Jose v. Hewett

50 Me. 248
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 1, 1861
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 50 Me. 248 (Jose v. Hewett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jose v. Hewett, 50 Me. 248 (Me. 1861).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was drawn up by

Cutting, J.

Writ of entry dated January 10th, 1859. Plea the general issue and brief statements. The demand-ant and tenant both claim the premises described in the writ under one Henry C. Lowell, whose title was admitted.

And it is further admitted, that the Shipbuilders’ Bank was incorporated March 7th, 1853, and duly organized; that on April 29fch, 1853, Lowell was duly chosen and qualified president and director; that on June 7th, 1853, one William L. Pitts, the son-in-law of Lowell, was .duly elected and qualified cashier, who, on the same day, gave his official bond in the penal sum of $40,000, with John Jones and Henry Ingraham, two of his sureties with others not residents of this State, which bond was approved by the directors; that Lowell, at the same time, gave his bond in the penal sum of $40,000, to Jones and Ingraham to induce them to become such sureties, conditioned to save them [249]*249harmless; that, on Oct. 14th, 1854, Loioell ceased to be a director, and I. K. Kimball was chosen director and president in his stead; that, on the same day, Pitts became a defaulter as cashier for a sum exceeding the penal amount of his bond, and was superseded by A. W. Kennedy in that office, when Lowell, at the request of Jones and Ingraham, gave them a mortgage of certain real estate, a part of which is the demanded premises, to secure his performance of the condition in his bond to them ,• that, on Oct.’ 26th, 1854, Lowell gave to the bank his bond in the penal sum of $40,000, conditioned to convey to Horace Merriam, Alden Ulmer, JEdward A. Mansfield and George Ihorndihe, directors of the bank, the real estate mortgaged to Jones and Ingraham, to indemnify the bank against loss on account of Pitts’ default, Lowell not being otherwise indebted to the bank; and that he did on the same day, in accordance with the conditions of his bond, convey to them the real estate.

On Dec. 1st, 1854, one Thomas W. Hooper commenced an action against Lowell on his acceptance of a draft for §2500 before October, 1854, and attached all his real estate in the then county of Lincoln; that, on Hooper’s decease, the demandant (Horatio JV'. Jose) was appointed administrator, who prosecuted the suit, and, at the January term, 1857, in Lincoln county, recovered judgment and execution for the amount of his claim and seasonably levied on the demanded premises.

On Dec.- 4th, 1854, Merriam and others released the real estate, of which they had received a deed of Lowell, to the bank, to effectuate the purpose of the conveyance to them; that, January 1, 1855, Jones and Ingraham, on condition of being discharged by the bank from their suretyship on Pitts’ bond, assigned their mortgage of Oct. 14th, 1854, to the bank, who, by their directors, on the same day, in consideration of the assignment and an obligation to indemnify them against Hooper’s attachment and to procure a release of Lowell’s wife’s right to dower, did so discharge them, the directors well knowing the consideration of the mortgage [250]*250at the date of its assignment; that, on January 1st, 1855, Lowell, in pursuance of that arrangement, and at the request of Jones and Ingraham, released the mortgaged premises and his wife her right to dower therein to the bank. Ingraham was an original stockholder, and has continued to be such; otherwise with Jones.

On Oct. 26th, 1854, the bank suspended payment, and Atwood Levensaler, Joseph Hewett and Abiel W. Kennedy were appointed receivers by the Court, January 10th, 1855, who thereupon took possession of the demanded premises as the property of the bank, and duly sold the same, together with Jpnes and Ingraham’s guaranty, July 8th, 1858, to the tenant (Hudson J. Hewett) for a sum less than $5000, leaving Pitts still a defaulter to a very large amount.

From the foregoing facts, it appears that both parties claim title to the demanded premises directly or indirectly under Henry O. Lowell, who was the undisputed owner of the same prior to Oct. 14th, 1854, the date of his mortgage to Hones and Ingraham, and Oct. 26th, 1854, the time of his release to Merriam and others, the directors' of the bank. Upon the force and effect of those two conveyances the tenant’s title principally depends, inasmuch as they were the only material transactions prior to the demandant’s attachment, which was on Dec. 1st, 1854, made by his intestate on a writ founded on Lowell’s acceptance before October of the same year. So that in order for the demandant to prevail he must successfully dispose of that mortgage and release. He attempts so to do.

And, first, he contends that’the mortgage was void because it was given to secure an obligation executed in violation of the statute of 1841, (Act of Amendment, c. 1, § 24,) which provides that, — "The bond of the cashier shall be renewed every year, in the month of October, and in no case shall the bond, given by the cashier, be signed by any director of the bank for which he is appointed.”

Lowell, being a director at the date of the cashier’s bond, could not, by the express language of the statute, have sign[251]*251ed as one of the sureties thereon, and, in not doing so, he has complied with the letter. But, could he evade the spirit of the law, by doing indirectly what he was forbidden to do directly? If so, the statute becomes a dead letter; for directors might readily approve of sureties, who should be indemnified by themselves, trusting, perhaps, more to their own indemnity than to the responsibility of such sureties. The directors, when sitting in judgment on the bond, would only have to say, the sureties must be sufficient, for we are to save them harmless. Such directors, in case of the default of their cashier, might not be too expeditious or over anxious to put his bond in suit. One cannot readily perceive a distinction between directors signing directly as sureties, or indirectly by their friends, upon such directors’ own responsibility; the two proceedings must amount to one and the same thing, and all the evils which the statute was intended to remedy would still exist. If any one shall have the curiosity to look at the recitals in Lowell’s bond

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Bluebook (online)
50 Me. 248, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jose-v-hewett-me-1861.