NO. 07-11-0042-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
NOVEMBER 13, 2012 ______________________________
JOSEPH ANTHONY KENNEDY, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 26TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY; 1
NO. 09-887-K26; HONORABLE BILLY RAY STUBBLEFIELD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
OPINION
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Joseph Anthony Kennedy, was
convicted by a jury of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child 2 and two counts
1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 73.001 (W EST 2005). As Appellant acknowledges in his brief, pursuant to Rule 41.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we apply the precedent of the transferor court. 2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (W EST SUPP. 2012). of indecency with a child by contact. 3 Appellant was sentenced to thirty-five years
confinement on the continuous sexual abuse charge and two years confinement on
each count of indecency with a child charges. 4 The sentences were ordered to run
consecutively. By a single issue, Appellant maintains that section 21.02 of the Texas
Penal Code, entitled “Continuous Sexual Abuse of Young Child or Children” violates the
constitutional and statutory requirements of a unanimous jury verdict. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was accused of sexually abusing his two stepdaughters, L.T. and
C.N.T., over a two-year period when they were under age fourteen. Only the facts
necessary for disposition of Appellant’s issue will be developed.
During pretrial proceedings via a Motion to Quash, as well as during the charge
conference in the guilt/innocence phase, Appellant complained that the statute on
continuous sexual abuse fails to require jury unanimity as to specific acts of sexual
abuse. 5 On appeal, he argues the statute violates his right to a unanimous jury verdict
guaranteed by the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend VI,
XIV; TEX CONST. art. V, § 13. He also argues the statute denies him due process and
due course of law on its face and as applied to him. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 19.
3 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (W EST 2011). 4 Appellant does not challenge his conviction or sentence for the two counts of indecency with a child by contact. 5 The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and also ruled against Appellant on his objections to the charge. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW
When confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we
presume the statute is valid and that the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or
arbitrarily. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Frieling v.
State, 67 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex.App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). We review the
constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo. Lockhard v. State, 364 S.W.3d 920, 921
(Tex.App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
Under section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code, a “person commits an offense if
during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more
acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts . . . are committed against one or
more victims . . . .” The statute also requires that the actor be seventeen years of age
or older and the victim or victims be younger than fourteen. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.02(b)(2) (W EST SUPP. 2012). If a jury is the trier of fact, members are not required to
agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed or the exact
date when those acts were committed. Id. at (d). The jury need only agree
unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is thirty or more days in duration,
committed two or more acts of sexual abuse. Id.
“It has long been the case that juror unanimity is required in felony cases by the
Texas Constitution and in all criminal trials by state statutes.” See Young v. State, 341
S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13 and TEX. CODE 3 CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 37.02, 37.03 and 37.04). See also Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d
738, 745 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Appellant relies on Richardson v. United States, 526
U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), and incorporating by reference an
amicus curiae brief filed by Professor George E. Dix of the University of Texas, he
contends that section 21.02 defines continuous sexual abuse without including an
element consisting of specific conduct. This, he argues, “creates an unacceptably high
risk that jurors will fail to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt of whether the
defendant engaged in the requisite criminal activity.” We disagree.
To date, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not written on the
constitutionality of section 21.02; however, the transferor court has concluded the
statute does not violate due process by permitting a conviction based on a jury’s
unanimous finding that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct consisting of
repeated acts of sexual abuse, but without requiring jury unanimity. See Jacobsen v.
State, 325 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex.App.—Austin 2010, no pet). See also Martin v. State,
335 S.W.3d 867 (Tex.App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d) (holding as it did in Jacobsen that
section 21.02 did not violate the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict). 6
In finding that section 21.02 did not violate an appellant’s right to a unanimous
jury verdict, citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745, the Jacobsen Court found that unanimity
requires that each juror agree that the defendant committed the same specific actus
6 Appellant also relies on State v. Rabago, 103 Hawaii 236, 81 P.3d 1151 (2003), which struck down an analogous statute. However, the Austin Court of Appeals considered and disagreed with Rabago in Jacobsen. 325 S.W.3d at 873. 4 reus. 7 The court went on, however, to note a crucial distinction between facts that are
the specific actus reus element of the crime and ones that are merely a means of
committing that element. Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 736. To convict, jurors must
unanimously agree on each element of the crime but need not agree on all the
underlying facts that make up a particular element. Id. “When alternative manners and
means of committing an offense are submitted to a jury, it is appropriate for the jury to
return a general verdict of guilty if the evidence supports a conviction under any one of
them.” Id. (citing Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)).
Under the plain meaning of section 21.02, the commission of two or more acts of
sexual abuse over a specified period of time is the actus reus element of the offense
which requires jury unanimity. Id. at 737.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NO. 07-11-0042-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
NOVEMBER 13, 2012 ______________________________
JOSEPH ANTHONY KENNEDY, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 26TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY; 1
NO. 09-887-K26; HONORABLE BILLY RAY STUBBLEFIELD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
OPINION
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Joseph Anthony Kennedy, was
convicted by a jury of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child 2 and two counts
1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 73.001 (W EST 2005). As Appellant acknowledges in his brief, pursuant to Rule 41.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we apply the precedent of the transferor court. 2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (W EST SUPP. 2012). of indecency with a child by contact. 3 Appellant was sentenced to thirty-five years
confinement on the continuous sexual abuse charge and two years confinement on
each count of indecency with a child charges. 4 The sentences were ordered to run
consecutively. By a single issue, Appellant maintains that section 21.02 of the Texas
Penal Code, entitled “Continuous Sexual Abuse of Young Child or Children” violates the
constitutional and statutory requirements of a unanimous jury verdict. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was accused of sexually abusing his two stepdaughters, L.T. and
C.N.T., over a two-year period when they were under age fourteen. Only the facts
necessary for disposition of Appellant’s issue will be developed.
During pretrial proceedings via a Motion to Quash, as well as during the charge
conference in the guilt/innocence phase, Appellant complained that the statute on
continuous sexual abuse fails to require jury unanimity as to specific acts of sexual
abuse. 5 On appeal, he argues the statute violates his right to a unanimous jury verdict
guaranteed by the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend VI,
XIV; TEX CONST. art. V, § 13. He also argues the statute denies him due process and
due course of law on its face and as applied to him. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 19.
3 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (W EST 2011). 4 Appellant does not challenge his conviction or sentence for the two counts of indecency with a child by contact. 5 The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and also ruled against Appellant on his objections to the charge. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW
When confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we
presume the statute is valid and that the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or
arbitrarily. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Frieling v.
State, 67 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex.App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). We review the
constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo. Lockhard v. State, 364 S.W.3d 920, 921
(Tex.App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
Under section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code, a “person commits an offense if
during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more
acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts . . . are committed against one or
more victims . . . .” The statute also requires that the actor be seventeen years of age
or older and the victim or victims be younger than fourteen. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.02(b)(2) (W EST SUPP. 2012). If a jury is the trier of fact, members are not required to
agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed or the exact
date when those acts were committed. Id. at (d). The jury need only agree
unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is thirty or more days in duration,
committed two or more acts of sexual abuse. Id.
“It has long been the case that juror unanimity is required in felony cases by the
Texas Constitution and in all criminal trials by state statutes.” See Young v. State, 341
S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13 and TEX. CODE 3 CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 37.02, 37.03 and 37.04). See also Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d
738, 745 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Appellant relies on Richardson v. United States, 526
U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), and incorporating by reference an
amicus curiae brief filed by Professor George E. Dix of the University of Texas, he
contends that section 21.02 defines continuous sexual abuse without including an
element consisting of specific conduct. This, he argues, “creates an unacceptably high
risk that jurors will fail to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt of whether the
defendant engaged in the requisite criminal activity.” We disagree.
To date, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not written on the
constitutionality of section 21.02; however, the transferor court has concluded the
statute does not violate due process by permitting a conviction based on a jury’s
unanimous finding that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct consisting of
repeated acts of sexual abuse, but without requiring jury unanimity. See Jacobsen v.
State, 325 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex.App.—Austin 2010, no pet). See also Martin v. State,
335 S.W.3d 867 (Tex.App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d) (holding as it did in Jacobsen that
section 21.02 did not violate the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict). 6
In finding that section 21.02 did not violate an appellant’s right to a unanimous
jury verdict, citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745, the Jacobsen Court found that unanimity
requires that each juror agree that the defendant committed the same specific actus
6 Appellant also relies on State v. Rabago, 103 Hawaii 236, 81 P.3d 1151 (2003), which struck down an analogous statute. However, the Austin Court of Appeals considered and disagreed with Rabago in Jacobsen. 325 S.W.3d at 873. 4 reus. 7 The court went on, however, to note a crucial distinction between facts that are
the specific actus reus element of the crime and ones that are merely a means of
committing that element. Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 736. To convict, jurors must
unanimously agree on each element of the crime but need not agree on all the
underlying facts that make up a particular element. Id. “When alternative manners and
means of committing an offense are submitted to a jury, it is appropriate for the jury to
return a general verdict of guilty if the evidence supports a conviction under any one of
them.” Id. (citing Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)).
Under the plain meaning of section 21.02, the commission of two or more acts of
sexual abuse over a specified period of time is the actus reus element of the offense
which requires jury unanimity. Id. at 737. The individual acts of sexual abuse that make
up the series of acts are not themselves elements of the offense. Id. They are merely
evidentiary facts, the manner and means by which the actus reus element is committed.
Id. Where the evidence supports more than two acts of sexual abuse over the specified
time, jurors need not agree as to which individual acts were committed so long as they
agree the defendant committed at least two. Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d).
Appellant was charged with committing two or more acts of sexual abuse against
L.T. during a period that was thirty days or more in duration over a two-year period. He
was also charged with committing two or more acts of sexual abuse against C.N.T. over
the same two-year period. The touching and/or penetration of his stepdaughters’
7 An actus reus is the wrongful deed which renders the actor criminally liable if committed with the requisite criminal intent, or mens rea. The actus reus is the physical aspect of a crime, whereas the mens th rea involves the intent factor. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 36 (6 ed. 1990). 5 breasts and genitals were simply the manner and means by which he committed
continuous sexual abuse. Subparagraph (d) of section 21.02 makes it clear that the
jurors did not need to agree on which individual acts Appellant committed as long as
they agreed that he did commit at least two. Accordingly, we conclude that section
21.02 does not violate Appellant’s constitutional and statutory right to a unanimous jury
verdict. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
Publish.