MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-09-00722-CR
Jose ZAMORA, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No 4, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 256425 Honorable Sarah Garrahan-Moulder, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Sitting: Karen A. Angelini, Justice Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 10, 2010
AFFIRMED
This appeal arises from the denial of Appellant Jose Zamora’s motion to suppress
evidence of his driving while intoxicated. Zamora argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion based on the arresting officer’s lack of probable cause to conduct (1) the initial stop of
Zamora’s vehicle and (2) the field sobriety tests. We affirm the order of the trial court. 04-09-00722-CR
BACKGROUND
Around 2:00 a.m., on June 27, 2008, Officer Chris Ruiz stopped Zamora for traveling
sixty miles per hour, fifteen miles over the posted speed limit. Officer Ruiz asked Zamora to exit
the car, and, after performing several field sobriety tests, determined that Zamora was intoxicated
and placed him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Following Zamora’s arrest, Officer
Ruiz conducted an interview.
Zamora moved to suppress evidence based on Officer Ruiz’s lack of reasonable suspicion
to (1) stop Zamora’s vehicle and (2) conduct field sobriety tests. 1 After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion. In accordance with Zamora’s plea agreement, the trial court sentenced
Zamora to six months confinement in the Bexar County jail, and assessed a fine in the amount of
$300.00. Zamora appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s order on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard, and affords almost total deference to the trial court’s factual determinations. Amador v.
State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). If the resolution of the factual determinations turns on the evaluation of a
witness’s credibility and demeanor, an appellate court also affords the same level of deference to
a trial court’s ruling on “application of law to fact questions,” or “mixed questions of law and
fact.” Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (internal quotes omitted). If not, the appellate court reviews
the application of law to the facts de novo. See id.
1 The trial court granted the motion to suppress with regard to a post-arrest interview.
-2- 04-09-00722-CR
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Zamora argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer
Ruiz lacked reasonable suspicion both to stop Zamora and to conduct field sobriety tests. The
State disagrees based on the totality of the circumstances of the stop and arrest.
A. Applicable Law
Routine traffic stops are investigative detentions that must be based on reasonable
suspicion. Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d,
untimely filed) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984)). These investigative
detentions are governed by the two-pronged test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See id.
First, a court must determine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception. Kothe v.
State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In making this determination, it must consider
whether the testifying officer has pointed to “specific, articulable facts that, when combined with
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular
person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Ford v. State, 158
S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “These facts must amount to more than a mere hunch
or suspicion.” Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Second, the
circumstances that justify the stop must be reasonably related to the scope of the seizure. Kothe,
152 S.W.3d at 63. In deciding whether a detention is reasonable, the stop may last no longer
than necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stop. Id. A court measures reasonableness in
objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 62.
B. The Stop
Officer Ruiz pointed to several specific, articulable facts relating to two distinct crimes
that led him to stop Zamora’s vehicle: speeding and suspicion of driving while intoxicated. At
-3- 04-09-00722-CR
the hearing, Officer Ruiz testified that Zamora was traveling at a speed of sixty miles per hour in
an area with a posted speed limit of forty-five miles per hour. Officer Ruiz explained that he was
driving at forty-five miles per hour, as indicated by his speedometer, and that he observed
Zamora “spe[e]d right by [him];” followed Zamora for a few moments; and paced Zamora as
traveling at sixty miles per hour.
Additionally, Officer Ruiz testified that Zamora failed to maintain a single lane and
crossed over lane markers. Although failing to maintain a lane is not necessarily a criminal
offense, it may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated. See Arizpe v.
State, 308 S.W.3d 89, 94 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 2010, no pet.); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Bell, 11 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 1999, no pet.). Because Officer Ruiz
developed reasonable suspicion to stop Zamora’s vehicle for speeding, as well as for suspicion of
driving while intoxicated, we overrule Zamora’s contention that Officer Ruiz lacked reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop.
C. The Field Sobriety Tests
We next address Zamora’s contention based on the second prong of Terry, that Officer
Ruiz lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 37.
At the hearing, Officer Ruiz testified that when Zamora pulled his vehicle over onto the left
shoulder, he obstructed the left lane of travel on the interstate. Officer Ruiz further relayed that
Zamora had a “strong odor of alcoholic beverage;” his eyes were “glossy and bloodshot;” and
Zamora admitted to having four drinks before driving. At that point, Officer Ruiz asked Zamora
to exit his vehicle and proceeded to conduct several field sobriety tests. As Zamora exited his
vehicle and attempted to follow the officer’s instructions, Officer Ruiz observed several specific,
articulable instances that led him to reasonably believe that Zamora might have been driving
-4- 04-09-00722-CR
while intoxicated. During such time, Officer Ruiz developed the necessary reasonable suspicion
to conduct the field sobriety tests to determine whether Zamora was intoxicated. See State v.
Wharton-Hasty, No.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-09-00722-CR
Jose ZAMORA, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No 4, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 256425 Honorable Sarah Garrahan-Moulder, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Sitting: Karen A. Angelini, Justice Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 10, 2010
AFFIRMED
This appeal arises from the denial of Appellant Jose Zamora’s motion to suppress
evidence of his driving while intoxicated. Zamora argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion based on the arresting officer’s lack of probable cause to conduct (1) the initial stop of
Zamora’s vehicle and (2) the field sobriety tests. We affirm the order of the trial court. 04-09-00722-CR
BACKGROUND
Around 2:00 a.m., on June 27, 2008, Officer Chris Ruiz stopped Zamora for traveling
sixty miles per hour, fifteen miles over the posted speed limit. Officer Ruiz asked Zamora to exit
the car, and, after performing several field sobriety tests, determined that Zamora was intoxicated
and placed him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Following Zamora’s arrest, Officer
Ruiz conducted an interview.
Zamora moved to suppress evidence based on Officer Ruiz’s lack of reasonable suspicion
to (1) stop Zamora’s vehicle and (2) conduct field sobriety tests. 1 After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion. In accordance with Zamora’s plea agreement, the trial court sentenced
Zamora to six months confinement in the Bexar County jail, and assessed a fine in the amount of
$300.00. Zamora appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s order on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard, and affords almost total deference to the trial court’s factual determinations. Amador v.
State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). If the resolution of the factual determinations turns on the evaluation of a
witness’s credibility and demeanor, an appellate court also affords the same level of deference to
a trial court’s ruling on “application of law to fact questions,” or “mixed questions of law and
fact.” Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (internal quotes omitted). If not, the appellate court reviews
the application of law to the facts de novo. See id.
1 The trial court granted the motion to suppress with regard to a post-arrest interview.
-2- 04-09-00722-CR
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Zamora argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer
Ruiz lacked reasonable suspicion both to stop Zamora and to conduct field sobriety tests. The
State disagrees based on the totality of the circumstances of the stop and arrest.
A. Applicable Law
Routine traffic stops are investigative detentions that must be based on reasonable
suspicion. Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d,
untimely filed) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984)). These investigative
detentions are governed by the two-pronged test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See id.
First, a court must determine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception. Kothe v.
State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In making this determination, it must consider
whether the testifying officer has pointed to “specific, articulable facts that, when combined with
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular
person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Ford v. State, 158
S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “These facts must amount to more than a mere hunch
or suspicion.” Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Second, the
circumstances that justify the stop must be reasonably related to the scope of the seizure. Kothe,
152 S.W.3d at 63. In deciding whether a detention is reasonable, the stop may last no longer
than necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stop. Id. A court measures reasonableness in
objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 62.
B. The Stop
Officer Ruiz pointed to several specific, articulable facts relating to two distinct crimes
that led him to stop Zamora’s vehicle: speeding and suspicion of driving while intoxicated. At
-3- 04-09-00722-CR
the hearing, Officer Ruiz testified that Zamora was traveling at a speed of sixty miles per hour in
an area with a posted speed limit of forty-five miles per hour. Officer Ruiz explained that he was
driving at forty-five miles per hour, as indicated by his speedometer, and that he observed
Zamora “spe[e]d right by [him];” followed Zamora for a few moments; and paced Zamora as
traveling at sixty miles per hour.
Additionally, Officer Ruiz testified that Zamora failed to maintain a single lane and
crossed over lane markers. Although failing to maintain a lane is not necessarily a criminal
offense, it may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated. See Arizpe v.
State, 308 S.W.3d 89, 94 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 2010, no pet.); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Bell, 11 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 1999, no pet.). Because Officer Ruiz
developed reasonable suspicion to stop Zamora’s vehicle for speeding, as well as for suspicion of
driving while intoxicated, we overrule Zamora’s contention that Officer Ruiz lacked reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop.
C. The Field Sobriety Tests
We next address Zamora’s contention based on the second prong of Terry, that Officer
Ruiz lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 37.
At the hearing, Officer Ruiz testified that when Zamora pulled his vehicle over onto the left
shoulder, he obstructed the left lane of travel on the interstate. Officer Ruiz further relayed that
Zamora had a “strong odor of alcoholic beverage;” his eyes were “glossy and bloodshot;” and
Zamora admitted to having four drinks before driving. At that point, Officer Ruiz asked Zamora
to exit his vehicle and proceeded to conduct several field sobriety tests. As Zamora exited his
vehicle and attempted to follow the officer’s instructions, Officer Ruiz observed several specific,
articulable instances that led him to reasonably believe that Zamora might have been driving
-4- 04-09-00722-CR
while intoxicated. During such time, Officer Ruiz developed the necessary reasonable suspicion
to conduct the field sobriety tests to determine whether Zamora was intoxicated. See State v.
Wharton-Hasty, No. 04-09-00428-CR, 2010 WL 2403730, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June
16, 2010, no pet.) (holding that bloodshot eyes and “slight” odor of alcohol were sufficient to
constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests).
Zamora argues that Officer Ruiz lacked reasonable suspicion because Officer Ruiz
testified at the hearing that Zamora was cooperative, that Zamora’s speech was not slurred, and
that Zamora did not fumble when he handed Officer Ruiz his driver’s license and registration.
However, because we measure reasonableness in objective terms by examining the totality of the
circumstance, these facts do not negate Officer Ruiz’s reasonable suspicion that Zamora was
driving while intoxicated. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 62–63. Consequently, not all of a driver’s
actions must suggest that he is driving while intoxicated. See id. Because Officer Ruiz had
reasonable suspicion that Zamora was driving while intoxicated, we overrule Zamora’s second
issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Officer Ruiz developed reasonable suspicion to stop Zamora for speeding, and because
Zamora’s conduct provided further evidence to substantiate reasonable suspicion to conduct field
sobriety tests, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to
suppress the initial stop and the field sobriety tests. We, therefore, affirm the order of the trial
court.
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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