In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-24-00071-CR ___________________________
JOSE VALLE-FERNANDEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1718742
Before Kerr, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Appellant Jose Valle-Fernandez appeals his convictions for continuous sexual
abuse of a child for which he was sentenced to life without parole and two counts of
indecency with a child by sexual contact for each of which he was sentenced to two
years’ confinement. In two issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by determining that a juror was disabled, thereby continuing with only
eleven jurors over his objections, and by refusing the defense’s requests to explore the
potential bias of another juror. Because Appellant has failed to show an abuse of
discretion as to either issue that he raises, we affirm.1
II. Disabled-Juror Determination and Decision to Proceed with Eleven Jurors
In his first issue, Appellant argues (1) that the trial court abused its discretion
by finding Juror No. 61 disabled and by excusing him and (2) that the defense did not
consent to proceeding with eleven jurors. Because, as explained below, the record
demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that a juror
who was coughing excessively and grabbing his chest was disabled, it follows that
under the disabled-juror statute it was proper for the trial court to continue the trial
with eleven jurors.
Because Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 1
support his convictions, we omit a factual background and instead summarize the relevant portions of the record under each of his issues.
2 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
This court has previously set forth the law regarding the right to a twelve-
person jury, the law that applies when determining whether a juror has become
disabled, and the standard of review that we apply when reviewing a finding of juror
disability:
While the right to a twelve-person jury is not found in the United States Constitution, both the Texas constitution and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure require a verdict rendered by twelve jurors in felony cases. Tex. Const. art. V, § 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.29(a). However, under both the constitution and the statute, if a juror becomes “disabled”[2] from sitting, the judge may remove the juror and allow the trial to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors. Tex. Const. art. V, § 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.29(a).
“The determination as to whether a juror is disabled is within the discretion of the trial court. Absent an abuse of that discretion, no reversible error will be found.” Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Our role in reviewing a finding of disability is not “to substitute [our] own judgment for that of the trial court[] but rather[] to assess whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Scales . . . , 380 S.W.3d [at] 784 . . . . Thus, we will reverse a trial court’s finding of disability only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
Frazier v. State, No. 02-21-00115-CR, 2022 WL 5240393, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Oct. 6, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Moreover,
if a juror is found to be disabled “from sitting at any time before the charge of the
court is read to the jury,” the defendant’s consent is not necessary to proceed with
2 To be “disabled” under Article 36.29(a), the juror must be physically, mentally, or emotionally impaired in such a way that would hinder or inhibit the juror’s ability to serve. Scales v. State, 380 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (op. on reh’g).
3 eleven jurors. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.29(a); see Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d
308, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that when a juror becomes disabled, “‘the
remainder of the jury shall have the power to render the verdict’ [and that t]here is no
need to obtain anyone’s consent in this instance”).
B. What the Record Shows
Voir dire took place on January 22, 2024. Many potential jurors were excused
for cause, leaving only one possible alternate juror. The trial court then gave each side
a strike to use on the alternate juror (who had transportation issues) and noted that if
the parties struck him, there would not be an alternate. The parties agreed to proceed
without an alternate juror.
Two days later when the trial commenced, but before any testimony began, the
trial court announced that Juror No. 61 was showing signs of illness:
THE COURT: Okay. We have a problem.
Juror No. 61 . . . is coughing heavily. He’s -- he was the one wearing a mask. He still has a mask. I have segregated him from the rest of the jury. He is grabbing his chest. He -- he appears to be sick.
While we haven’t tested him for COVID, he said he would be willing to test for COVID. I don’t want to test him unless we just have to. Y’all know the law. We can excuse him, but all 11 have to sign the verdict form.
So, State, what do you want to do?
4 The State responded that it “would be fine with excusing him.” After defense counsel
spoke with Appellant, Appellant indicated that he wanted “to go forward with 12
jurors, not 11.”
The trial court stated, “Well, we got one that’s sick. He can’t continue, so the
[c]ourt plans to excuse him and proceed with 11.” Defense counsel responded,
“[O]bviously, we would object to that just for the record,” and the trial court
overruled the ambiguous objection. [Emphasis added.] Defense counsel then
“move[d] for the mistrial in the event the [c]ourt [wa]s excusing the 12th juror to -- to
11,” and the trial court denied the motion for mistrial.
The trial court next brought in Juror No. 61 and put the following on the
record:
Okay. [Juror No. 61], you have been coughing excessively this morning, correct?
JUROR: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You got a mask on?
JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you sick?
JUROR: I’m sick, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you sick to a degree that you cannot continue as a juror?
THE COURT: Because I’m planning to excuse -- you say “yes”?
5 All right. Did you say “yes”?
THE COURT: Okay. You’re excused, okay?
JUROR: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay. Take that down to jury dismissal[,] and you’re done.
....
And for the record, Juror No. 61 . . . is continuing to cough, and it’s on a regular basis. We’ve tried giving him water. We’ve tried giving him HALLS throat lozenges. Nothing was working. He was continuing to cough. And the [c]ourt’s opinion, it would have been -- his cough and sickness would have been so completely disruptive to the trial that we could not have continued with him in the jury box.
And he was continuing to cough all the way down the hall, right, [bailiff]?
THE BAILIFF: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: And it was a yucky kind of phlegmy cough, correct?
THE BAILIFF: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Court also witnessed him grabbing his chest and indicating that he just was shaking his head that he just couldn’t continue.
So that’s for the record. I’m going to intend to bring the jury out.
The indictment was read, and the trial began. When the jury was excused for a
morning break, the trial court realized that it had not made a disabled-juror finding:
“I neglected to make a finding under [Article] 36.29 [as] to the dismissed juror, No. 61
6 . . . . In addition to everything I have said, I also find that he was disabled and [that]
his sickness would have kept him unable to serve as a juror.” After the break but
before the jury was brought in, the trial court asked if both sides were ready. Defense
counsel lodged “the same objection” under Article 36.29 and stated that the defense
was “not going to agree to go forward with 11 jurors” and was going to continue to
object. The trial court implicitly overruled the objection and proceeded with the trial.
C. Analysis
1. Disabled-Juror Finding
The State argues that Appellant failed to preserve his complaint regarding the
trial court’s finding that Juror No. 61 was disabled because Appellant did not
specifically object to the trial court’s finding. Thus, as a threshold matter, we must
consider whether Appellant preserved this specific claim of error.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that a
specific and timely objection was made to the trial court and that the court ruled on
the objection. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). “The complaining party must have informed the trial judge what was
wanted and why the party was entitled to it.” Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691.
After the trial court announced that it intended to excuse Juror No. 61 as
disabled and to continue with eleven jurors, Appellant raised a bare objection that did
not identify which part of the trial court’s decision that he was objecting to (i.e., the
disability finding, the decision to proceed with eleven jurors, or both) or on what
7 grounds: “[O]bviously, we would object to that just for the record[.]” [Emphasis
added.] After the trial court overruled Appellant’s ambiguous objection, he “move[d]
for the mistrial in the event the [c]ourt [wa]s excusing the 12th juror to -- to 11,” thus
focusing on the decision to proceed with eleven jurors. And later when the trial court
made a specific disabled-juror finding on the record, Appellant made no objection.
After the parties returned from a break and the trial court asked whether both sides
were ready, defense counsel lodged “the same objection” under Article 36.29 and
stated that the defense was “not going to agree to go forward with 11 jurors” and was
going to continue to object. Based on the objections that were raised, we hold that
Appellant failed to specifically object to the trial court’s finding that Juror No. 61 was
disabled.
Because Appellant failed to specifically object to the juror-disability finding at
trial, this issue does not appear to have been preserved for appellate review. See
Frazier, 2022 WL 5240393, at *4; cf. Starks v. State, 252 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (holding that appellant forfeited objection to ill juror’s
discharge by failing to specifically object on the record when the trial court announced
the juror’s discharge); Hughes v. State, 787 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1990, pet. ref’d) (“[A]fter the trial court dismissed [the juror,]
appellant objected to the court’s ruling but failed to state any grounds for his
objection. Error is not preserved in the absence of a timely and specific objection.”).
8 Even setting aside the preservation issue and assuming without deciding that
the claim of error was preserved, we rule against Appellant on the merits. He
contends that Juror No. 61’s “cough the morning [that] testimony was to commence
fell well below what the Court of Criminal Appeals has found [to] constitute[] a
physical disability, and the trial [court] took no steps to avoid dismissing him.”
Appellant’s focus solely on Juror No. 61’s cough ignores the full picture that the trial
court described in detail on the record.3 The trial court noted that Juror No. 61 was
“coughing heavily” and “excessively,” was wearing a mask, was grabbing his chest,
and was continuing to cough (“a yucky kind of phlegmy cough”) while walking down
the hall. Appellant contends that the trial court “intentionally avoided testing” Juror
No. 61 for COVID, that “[a] medical diagnosis or test would have supported the trial
court’s decision,” and that the trial could have recessed to allow Juror No. 61 to seek
medical attention. Appellant, however, ignores that the trial court is allowed to review
a juror’s symptoms and has the “discretion to determine whether [a] juror ha[s]
become disabled.” Johnson v. State, No. 07-11-0211-CR, 2012 WL 592201, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Moreover, the trial court took steps to help alleviate Juror No. 61’s symptoms (e.g.,
giving him water and throat lozenges), but those steps were to no avail. When the
3 Appellant’s contention that “[t]he voir dire transcript contains nothing suggesting a juror was ill” provides no support for his argument as voir dire took place two days prior to the trial’s commencement, and nothing in Article 36.29 requires a juror to display illness during voir dire in order to be found disabled. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.29.
9 trial court questioned Juror No. 61, he stated that he was sick to a degree that he
could no longer continue sitting as a juror.
Because Juror No. 61’s symptoms impaired his ability to perform the functions
of a juror, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by declaring him
disabled. See id. (stating that other courts have upheld disability findings in cases
where jurors “complained of . . . temporary illnesses that impaired their ability to
perform the functions of a juror,” and upholding trial court’s disabled-juror
determination because juror had food poisoning); Hughes, 787 S.W.2d at 195 (holding
no abuse of discretion in juror-disability determination when trial court dismissed a
juror who “felt queasy, had headaches, . . . had vomited,” and had appeared to be in
“distress”); cf. Frazier, 2022 WL 5240393, at *5 (holding no abuse of discretion in
juror-disability determination when juror was under a quarantine order due to
COVID and could not “fully and fairly perform[] the functions of a juror”). We
therefore overrule the portion of Appellant’s first issue challenging the trial court’s
disabled-juror determination.
2. Proceeding with Eleven Jurors
In the remainder of his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
proceeding with eleven jurors. Appellant’s argument fails due to our previous
disposition.
As explained by the Austin Court of Appeals,
10 Having held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the juror, we hold that the court’s decision to continue the trial with eleven jurors because of the juror’s disability did not amount to an abuse of discretion. On the contrary, once the court determined that the juror was disabled, it was required to continue the trial. See Hill . . . , 90 S.W.3d [at] 315 . . . ; Carrillo v. State, 597 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. [[Panel Op.]] 1980).
Engledow v. State, Nos. 03-04-00765-CR, 03-04-00768-CR, 2006 WL 357890, at *3
(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); see Taylor v. State, No. 02-17-00414-CR, 2018 WL 3672755, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(stating that the Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted Article 36.29(a) as not only
authorizing the trial court to continue with eleven jurors in the event one is disabled
but as requiring the trial court to do so).
Because the trial court properly determined that Juror No. 61 was disabled, it
was required to continue the trial with eleven jurors. Accordingly, we overrule the
remainder of Appellant’s first issue.
III. Alleged Refusal to Probe or to Allow Probe of Seated Juror’s Bias
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing his requests to explore the potential bias of Juror No. 23 when it was
discovered during trial that he had formerly been related by marriage to the case
detective. Specifically, Appellant argues that (1) the trial court did not allow him to
question Juror No. 23, and (2) the trial court’s inquiry into Juror No. 23’s potential
bias was insufficient because it did not make specific inquiries into the juror’s
11 relationship with the detective. Even if we assume that Appellant preserved these
issues, case law does not provide for his desired mid-trial questioning of a juror when
Appellant failed to ask any questions during voir dire about the juror’s relationship to
a testifying witness.
A. What the Record Shows
During the third day of testimony, the State called Sergeant Scott Christensen,
who was the detective assigned to this case. The proceedings for the day ended while
Christensen was being cross-examined.
The next morning before cross-examination resumed, the trial court
announced that Juror No. 23 had mentioned to one of the bailiffs that he knew
Christensen. The trial court stated that it alone would question Juror No. 23 and
asked if either side objected to this process. Appellant said, “No, Judge.” The trial
court also gave the parties an opportunity to supply questions for the trial court to
ask, and defense counsel stated, “[J]ust the extent of their relationship, . . . how they
interacted and things like that, how close they were.”
The trial court asked how Juror No. 23 knew Christensen, and Juror No. 23
said, “Years ago, I used to be married to his wife’s sister,” which he later summarized
as being Christensen’s “brother-in-law in law.” Juror No. 23 said that he had seen
Christensen from time to time but that they were not close. The trial court reiterated
the juror’s duties, and Juror No. 23 stated that he understood that he could not allow
his prior relationship with Christensen to influence his verdict. Juror No. 23 said that
12 he could render a verdict based solely on the law and the evidence and that he would
not violate his oath.
After allowing Juror No. 23 to return to the jury room, the trial court asked
Christensen to return to the stand to continue the prior day’s cross-examination, and
the State offered an exhibit to which Appellant had no objection. After these events,
Appellant sought to have the trial court hear argument on Juror No. 23’s ability to be
impartial. Appellant contended (1) that Juror No. 23 could not be impartial because
he and Christensen were “related by marriage”4 and (2) that “we don’t know the
depth of the relationship, how the relationship ended, things like that.” The trial
court asked Appellant to clarify what additional questions he wanted the trial court to
ask Juror No. 23, but rather than suggesting additional questions, Appellant reiterated
his belief that Juror No. 23 could not be impartial. The following discourse took
place between the trial court and defense counsel:
THE COURT: [J]ust because you say it with conviction, that don’t make it so. What is it that’s in the record other than the fact that there was a relationship there that says that he can’t follow his oath?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have no direct evidence. He didn’t say that he couldn’t, but although he --
THE COURT: No, in fact, he said he could. In fact, he said he would, and he was very -- and I was here, and you were here, too, and we questioned him outside the presence of everybody else. I was there to see him testify. I was there to evaluate his credibility, and I find that
4 As noted in the State’s brief, Juror No. 23 and Christensen were not related by marriage; Juror No. 23 stated that “[y]ears ago, [he] used to be married to [Christensen’s] wife’s sister.”
13 he was being credible when he said he would not consider it. He was very adamant about that. He didn’t hesitate. He didn’t look up and think about it. He looked me right in the eye and said he wouldn’t consider it, and he would follow his oath, and he understood the oath. So I -- I’m hard-pressed to figure out -- I mean, you may have thought about striking [Juror No. 23] had we known that [he was married to Christensen’s sister-in-law during] voir dire, but nobody asked that question on voir dire.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: True.
THE COURT: Nobody asked if they knew any of the witnesses that you knew were going to testify.
Defense counsel stated that this was a unique situation, and the trial court reiterated
that it presumed that Juror No. 23 was going to follow his oath. Defense counsel
then asked the trial court to excuse Juror No. 23 “out of an abundance of caution,”
which would have left ten jurors and would have resulted in a mistrial. The trial court
denied that request.
B. Applicable Law
The constitutional underpinnings of an impartial jury have been summarized by
the Tyler Court of Appeals:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. Amend. VI[]; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 10. The protection under the Texas Constitution is identical to that offered by the United States Constitution. See Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Fulton v. State, 576 S.W.3d 905, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. ref’d).
14 “Normally, challenges for cause are made before the jury is sworn. Under
some circumstances[,] it is proper to challenge a juror for cause after the jury is
sworn[] if the juror’s bias is not disclosed before then.” Saldana v. State, No. 04-94-
00803-CR, 1996 WL 209748, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 1, 1996, pet. ref’d)
(not designated for publication) (citing Lee v. State, 301 S.W.2d 114, 115–16 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1957)).
But usually, the duty is placed on defense counsel to ask questions during voir
dire that would reflect whether a juror can be challenged:
It is incumbent upon counsel to specifically ask questions [that] will determine whether they have a right to challenge the veniremember. The jury panel does not know the statutory challenges for cause and thus the prospective jurors likely do not know what the parties are trying to determine during voir dire. It is counsel’s responsibility to ask questions specific enough to elicit the answers they require.
Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
When a person serves on a jury but is partial, biased, or prejudiced and that
juror is selected not through the fault or lack of diligence of defense counsel but
based on inaccurate answers in voir dire, a new trial can be obtained. Fulton, 576
S.W.3d at 923 (citing Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978)).
Fulton and Saldana further explain why the trial court is not required to allow a
defendant to question a juror after the start of trial and why the trial court has no duty
to question a juror after the start of trial when questions that would indicate a
15 potential bias were not asked during voir dire. Fulton, 576 S.W.3d at 923; Saldana,
1996 WL 209748, at *3. As explained in Fulton, the trial court is not required to allow
a defendant to question a juror after the start of trial when the defendant failed to ask
the requisite question during voir dire:
Because Appellant’s trial counsel made no attempt during voir dire to ask the veniremembers whether they knew any potential witnesses, despite trial counsel[’s] knowing the witnesses’ identities, the juror never withheld any information. See Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Thus, Appellant argues that he has a constitutional right to ask jurors additional questions after the start of trial if the need arises. This proposition was specifically dispelled by the court in Franklin[ v. State]. 138 S.W.3d [351,] 358 [(Tex. Crim. App. 2004)] (“But we do not hold here that Franklin had a constitutional right to ask the juror additional questions during trial.”)[.]
Appellant offers no other authority, nor are we aware of any, that requires a trial court to allow a defendant to question a juror, after the start of trial, about matters he could have questioned the juror about during his voir dire examination.
576 S.W.3d at 923. Similarly, in Saldana, the court explained why the trial court has no
duty to question a juror after the start of trial when the defendant failed to ask the
veniremembers if they knew a witness:
[I]n this case, [appellant] had every opportunity to ask the jury panel during voir dire whether they knew any of the witnesses [that] the [S]tate planned to call. The record indicates [that] the defense had been provided before voir dire with the [S]tate’s witness list. Yet [appellant] failed to ask a single question about Rodolfo Ruiz.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “defense counsel has an obligation to ask questions calculated to bring out that information [that] might be said to indicate a juror’s inability to be impartial and truthful. . . . Unless defense counsel asks such questions, the material information [that] a juror fails to disclose is not really
16 ‘withheld.’” Armstrong . . . , 897 S.W.2d [at] 363–64 . . . . In that case, the court refused to reverse a murder conviction even though the jury foreperson, it was later learned, had been friends with the prosecutor at appellant’s trial for twenty-seven years[,] and . . . her husband and the prosecutor had been best men in each other’s weddings. However, no one asked her about her relationship to the prosecutor. Although not on point, Armstrong is applicable to the present case because it shows that a juror does not mislead the court by failing to inform the court of a relationship with one of the actors when the juror is never asked.
In the absence of discovery of a misleading answer during voir dire, there is no requirement for the trial court to conduct a hearing of a sworn and seated juror when new information surfaces concerning a juror’s potential bias.
1996 WL 209748, at *3.
The State points out that Appellant did not preserve his arguments as to Juror
No. 23 because Appellant did not object (1) to the trial court’s statement that it alone
was going to question the juror or (2) to the sufficiency of the trial court’s inquiry into
Juror No. 23’s ability to be impartial. As noted above in the section describing what the
record shows, Appellant stated, “No, Judge,” when asked if he had any objection to the
trial court’s decision to not allow the parties to question Juror No. 23, and Appellant
did not specifically object to the trial court’s decision to not further question Juror No.
23 after he had explained his relationship to Christensen and had stated that he would
uphold his oath. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691.
But even assuming that Appellant had preserved his arguments, Fulton and
Saldana show that Appellant’s arguments are without merit. Appellant’s brief cites to
17 case law relating to voir dire and how it is constitutional error “[w]here the trial court
disallows the defendant to ask a proper question on voir dire,” but Appellant ignores
that he was not denied the opportunity to ask the desired questions during voir dire.
Instead, he admitted to the trial court that he had failed to ask during voir dire if any
of the veniremembers knew the detective, who had been listed on the State’s witness
list. Moreover, Appellant morphs the failure to fulfill his duty during voir dire—to
specifically ask questions that would have determined whether he had a right to
challenge the veniremember—into a duty for the trial court to sufficiently question a
juror mid-trial. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 113. This stance fails to recognize that the
trial court never had a duty to question Juror No. 23 and that when the trial court did
so, it delved into the juror’s relationship to the detective and was assured that the
juror could be impartial. See Saldana, 1996 WL 209748, at *3. Because no bias was
discovered, Appellant’s right to a trial by an impartial jury was not infringed.
Accordingly, we overrule his second issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: February 27, 2025