NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2516-24
JOSEPH ARMENTAL,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, BERGEN COUNTY,
Respondent-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted March 25, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026
Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of Education, Docket No. 123-5/24.
Taylor Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Phillip E. Stern, Amy E. Mueller, R. Scott Eveland, of counsel and on the brief; Kyle C. McLester, on the brief).
Schwartz Law Group, LLC, attorney for respondent (Andrew L. Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief; Jordan T. Shead, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Commissioner of Education (Natalie K. Dennis, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
The Englewood Board of Education (Board) appeals from the
Commissioner of Education's summary decision for petitioner, which
determined that the Board's involuntary transfer of petitioner to Athletic
Director (AD) constituted a dismissal from his tenured position as principal, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
I.
Petitioner, Joseph Armental, was employed by the Board in September
2006 as a mathematics teacher. In 2011, the Board appointed him to Assistant
Principal. In 2013, the Board appointed him to AD as well. Petitioner served
as both the assistant principal and AD until 2015, when he relinquished the dual
role and served as assistant principal only. Petitioner remained in this position
until November 2021 when the Board transferred him to Dwight Morrow High
School as acting principal. Petitioner served as both the AD and acting principal
for one month, thereafter he served only as Dwight Morrow's principal.
As principal, petitioner acquired tenure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6,
having served at Dwight Morrow for three years with satisfactory evaluations.
A-2516-24 2 Petitioner also earned tenure in the role of AD due to his prior years of service
in the position.
In March 2024, the Board's Director of Human Resources notified
petitioner by letter that the Board's Superintendent recommended his
"involuntary transfer" from Dwight Morrow's principal to the District's AD
position, effective July 1, 2024. Petitioner urged the Board to reconsider,
contending that the transfer without his consent would violate petitioner's tenure
rights. The Board transferred petitioner to AD without his consent exclusively
for the 2024-25 school term. The Board also notified the school district
community of the transfer.
Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner),
alleging the Board violated his tenure rights. He and the Board cross-moved for
summary decision. The Department of Education (DOE) transferred the matter
to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued their decision on December
9, 2024, finding petitioner's tenure rights were not violated because: both the
principal and AD position required a certificate of administration with a
principal's endorsement; petitioner's salary was not reduced; the new position
did not require an additional certificate; and the positions were not separately
A-2516-24 3 tenurable under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5. The ALJ determined that, because the AD
position required no change in petitioner's qualifications and he was not
otherwise prejudiced, the Board did not need petitioner's consent for the transfer,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6. The ALJ granted summary decision for the
Board and dismissed petitioner's petition.
Petitioner filed timely exceptions to the initial decision. Thereafter, the
Commissioner rejected the initial decision on March 7, 2025. The
Commissioner found that transfer without petitioner's consent was improper and
ordered the Board to restore petitioner to the position of principal in accordance
with his tenure and seniority rights. The Board appealed.
II.
Our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited. In re Protest
by El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp., 260 N.J. 362, 373 (2025). We will sustain an
agency's final decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Seago v.
Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity Fund, 257 N.J. 381, 391 (2024) (quoting
Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018)).
Our role in reviewing administrative action is generally limited to:
"(1) whether . . . the agency follow[ed] the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
A-2516-24 4 support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been" reached.
[Bd. of Educ. of Sparta v. M.N. on behalf of A.D., 258 N.J. 333, 342 (2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Allstars Auto Grp., Inc., 234 N.J. at 157).]
We owe "substantial deference" to an agency if its decision satisfies the
criteria. Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 482 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div.
2025) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
It is well settled that "we accord a degree of deference when the agency
interprets a statute or a regulation that falls 'within its implementing and
enforcing responsibility,' 'unless the interpretation is plainly unreasonable.'"
McKnight v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 476 N.J. Super. 154, 163 (App. Div.
2023) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001); and then quoting In re Appeal
by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)).
However, we are "in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or
its determination of a strictly legal issue." Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ., 477 N.J.
Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal
Props., LLC, 215 N.J. 142, 165 (2013)) . It follows, then, that we review an
A-2516-24 5 agency's interpretation of a statute or case law de novo. Bulur v. N.J. Off. of
the AG, 261 N.J. 275, 286 (2025).
III.
The Board argues the Commissioner's summary decision was error. The
Board makes two main arguments. First, it contends that petitioner's involuntary
transfer to AD from principal was not a dismissal or demotion because petitioner
suffered no reduction in salary. Next, the Board posits that because petitioner
held tenure in both positions, his involuntary transfer did not violate tenure laws.
After a review of the record and our well-settled jurisprudence regarding
teaching tenure, we conclude that the Board's arguments are without merit. We
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the Commissioner of
Education's final administrative decision which properly interpreted N.J.S.A.
18A:28-5 to -6, two statutes within its enforcing responsibility.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2516-24
JOSEPH ARMENTAL,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, BERGEN COUNTY,
Respondent-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted March 25, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026
Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of Education, Docket No. 123-5/24.
Taylor Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Phillip E. Stern, Amy E. Mueller, R. Scott Eveland, of counsel and on the brief; Kyle C. McLester, on the brief).
Schwartz Law Group, LLC, attorney for respondent (Andrew L. Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief; Jordan T. Shead, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Commissioner of Education (Natalie K. Dennis, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
The Englewood Board of Education (Board) appeals from the
Commissioner of Education's summary decision for petitioner, which
determined that the Board's involuntary transfer of petitioner to Athletic
Director (AD) constituted a dismissal from his tenured position as principal, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
I.
Petitioner, Joseph Armental, was employed by the Board in September
2006 as a mathematics teacher. In 2011, the Board appointed him to Assistant
Principal. In 2013, the Board appointed him to AD as well. Petitioner served
as both the assistant principal and AD until 2015, when he relinquished the dual
role and served as assistant principal only. Petitioner remained in this position
until November 2021 when the Board transferred him to Dwight Morrow High
School as acting principal. Petitioner served as both the AD and acting principal
for one month, thereafter he served only as Dwight Morrow's principal.
As principal, petitioner acquired tenure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6,
having served at Dwight Morrow for three years with satisfactory evaluations.
A-2516-24 2 Petitioner also earned tenure in the role of AD due to his prior years of service
in the position.
In March 2024, the Board's Director of Human Resources notified
petitioner by letter that the Board's Superintendent recommended his
"involuntary transfer" from Dwight Morrow's principal to the District's AD
position, effective July 1, 2024. Petitioner urged the Board to reconsider,
contending that the transfer without his consent would violate petitioner's tenure
rights. The Board transferred petitioner to AD without his consent exclusively
for the 2024-25 school term. The Board also notified the school district
community of the transfer.
Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner),
alleging the Board violated his tenure rights. He and the Board cross-moved for
summary decision. The Department of Education (DOE) transferred the matter
to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued their decision on December
9, 2024, finding petitioner's tenure rights were not violated because: both the
principal and AD position required a certificate of administration with a
principal's endorsement; petitioner's salary was not reduced; the new position
did not require an additional certificate; and the positions were not separately
A-2516-24 3 tenurable under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5. The ALJ determined that, because the AD
position required no change in petitioner's qualifications and he was not
otherwise prejudiced, the Board did not need petitioner's consent for the transfer,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6. The ALJ granted summary decision for the
Board and dismissed petitioner's petition.
Petitioner filed timely exceptions to the initial decision. Thereafter, the
Commissioner rejected the initial decision on March 7, 2025. The
Commissioner found that transfer without petitioner's consent was improper and
ordered the Board to restore petitioner to the position of principal in accordance
with his tenure and seniority rights. The Board appealed.
II.
Our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited. In re Protest
by El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp., 260 N.J. 362, 373 (2025). We will sustain an
agency's final decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Seago v.
Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity Fund, 257 N.J. 381, 391 (2024) (quoting
Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018)).
Our role in reviewing administrative action is generally limited to:
"(1) whether . . . the agency follow[ed] the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
A-2516-24 4 support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been" reached.
[Bd. of Educ. of Sparta v. M.N. on behalf of A.D., 258 N.J. 333, 342 (2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Allstars Auto Grp., Inc., 234 N.J. at 157).]
We owe "substantial deference" to an agency if its decision satisfies the
criteria. Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 482 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div.
2025) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
It is well settled that "we accord a degree of deference when the agency
interprets a statute or a regulation that falls 'within its implementing and
enforcing responsibility,' 'unless the interpretation is plainly unreasonable.'"
McKnight v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 476 N.J. Super. 154, 163 (App. Div.
2023) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001); and then quoting In re Appeal
by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)).
However, we are "in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or
its determination of a strictly legal issue." Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ., 477 N.J.
Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal
Props., LLC, 215 N.J. 142, 165 (2013)) . It follows, then, that we review an
A-2516-24 5 agency's interpretation of a statute or case law de novo. Bulur v. N.J. Off. of
the AG, 261 N.J. 275, 286 (2025).
III.
The Board argues the Commissioner's summary decision was error. The
Board makes two main arguments. First, it contends that petitioner's involuntary
transfer to AD from principal was not a dismissal or demotion because petitioner
suffered no reduction in salary. Next, the Board posits that because petitioner
held tenure in both positions, his involuntary transfer did not violate tenure laws.
After a review of the record and our well-settled jurisprudence regarding
teaching tenure, we conclude that the Board's arguments are without merit. We
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the Commissioner of
Education's final administrative decision which properly interpreted N.J.S.A.
18A:28-5 to -6, two statutes within its enforcing responsibility. We add the
following comment.
The record shows that both the principal and AD positions require an
administrative certificate with a principal's endorsement for a teaching staff
member to be appointed to either job. This fact underlies the Board's central
premise: since the two positions require the same administrative certificat es,
the Board argues that it can transfer employees between the two positions with
A-2516-24 6 no reduction in salary or other benefits. Because petitioner's tenure status as
principal is separate and distinct from his tenure status as AD, the Board's
attempt to link the two positions through their common certificate requirements
falls flat.
Our jurisprudence is crystal clear in holding that each of the enumerated
teaching staff positions identified in N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 is tenured separately.
The title of principal is one of those enumerated positions. Nelson v. Bd. of
Educ. of Old Bridge, 148 N.J. 358, 366 (1997). The undisputed record shows
that petitioner's position as principal at Dwight Morrow High School was
tenured under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5. He could not be involuntarily transferred
from that position without his consent, except by cause. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
10, :28-6. The Board's involuntary transfer attempt, done without obtaining
petitioner's consent, was effectively a dismissal without cause from his tenured
position as principal.
The Board cites Carpenito v. Bd. of Ed. of Rumson, 322 N.J. Super. 522
(App. Div. 1999) in support of its position. In Carpenito, we held that a tenured
teacher may be involuntarily transferred to another teaching position within the
scope of their certification, if there is no loss in salary or other reduction in
employment. Id. at 529. The Board contends that where petitioner has suffered
A-2516-24 7 no loss of salary, and has tenure as an AD, Carpenito must control and permits
his involuntary transfer. We disagree with the Board's interpretation of the case.
The core element of the Carpenito holding is the teacher-to-teacher
transfer. Put another way, Carpenito permits involuntary transfers of staff
within that staff member's current certification. The circumstances here do not
involve a teacher-to-teacher, or principal-to-principal, involuntary transfer.
Here, the Board transferred, without consent, a teaching staff member from one
separately tenured position, principal, to another separately tenured position,
AD. Carpenito is not applicable to these facts.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions
raised by the Board, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2516-24 8