Joseph Cox v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Company, LP
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Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-23-00151-CV __________________
JOSEPH COX, Appellant
V.
CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICAL COMPANY, LP, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 163rd District Court Orange County, Texas Trial Cause No. 220065-C __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this age discrimination suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act (TCHRA), Appellant Joseph Cox (Cox or Appellant) appeals the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of Appellee Chevron Phillips Chemical Company, LP
(CPChem). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012. We affirm.
1 Cox filed Plaintiff’s Amended Petition 1 against CPChem, Singular Resource
Solutions LLC (SRS), and JAB Recruitment LLC (JAB) and asserted a claim against
the defendants for age discrimination under the TCHRA. According to the petition,
Cox “contracted to work for [CPChem] under a two (2) year contract as a Project
Engineer, by and through SRS and JAB.”2 On May 10, 2022, the trial court signed
an order non-suiting SRS and JAB pursuant to Plaintiff’s Notice of Nonsuit and
dismissing Cox’s claims against SRS and JAB without prejudice. CPChem filed a
Traditional and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment and argued: (1)
CPChem was not Cox’s employer under the TCHRA; (2) Cox, by his own
admission, has no evidence that CPChem discriminated against him based on his
age; (3) Cox cannot meet the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination;
and (4) Cox has no evidence that CPChem’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions are pretext for discrimination. On April 21, 2023, the trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment without specifying the grounds on which
1 Plaintiff’s Amended Petition was the live petition at the time the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CPChem. 2 Cox also asserted causes of action against all defendants for retaliation and breach of contract, but after CPChem filed its summary judgment motion and prior to the trial court’s order granting CPChem’s summary judgment motion, Cox “concede[d] to the dismissal of his retaliation and breach of contract claims[.]” Accordingly, we will not discuss Cox’s allegations related to those causes of action or CPChem’s arguments in its summary judgment motion in response to those causes of action. 2 the summary judgment was granted, and the trial court dismissed Cox’s claims
against CPChem with prejudice. Cox timely filed this appeal.
In his appellate brief, Cox raises two issues in which he asserts that the trial
court erred in dismissing his claims because it should have found that Cox had
suffered an adverse employment action as a result of his protected class (age) and
that Cox’s employment was terminated based on pretext for discrimination. In
addition to responding to those issues, CPChem suggests in its Appellee’s Brief that
this Court must affirm the trial court’s summary judgment because Cox failed to
negate CPChem’s ground for summary judgment on the basis that CPChem was not
Cox’s employer.
“When a summary judgment motion alleges multiple grounds and the order
granting summary judgment does not specify the ground on which the summary
judgment was rendered, the appellant must challenge and negate each and every
basis for summary judgment on appeal.” Nixon Fam. P’ship, LP v. Jet Lending, LLC,
No. 09-20-00201-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5544, at *23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Aug. 4, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders,
Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). According
to CPChem, “Cox’s Appellant’s Brief is devoid of any reference to th[e]
foundational requirement” that only an employer may be liable for an unlawful
employment practice under the TCHRA “although [that requirement] was fully
3 briefed and argued before the trial court in support of CPChem’s Summary Judgment
motions[.]” We agree. In his appellate brief, Cox did not address CPChem’s
argument that CPChem was not Cox’s employer.
Because the summary judgment order did not state the grounds upon which
the trial court granted summary judgment and Cox has not challenged all
independent bases of CPChem’s motion for summary judgment on appeal, this Court
must affirm the summary judgment. See id. at *26; see also Denmax Energy Servs.
v. LightPoint Eng’g, LLC, No. 09-22-00120-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1742, at
*40 n.16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 7, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). We overrule
Appellant’s issues one and two, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON Justice
Submitted on October 26, 2023 Opinion Delivered April 18, 2024
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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