶4 The appellant filed a petition for review, and the agency filed a response in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In an adverse action appeal, an appellant is entitled to a hearing on jurisdiction if he makes a nonfrivolous claim of Board jurisdiction, at which he must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. SanSoucie v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 149, ¶ 16 (2011); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). Nonfrivolous allegations are allegations of fact that, if proven, could establish that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter at issue. Walker v. Department of the Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 6 n.2 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that he was an employee with Board appeal rights. ¶6 It is undisputed that the appellant received annuity payments while he was employed with the agency. IAF, Tab 13. Thus, the administrative judge correctly determined that the appellant was a reemployed annuitant and served at the will of the appointing authority. ID at 3-4; see 5 U.S.C. § 3323(b)(1); Garza v. Department of the Navy, 119 M.S.P.R. 91, ¶ 9 (2012). As such, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant had no right to appeal his separation to the Board. Garza, 119 M.S.P.R. 91, ¶ 9. 4

¶7 On review, the appellant does not dispute that he was receiving an annuity while employed by the agency. PFR File, Tab 1. He argues that, under 5 C.F.R. § 553.201(f), the agency was required to ask the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to waive the annuity offset of his pay. Id. at 5-6. He also states that he did not decide to waive or decline annuitant pay. Id. The appellant also reasserts that he was not a probationary employee at the time he was removed. Id. He provides documentation showing that he had prior service in the same agency and references documents that the agency submitted with its agency file, specifically personnel actions taken against him in his prior position, as evidence of the agency’s intent to obscure the fact that he completed his probation period. Id. at 5, 7-8. As explained below, none of these arguments provide a basis to disturb the initial decision. ¶8 The appellant’s argument regarding any obligation on the part of the agency to request that OPM waive the offset is unavailing. Absent a waiver, an Executive agency is required to reduce the pay of a reemployed annuitant by the amount of his annuity. 5 U.S.C. § 8468(a), (f). To the extent that the appellant argues that it was the agency’s responsibility to waive or decline annuity payments on his behalf, he has not identified a law, rule, or regulation that imposes such an obligation on an employing agency. He appears to conflate 5 C.F.R. § 553.201 and 5 C.F.R.

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Joseph E Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-e-harding-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.