Joseph Bramante v. HRO Property Owner, LP

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket01-24-00754-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Joseph Bramante v. HRO Property Owner, LP (Joseph Bramante v. HRO Property Owner, LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph Bramante v. HRO Property Owner, LP, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Opinion issued July 24, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00754-CV ——————————— JOSEPH BRAMANTE, Appellant V. HRO PROPERTY OWNER, LP, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1230556

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a forcible detainer judgment in favor of appellee.

Appellant’s brief asserts that this appeal is moot and must be dismissed because

“Appellant is no longer in possession of the Premises and [Appellant] is not asserting

a claim of right to current, actual possession of the Premises.” Appellee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot on the same basis asserted in appellant’s

brief. Upon consideration of appellant’s brief and appellee’s motion, we agree that

the appeal is moot. Accordingly, we vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss

the appeal.

The only issue in a forcible-detainer action, like this one, is the right to actual

possession of the premises. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City

of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006). When a tenant is no longer in

possession of the property, an appeal from a forcible detainer action becomes moot

unless the tenant asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession” of the property. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 (citing Williams v.

Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001)). Here, the parties agree that appellant is no

longer in possession of the premises and does not assert a claim of right to current,

actual possession of the property.

Accordingly, we vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss the case as

moot. See Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (“If a

case is or becomes moot, the court must vacate any order or judgment previously

issued and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.”); Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 788

(“One purpose of vacating the underlying judgment if a case becomes moot during

appeal is to prevent prejudice to the rights of parties when appellate review of a

2 judgment on its merits is precluded.”). We dismiss all other pending motions as

moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.

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Related

Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio
198 S.W.3d 782 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Williams v. Lara
52 S.W.3d 171 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)

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Joseph Bramante v. HRO Property Owner, LP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-bramante-v-hro-property-owner-lp-texapp-2025.