IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-KA-01382-SCT
JOSEPH ANTHONY ZATTONI a/k/a JOSEPH A. ZATTONI a/k/a JOSEPH ZATTONI
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JAMES ANDERSON, JR. ANDREW JAMES WILLIAMS JAMES KURT GUTHRIE LUKE ENTERKIN WHITAKER STEVEN DARRYLL USRY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES MOLLY HALPIN McNAIR ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS, II NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/28/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
SULLIVAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This case stems from an argument between Joseph Zattoni and his girlfriend, Natalie
Lambert. As Lambert attempted to leave the situation, Zattoni shot at her car. He then
proceeded to chase her, smash her car-door window, and put her in his truck. The two drove
around for several hours. During this time, law enforcement was notified of a possible abduction and began searching for Lambert. The police eventually located Lambert. As a
result, Zattoni was indicted for aggravated domestic violence, kidnapping, and felon in
possession of a weapon.
¶2. After a trial, the jury found Zattoni guilty of kidnapping and felon in possession of a
weapon. He was sentenced as a nonviolent habitual offender to the following: (1) for
kidnapping, twenty-five years, with three years suspended, and (2) for felon in possession of
a firearm, five years, to run concurrently with the kidnapping sentence.
¶3. On appeal, Zattoni argues that the trial court committed reversible error. Despite the
trial court’s erroneously admitting evidence that was more prejudicial than probative, the
error was harmless. Thus, this Court affirms Zattoni’s conviction.
FACTS
I. Factual Background
¶4. On February 9, 2023, several law-enforcement agencies responded to a 911 call,
which “advis[ed] that a white female was being dragged into a vehicle and also that a shot
had been fired in that area.” One of the responding officers was Trooper Skyla Tillis with the
Mississippi Highway Patrol. When she arrived on the scene, Trooper Tillis learned that the
suspect was driving a dark-colored pickup truck and that the victim had been dragged out of
a Honda. After learning this information, Trooper Tillis began patrolling the nearby area and
discovered an abandoned Honda that matched the description of the victim’s vehicle. Tillis
testified that the driver’s side window of the vehicle was “busted” and that the driver’s side
rear tire was flat. She also discovered a purse inside of the vehicle, which contained a
2 driver’s license that belonged to Natalie Lambert.
¶5. Investigator Willard Holifield with the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation was asked
to assist in the investigation and was dispatched to the scene where the victim’s Honda was
discovered. Upon arriving at the scene, Investigator Holifield stated that the victim’s blue
Honda Accord was parked in a random residential driveway. Like Trooper Tillis, he also
noted that the driver’s side front window was broken and that the driver’s side rear tire was
flat.
¶6. Law-enforcement agencies continued to patrol the area looking for Lambert. Later that
evening, Lambert was discovered by the police. At this time, Zattoni’s location was
unknown. Both Trooper Tillis and Investigator Holifield described Lambert’s demeanor after
being recovered by the police. Tillis stated that Lambert appeared overwhelmed and had
bruises on her body. Likewise, Holifield stated that Lambert appeared distraught and had
“abrasions” on her body.
¶7. While at the scene, Investigator Holifield interviewed Lambert. According to
Holifield, Lambert had attempted to leave her boyfriend, Zattoni, after he struck her during
an argument. Holifield also learned that there had been a shooting at Lambert’s and Zattoni’s
residence, i.e., Zattoni’s father’s trailer. Upon learning this information, Holifield went to the
residence and discovered three nine-millimeter shell casings in the driveway of the residence.
¶8. A few days later, Zattoni was taken into custody. He was indicted in June 2023 for one
count of aggravated domestic violence (Count I), one count of kidnapping (Count II), and
one count of felon in possession of a firearm (Count III). His indictment also included a
3 sentencing enhancement under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020).
¶9. Zattoni’s trial began on September 3, 2024. Natalie Lambert testified for the State.
She explained that at the time of the incident, she had been dating Zattoni for about four to
five months and that the two had been living at Zattoni’s father’s house in Terry, Mississippi.
On the morning of the incident, Lambert stated that she and Zattoni had argued about
infidelity. Deciding to leave the situation, Lambert exited the residence and got into her
vehicle. As she drove off, Lambert stated that she heard a gunshot. After she heard the
gunshot, she realized that her tire was flat. She testified that she did not know if Zattoni had
shot at the car or in the air because she was inside the car when the shot rang out. She denied
that the gun belonged to her. But she did acknowledge that she previously had seen a gun
inside the house.
¶10. As she continued to drive away, Lambert stated that Zattoni “came up behind [her]
in his dad’s truck.” According to Lambert, Zattoni used the truck to block her “to where [she]
couldn’t go in the road.” At some point, Lambert was able to maneuver around Zattoni’s
truck and parked her car in a nearby residential driveway. When she parked her car,
Lambert’s driver’s side window was partially rolled down. As she attempted to roll up the
window, Zattoni appeared and attempted to push the window back down. In doing so, the
window shattered. Then, Zattoni proceeded to open the car door, pick Lambert up, and put
her in his truck. Lambert clarified that she did not voluntarily get in the truck.
¶11. After being placed in Zattoni’s truck, Lambert testified that the two drove around for
a while. Initially, Lambert was in the passenger seat. Then, at some point during the journey,
4 the two switched places. While she was driving the truck, Zattoni had a handgun in his
possession and was threatening to harm himself with it.
¶12. Lambert testified that at one point, she proceeded to jump out of the moving vehicle
from the passenger seat. In response, Zattoni stopped the truck, picked up Lambert, and put
her back into the vehicle. He then went to a family member’s house in an attempt to doctor
Lambert’s injuries. But the family member was not home. When asked why she jumped out
of the vehicle, Lambert said that she “just wanted what was best for him and [she] just
wanted to be away. [She] didn’t want him to hurt himself, and [she] didn’t want to continue
to be around it.” Lambert simply wanted to get out of the vehicle.
¶13. The two continued to drive around before “eventually [Zattoni] just got out and told
[her] to take his dad’s truck back home.” She explained that Zattoni exited the truck, and he
walked toward the woods as she drove off. Lambert stated that she was “about five minutes
from [Zattoni’s] dad’s trailer” when she was stopped by the police.
¶14. At trial, Investigator Holifield testified that during the course of his investigation, he
discovered that Zattoni had a criminal record and was not allowed to possess a firearm as a
convicted felon. Holifield testified also that Zattoni admitted to possessing a weapon, being
a convicted felon, and forcibly putting Lambert into his vehicle. Additionally, Holifield
stated that he interviewed Zattoni, which was recorded. The State admitted the audio
recording of Zattoni’s interview and played it for the jury. The State also admitted the
handwritten statements made by Zattoni during the interview.
¶15. Zattoni testified in his own defense. While Zattoni admitted shooting Lambert’s tire
5 in an attempt to stop her from leaving, he stated that he “didn’t mean to hit the tire.”
According to Zattoni, he followed Lambert because she had a flat tire and because he wanted
to make sure that she was okay. He claimed that he did not block Lambert’s car with his
truck. Instead, he asserted that she had pulled over due to having a flat tire and that he pulled
up behind her car. Zattoni claimed that the car window broke because Lambert attempted to
drive away while his hands were rolled up in the window. He explained that he had put his
hands in Lambert’s partially-rolled-down window while he was talking to her. Zattoni
admitted that the two drove around for more than an hour and that they had taken turns
driving the vehicle. He also acknowledged that Lambert had jumped out of the moving
vehicle. But he stated that he had also jumped from the car, explaining that it “was one of our
things” and that “when she did something crazy, I’d do the same thing.” After driving around
for a while, Zattoni testified that he told Lambert to drop him off, return the truck to the
house, and the two would “go [their] separate ways for a little bit.”
¶16. While Zattoni admitted possessing and firing the gun, he denied pointing a gun at
Lambert or threatening her. Additionally, he asserted that he “put [the gun] in a field.” When
asked if he was able to locate the gun and give it to the police, Zattoni said, “[w]hy would
I do that? I’m a convicted felon.”
II. Facts Regarding the Stipulation
¶17. Before the jury was seated, Zattoni offered a proposed stipulation to the trial court.
The trial court stated that “this would come in later, but [it would] hold this until then.” At
this point, the State interjected, asking, “were you saying you wanted to hold the stipulation
6 until later?” In response, the trial court stated, “I mean, we don’t even have a jury in the box
yet so what are we doing with the stipulation?” The State proceeded to raise concerns about
the wording of the stipulation. The State claimed that “all” it wanted the stipulation “to do
was track the allegation that was made in the indictment.”
¶18. After acknowledging that it would not be mentioning or reading the sentencing-
enhancement portion of the indictment, the trial court explained that it usually states “what
the counts are and read[s] them to the jury to make sure that they have no information about
the charges.” Then the trial court asked the parties to clarify: “is it your request that it just
state that he was convicted of a felony crime and not read anything else about the cause
number or any of that information?” Defense counsel responded, “[t]hat would be our
request.” The State objected, stating again that it “wanted the stipulation to be all three
convictions.” In response, the trial court stated:
I understand what the State is saying . . . . My question is very simply this: is there any objection—the defense is asking that since we are going to stipulate as to the defendant having a prior conviction, for purposes of the case in chief so that there’s no prejudice to the defendant, it’s not necessarily saying what he’s been convicted of?
¶19. The State proceeded again to argue about the wording of the proposed stipulation.
This prompted the following exchange between the trial court and the defense:
[Trial court]: So this is not the stipulation that you will present for purposes of the trial before the jury. This is a stipulation you all are trying to present as part of the [c]ourt’s voir dire? Is that what we’re doing?
[Defense]: This was going to be for the jury. Historically, I’ve just given—when I was in your court before, I just gave it to you at the very, very beginning and you usually just put it in your
7 folder and that was read to the jury at some point during the trial that the two sides had stipulated that on the date in question in this case, February of ’23, that he was a convicted felon.
[Trial court]: So we’re having two different conversations, actually. To be honest, the defense has not asked me anything about what I would say in the voir dire.
[Defense]: I think—yeah.
[Trial court]: So I’m just going to read the indictment as I normally do without reading the enhancement portion of the indictment.
Additionally, the trial court and the State agreed that the issue regarding the language of the
stipulation would be dealt with later.
¶20. While reading Zattoni’s indictment to the jury, the trial court stated Zattoni’s exact
prior convictions that were alleged in Count III, felon in possession of a gun. Immediately,
Zattoni’s attorney objected. The trial court denied the objection, stating, “I know what you
want. No.”
¶21. After the jury was empaneled and before opening statements, the State announced that
the parties “[had] reached an agreement as to the stipulation.” The trial court took the
stipulation under advisement because it was “not comfortable with the wording of [the
stipulation]” and wanted to conduct its own research.1
¶22. After the State presented its case and the defense rested, the trial court, outside the
presence of the jury, asked the State to admit the stipulation and to rest its case. The trial
court accepted the stipulation, which declared that “[t]he State and Defense agree that prior
1 According to the record, this version of the stipulation included the phrase “[a]nd we stipulate that what’s in the indictment is true[.]”
8 to the date of the incident, Joseph Zattoni had been a convicted felon as alleged in the
indictment.” The stipulation was read before the jury and admitted into evidence.
III. Facts Regarding the Audio Recording of Zattoni’s Police Interview
¶23. Before opening statements, Zattoni’s attorney objected to the State’s use of an
unredacted version of Zattoni’s police interview. He asked the trial court to have the State
use a redacted version of the recording or prohibit the use of the recording entirely. Zattoni’s
attorney asserted that the recording, specifically “the latter half,” contained “extensive
discussion of [Zattoni’s] criminal record[.]” In response, the trial court asked if Zattoni had
been “Mirandized[2] prior to giving his statement?” While defense counsel acknowledged
that Zattoni had been made aware of his rights, he asserted that “the interview [was] overly
prejudicial and of no value in this case other than to be prejudiced [sic] the defendant.” The
trial court noted the argument and overruled Zattoni’s objection.
¶24. When the State attempted to introduce the recording into evidence at trial, Zattoni’s
attorney renewed its objection to using an unredacted version of the recording. Zattoni
argued that “the interview in total coming in unredacted without the parts that we believe are
far more prejudicial than probative coming in.” In response, the State argued that it was the
“entire recording” and that Zattoni had been Mirandized before making these statements.
Again, the trial court overruled Zattoni’s objection, stating:
Because the defendant was on notice of his rights and he waived those rights and voluntarily gave a statement, waived his right to counsel and was notified that anything he said could and would be used against him, the [c]ourt finds that the statement may be admitted and overrules the objection.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
9 The unredacted recording was played for the jury.
¶25. Because the jury heard evidence of Zattoni’s prior convictions and his previous
encounters with the legal system, the trial court gave a limiting instruction. The following
limiting instruction was given from the bench:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard testimony that the defendant has prior convictions and encounters with law enforcement and the court system. The fact that the defendant has previously been found guilty of another crime or has had prior encounters with law enforcement or the court system does not mean that the defendant committed the crimes for which the defendant is now on trial and you may not use his testimony as proof of the crimes charged in this case. And that is the limiting instruction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶26. “The admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court, and
reversal is appropriate only when a trial court commits an abuse of discretion resulting in
prejudice to the accused.” Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 992 (Miss. 2007) (citing Irby v.
State, 893 So. 2d 1042, 1047 (Miss. 2004)). Additionally, “[a] trial judge enjoys a great deal
of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the judge abuses this
discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling.” Shaw
v. State, 915 So. 2d 442, 445 (Miss. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Jefferson v. State, 818 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 2002)).
DISCUSSION
I. The Stipulation
¶27. According to Zattoni, since he had stipulated to being a convicted felon, the trial court
erred by “read[ing] the indictment to the venire, which listed Zattoni’s prior convictions for
10 possession of counterfeit instruments and accessory after the fact to murder.” Zattoni argues
that allowing the jury to hear the specifics of his prior convictions after stipulating served “no
probative purpose, was overly prejudicial, and failed to comply with the Mississippi Rules
of Evidence.” Zattoni relies on Court of Appeals case Herrington v. State, 102 So. 3d 1241,
1248 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), that states, “once the parties stipulate to the defendant’s status
as a previously convicted felon, admittance of the prior convictions into evidence is a
violation of Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) [of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence].” Thus, Zattoni
alleges that “[t]he trial court could have read a redacted version of the indictment . . . or
paraphrased the indictment” to the jury, instead of reading the indictment verbatim.
¶28. The State argues that this issue is waived because “[a]t no point did Zattoni ask the
stipulation be read to the venire, nor did he ask the trial court not to read certain portions of
the indictment including any language from Count 3.” If the argument is not waived, the
State also asserts that Zattoni’s argument lacks merit because (1) the jury must be informed
of the charges against the defendant, and (2) the indictment is not evidence.
¶29. First, this issue is not waived. Zattoni submitted the stipulation at the outset of his trial
in order to prevent the specifics of his prior convictions from being introduced to the jury.
Additionally, his attorney later objected to the reading of Count III of the indictment, which
the trial court denied. We find that Zattoni’s attorney took every reasonable step to properly
preserve this issue for appeal.
¶30. Second, this Court finds that the trial court erred by informing the jury of the specifics
of Zattoni’s prior convictions. Pursuant to Rule 19.1(b)(2)(B) of Mississippi’s Rules of
11 Criminal Procedure,
When a prior conviction is an element of the principal charge, the fact of a prior conviction shall be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the defendant may stipulate to, or waive proof regarding, the prior conviction and the trial court shall accept such a stipulation. The stipulation then shall be submitted to the jury with a proper limiting instruction.
MRCrP 19.1(b)(2)(B); see also Williams v. State, 991 So. 2d 593, 605-06 (Miss. 2008).
¶31. It is apparent from the record that there was confusion regarding the acceptance of the
stipulation. Even the State acknowledges that “[t]he record suggests a lack of mutual
understanding between the trial court and the prosecution” regarding the stipulation. Before
a jury was even seated, Zattoni offered a stipulation to the trial court. Instead of accepting
the stipulation, the trial court and the State entered into a debate about the language of the
stipulation. Instead of resolving the dispute and accepting the stipulation before jury
selection, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The stipulation was not accepted
and admitted until after the State presented its case-in-chief. At that point, the jury already
had heard several references to Zattoni’s prior convictions.
¶32. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted in Herrington, in cases such as these,
The jury did not need to know the details of [the defendant’s] prior convictions to reach a verdict on the charge of felon in possession of a weapon; it needed only to know that there was one prior felony conviction. The type of prior conviction has no probative value regarding whether [the defendant] was a felon in possession of a weapon. Therefore, once the parties agreed to [the defendant’s] status as a previously convicted felon, there was no probative value in introducing the details of his prior convictions into evidence.
Herrington, 102 So. 3d at 1248 (emphasis added).
12 ¶33. When the stipulation was presented at the beginning of the trial, the trial court was
required to accept it. If the trial court had issues with the wording of the stipulation, the issue
should have been resolved and accepted the stipulation before the start of the trial. The trial
court’s delay in accepting the stipulation allowed the State to introduce specific details
regarding Zattoni’s prior convictions, which contradicts the purpose of stipulations.
Therefore, we find that the trial court erred by not accepting the stipulation until after the
State had presented its case-in-chief.
II. The Unredacted Audio File
¶34. Zattoni argues also that the trial court improperly admitted an unredacted audio
recording of his interview with police, which “included evidence of Zattoni’s prior crimes”
that were “provided in response to police questioning.” He asserts that “the portions of the
audio file that discussed his unrelated criminal convictions were inadmissible under Rule 403
and 404 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.” According to Zattoni, instead of conducting
a proper Rule 403 analysis, the trial court erroneously “reasoned that because Zattoni [had
been] Mirandized, the entire audio file was admissible.” The State argues that the trial court
did not err by admitting the recording in its entirety because:
(1) “the statement and its tangential references to other crimes were not offered to show that he acted in conformity with other bad acts in violation of Rule 404(b) but offered to tell a complete story and to show consciousness of guilt[,]”
(2) Zattoni’s “references to his criminal history were continually intertwined with his admissions and explanations about his present charges[,]”
(3) while the trial court considered the standard set forth in Miranda, “[t]he
13 record[] shows Rule 404(b) arguments were presented, heard, and ruled on.”
(4) Zattoni did not “offer a redacted version of his statement.”
¶35. We disagree. After listening to the entirety of the sixty-minute audio recording, this
Court determined that only sixteen of those minutes concerned events surrounding Zattoni’s
current charges. The rest of the sixty-minute audio recording concerned Zattoni and
Investigator Holifield’s conversations about (1) Zattoni’s drug use; (2) Zattoni’s associations
with criminal organizations, such as the Aryan Brotherhood; (3) Zattoni’s attempts to flee
from the police, a crime for which he had not been charged; (4) the details regarding
Zattoni’s prior convictions; and (5) either silence or background noise as Zattoni wrote down
his statement.
¶36. The majority of the statements contained within the audio recording do not concern
the crimes for which Zattoni was being prosecuted. As a result, the only purpose they could
serve were to paint Zattoni in a bad light. Additionally, we cannot fault Zattoni for not
providing a redacted version of the recording because “[i]n a criminal case, the burden of
proof remains always with the prosecution on each element of the offense.” Moore v. State,
348 So. 3d 322, 329 (Miss. 2022) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Heidel v. State,
587 So. 2d 835, 843 (Miss. 1991)). The only obligation Zattoni bore was to object properly
to the State’s admitting of the recording, which he did on multiple occasions. He was under
no obligation to help the State satisfy its burden of proof.
¶37. Second, the record does not support any inclination that the trial court considered
Mississippi Rules of Evidence 404(b) or 403 in determining the admissibility of the
14 recording. Even if the recording satisfied Rule 404(b), it fails the Rule 403 balance test
because Zattoni’s statements were more prejudicial than probative. See Pitchford v. State,
45 So. 3d 216, 246 (Miss. 2010) (“Rule 404(b) exceptions are, indeed, subject to a Rule 403
balancing test.”). While the trial court did not say the magic words regarding the Rule 403
balancing test, the trial court clearly admitted the unredacted recording solely because Zattoni
had been Mirandized and had been made aware that his statements could be used against
him. See Pitchford, 45 So. 3d at 246; see also Jenkins v. State, 75 So. 3d 49, 55 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2011). The fact that Zattoni had been Mirandized does not affect the balancing of
prejudicial versus probative value of the recording because each standard protects different
interests.3 Therefore, the trial court did not conduct a proper admissibility analysis and erred
by admitting the unredacted recording because it was more prejudicial than probative.
III. Harmless Error
¶38. The State argues that if the trial court committed any error, it was harmless because
“[t]he evidence of Zattoni’s guilt was overwhelming.” Zattoni argues that the error is not
harmless because “the record reflects a real and substantial risk of prejudice.” Zattoni asserts
that since one venire member had an issue after hearing the nature of his prior convictions,
there was a possibility that similarly situated jurors felt the same. He claims that the trial
3 This Court has stated that “[t]he purpose of the Miranda warnings is to protect the individual’s constitutional rights against illegal government intrusion.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 518 (Miss. 1998) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). Rule 403’s balancing test, by contrast, seeks to prevent evidence from being introduced that could result in an unfair and prejudicial trial. See Welde v. State, 3 So. 3d 113, 117 (Miss. 2009) (“Rule 403 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crawford v. State, 754 So. 2d 1211, 1220 (Miss. 2000), disagreed with on other grounds by Dilworth v. State, 754 So. 2d 1211 (Miss. 2000))).
15 court’s failure to exclude the “highly prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts . . . taint[ed] the
fairness of the proceedings.”
¶39. This Court has held that
[E]rrors may be deemed harmless where “the same result would have been reached had they not existed.” “[E]ven where error has occurred, we will not reverse a conviction where the overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the guilty verdict.”
Tate v. State, 912 So. 2d 919, 926 (Miss. 2005) (second alteration in original) (citations
omitted). “A criminal [defendant] is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair trial.” Hutto v.
State, 227 So. 3d 963, 998 (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ronk
v. State, 172 So. 3d 1112, 1148 (Miss. 2015)).
¶40. Even without the audio recording, the State presented overwhelming evidence of
Zattoni’s guilt for the crimes of kidnapping and felon in possession of a gun. Regarding the
kidnapping charge, the jury heard testimony from the victim, Lambert. Specifically, the jury
heard Lambert state that she did not voluntarily get into Zattoni’s truck and that she
intentionally jumped out of the vehicle because she no longer wanted to be there. As for the
possession of a gun by a felon, Zattoni admitted on the stand that he was a convicted felon,
that he intentionally fired the gun in the direction of Lambert’s car, and that he intentionally
threw the gun in a field to get rid of it due to his status as a convicted felon. Additionally, the
trial court gave a limiting instruction regarding considering Zattoni’s prior convictions and
previous encounters with law enforcement. By giving this instruction, the trial court “cured
any possible prejudice that could have occurred.” King v. State, 857 So. 2d 702, 723 (Miss.
2003) (citing Day v. State, 589 So. 2d 637, 644 (Miss. 1991)). In light of the evidence
16 provided and limiting instruction, the above-mentioned errors were harmless.
CONCLUSION
¶41. Even though the trial court erred by allowing prejudicial evidence to be admitted,
those errors were harmless. The State presented overwhelming evidence that demonstrated
Zattoni kidnapped his girlfriend and possessed a gun while being a felon. Zattoni’s
conviction is affirmed.
¶42. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE, GRIFFIS AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR.