Joseph Aruanno v. Bureau of Fiscal Service United States Department

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: November 26, 2024
• Docket: 23-2543
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2543 __________

JOSEPH ARUANNO, Petitioner

v.

BUREAU OF FISCAL SERVICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY ____________________________________

On a Petition for Review of a Decision of the Bureau of Fiscal Service ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) November 18, 2024 Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 26, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Joseph Aruanno is a frequent pro se litigant who, since 2005, has been civilly

committed under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act. He resides in the

Special Treatment Unit operated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Aruanno

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. seeks review of a decision of the Bureau of Fiscal Service reaffirming its denial of his

claim for an economic impact payment (or “stimulus check”) under the Coronavirus Aid,

Relief, and Economic Security Act, to the Department of Corrections. In its decision, the

Bureau of Fiscal Service, a service in the United States Department of the Treasury, see

31 U.S.C. § 306, agreed that Aruanno was the payee on the check authorized by the

Internal Revenue Service but explained that “it appears” that the check has already been

deposited by the Department of Corrections on his behalf. 3d Cir. Doc. 1-1.

Aruanno, in his brief, takes issue with the Bureau of Fiscal Service’s use of the

term “it appears,” claiming that the term understates what happened. Calling the check

“stolen,” he maintains that the Department of Corrections not only deposited it but also

cashed it and kept the funds to satisfy an alleged debt that he did not owe. 3d Cir. Doc.

No. 10 at 1 & 9. He also argues that the Bureau of Fiscal Service should not have mailed

the check, especially because it was “warned-instructed not to.” Id. at 3; see also id. at 8

(stating that he had “made clear to the IRS” that if it mailed the stimulus check to him at

the Special Treatment Unit it would be stolen). Aruanno states that “interest of justice

requires that [the Department of Corrections] be compelled to return those funds to the

I.R.S.” and requests that we “order the I.R.S. to have the funds returned to them then

reissue to either the direct deposit or home address.” Id. at 5 & 10.

Before we consider anything else, we must consider whether we have jurisdiction

over this matter. See Petroleos Mexicanos Refinacion v. M/T King A (EX-TBILISI), 377

F.3d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S.

449, 453 (1900) (“This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even

2 when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.”).

Our jurisdiction is limited; we “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). We

have been granted jurisdiction over final and certain interlocutory orders of the district

courts, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 1292; In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 211 (3d Cir. Pa.

2006), some decisions in bankruptcy and tax matters, see 28 U.S.C. § 158; 26 U.S.C. §

7482; N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 349 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2003), and

various agency decisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2342; 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We have not found any statutory or other authority to review the challenged

decision of the Bureau of Fiscal Service, and Aruanno does not point us to any. See

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (explaining that ‘[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies

outside this limited jurisdiction,” and that “the burden of establishing the contrary rests

upon the party asserting jurisdiction”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)(B).

Accordingly, we must dismiss this case. 1 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any

cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only

1 We have considered whether we could grant Aruanno the relief he requests pursuant to our mandamus authority, and we have concluded that mandamus relief is not available. See generally United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 893 (3d Cir. 1981); cf. In re Wolenski, 324 F.2d 309, 309 (3d Cir. 1963) (per curiam). We also cannot entertain his claims in the first instance. See O’Hanlon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 990 F.3d 757, 763 n.3 (3d Cir. 2021) (reaffirming the established principle that we are “a court of review, not of first view”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Lastly, we express no opinion on his ability to pursue his claims in a district court (beyond what we have already stated, see Aruanno v. IRS, C.A. No. 23-2630, 2024 WL 686153 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2024) (per curiam)). 3 function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)

(quotation marks omitted).