Joseph David Rousan v. United States

Eighth Circuit

Joseph David Rousan v. United States

668 F.2d 1006, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22298

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 27, 1982

Docket81-1460

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 668 F.2d 1006 (Joseph David Rousan v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Joseph David Rousan v. United States, 668 F.2d 1006, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22298 (8th Cir. 1982).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

On March 4, 1977, the appellant, Joseph David Rousan, pleaded guilty of conspiracy to illegally distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Thereafter the remaining three substantive counts of the four count indictment were dismissed and appellant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to a term of twelve years imprisonment to be followed by a special parole term of five years.

On December 3, 1980, the sentencing court, 1 on its own motion pursuant to Fed. Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 35, ordered the sentence corrected by elimination of the special parole term.

On December 9, 1980, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he contended that under Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980), his entire sentence was void. The petition was denied and Rousan appealed.

The question presented in Bifulco was “whether § 406 [21 U.S.C. § 846], which states the penalty for conspiracy as ‘imprisonment or fine or both,’ but limits maximum punishment by reference to the penalty provisions of the substantive target offense, authorized the imposition of a special parole term when that sanction is included within the penalty provisions of the target offense.”

447 U.S. at 385, 100 S.Ct. at 2251. The Court held it did not. The sua sponte action of the sentencing court in deleting the special parole term of five years from appellant’s sentence is all that was required under Bifulco and appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied. See United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Noble, 653 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Anderson, 652 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1980).

Affirmed.

1

. The Honorable H. Kenneth Wangelin, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

On March 4, 1977, the appellant, Joseph David Rousan, pleaded guilty of conspiracy to illegally distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Thereafter the remaining three substantive counts of the four count indictment were dismissed and appellant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to a term of twelve years imprisonment to be followed by a special parole term of five years.

On December 3, 1980, the sentencing court, 1 on its own motion pursuant to Fed. Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 35, ordered the sentence corrected by elimination of the special parole term.

On December 9, 1980, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he contended that under Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980), his entire sentence was void. The petition was denied and Rousan appealed.

The question presented in Bifulco was “whether § 406 [21 U.S.C. § 846], which states the penalty for conspiracy as ‘imprisonment or fine or both,’ but limits maximum punishment by reference to the penalty provisions of the substantive target offense, authorized the imposition of a special parole term when that sanction is included within the penalty provisions of the target offense.”

447 U.S. at 385, 100 S.Ct. at 2251. The Court held it did not. The sua sponte action of the sentencing court in deleting the special parole term of five years from appellant’s sentence is all that was required under Bifulco and appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied. See United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Noble, 653 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Anderson, 652 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1980).

Affirmed.

1

. The Honorable H. Kenneth Wangelin, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

668 F.2d 1006, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22298, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-david-rousan-v-united-states-ca8-1982.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack