Joseph Anthony Mata v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00907-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued June 26, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00906-CR NO. 01-24-00907-CR ——————————— JOSEPH ANTHONY MATA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 487th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 1807007 & 1807010

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Joseph Anthony Mata, pleaded guilty without an agreed

punishment recommendation from the State to two charges of indecency with a child by contact.1 The trial court found appellant guilty in both cases and assessed

appellant’s punishment at confinement for fourteen years. Appellant timely filed a

notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The trial court must sign a certification of a defendant’s right of appeal each

time it enters a judgment of guilt or other appealable order. TEX. R. APP. P.

25.2(a)(2). An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant

has a right of appeal has not been made part of the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d);

Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Here, the trial court’s

certification is included in the record on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). It states

that this “[i]s a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). As discussed below, the record supports the trial court’s

certification that appellant has no right to appeal.2

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(c)(2). 2 Appellant filed a motion to abate and remand this appeal to the trial court for clarification regarding his right to appeal. Appellant asserts, among other things, that “the record does not indicate that this was a plea-bargain case as defined by Rule 25.2(a)(2).” Although we agree that this is not a plea-bargain case as defined by Rule 25.2(a)(2), the trial court’s certification that appellant “has NO right to appeal” is nevertheless correct because the record demonstrates that appellant waived his right to appeal. See Evans v. State, No. 01-22-00838-CR, 2023 WL 5615797, at 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant also asserts that the State’s consent to the waiver of jury trial is insufficient consideration for a valid waiver of appellant’s right to appeal regarding the sentence imposes, but this is contrary to well-established caselaw discussed herein. Accordingly, the motion to abate and remand is denied. 2 Although a defendant has a statutory right to appeal his conviction, he may

waive his right to appeal in all but capital cases. Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489,

492–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A valid waiver of appeal—one made voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently—prevents a defendant from appealing without the trial

court’s consent. See id.; Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697–99 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009); see also Flores v. State, Nos. 01-20-00243-CR to 01-20-00246-CR,

2020 WL 2988564, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 4, 2020, pet. ref’d)

(per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “[A] defendant may

knowingly and intelligently waive his appeal as part of a plea when consideration is

given by the State, even when sentencing is not agreed upon.” Carson, 559 S.W.3d

at 494; see Jones v. State, 488 S.W.3d 801, 804–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(explaining presentence waivers of right of appeal have been upheld when record

showed defendant received consideration for waiver); see also TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 1.14(a) (“The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may

waive any rights secured him by law . . . .”); Flores, 2020 WL 2988564, at *1.

Here, as part of his guilty plea, appellant signed a “Waiver of Constitutional

Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession,” stating:

I intend to enter a plea of guilty without an agreed recommendation of punishment from the prosecutor and request that my punishment should be set by the judge. I understand that I have not reached an agreement with the prosecutor as to punishment, and the prosecution reserves the right to argue for any sentence within the available range of punishment at my sentencing hearing. Further, in exchange for the state waiving its 3 right to a jury trial which then includes within the permissible range of sentence deferred adjudication community supervision, I agree that I have knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily waived any right of appeal which I may have.

(emphasis added).3 In exchange for appellant waiving his right to appeal, the State

agreed to waive its right to a jury trial or, more precisely, the State consented to

appellant’s waiver of his right to jury trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13(a)

(“The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony

case in which the [S]tate notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the

death penalty shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by

jury, conditioned, however, that, except as provided by [Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure] [a]rticle 27.19, the waiver must be made in person by the defendant in

writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney

representing the [S]tate.” (emphasis added)); see also Harrison v. State, No.

01-20-00093-CR, 2020 WL 7776082, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.

31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Flores, 2020 WL

2988564, at *2. By agreeing to waive its right to a jury trial, the State gave

consideration for appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal. See Carson, 559 S.W.3d

at 492–96; Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d at 695–99; see also See Lagunas v. State,

3 Appellant also signed a document titled, “Advice of Defendant’s Right of Appeal,” which advised appellant of the following: “If you waived or gave up your right to appeal, you cannot appeal your conviction.” (emphasis omitted).

4 No. 01-20-00279-CR, 2020 WL 5823291, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Oct. 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (per curiam)

(defendant voluntarily waived his statutorily created right of appeal in exchange for

State waiving its right to jury trial); Flores, 2020 WL 2988564, at *2.

Although appellant attempts to appeal from the trial court’s judgment of

conviction, the record is clear that appellant voluntarily waived his statutorily-

created right of appeal in exchange for the State waiving its right to a jury trial. See

Lewis v. State, No. 01-22-00303-CR, 2022 WL 14165900, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). If a defendant validly waives his right to appeal but nonetheless

appeals, we must dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id.; see Chavez v. State,

183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having

jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant . . . is permitted to appeal by [Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure] 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without

further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 43.2(f). We dismiss all pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).