IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1133 / 12-1361 Filed February 19, 2014
JOSE RUESGA, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, John G. Linn,
Judge.
Ruesga appeals from the district court order dismissing his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Jose Ruesgo, Fort Madison, pro se appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Forrest Guddall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., Bower, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013). 2
MILLER, S.J.
Jose Ruesga is an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison.
In 2012 he was charged with violating an institutional rule. In a prison
disciplinary proceeding, Ruesga was found to have violated the rule and received
fifteen days of disciplinary detention as the only sanction imposed. His appeal
and supplemental appeal to the warden were denied. Ruesga then filed an
application for postconviction relief with the district court. In his application
Ruesga raised as grounds for relief claims that the “report” against him had been
brought in retaliation for him “giving a statement against an officer being
investigated,” and that the conduct he had been accused of did not in fact
constitute a violation of the institutional rule in question. His request for relief
included a request for “dismissal of report and expunge[ment] from file.”
The State filed a motion to dismiss, pointing out that the only sanction
imposed had been fifteen days of disciplinary detention and Ruesga had not lost
any “earned time.” The State asserted that the sanction thus involved no
substantial deprivation of a liberty or property interest and that under such
circumstances Ruesga’s application did not state a claim cognizable in an action
for postconviction relief.
On July 5, 2012, Ruesga filed a response to the State’s motion. He
alleged he was serving a life sentence and argued that his having been found to
have violated an institutional rule would “impact my application for commutation.”
Ruesga cited the June 25, 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, ___,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 424 (2012), for the proposition that 3
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for persons who were under the age
of eighteen at the time of their crimes constituted unconstitutional cruel and
unusual punishment. He asserted he had been incarcerated for twenty years,
and had not had but was entitled to “a hearing to consider mitigating
circumstances” concerning his “possibility of rehabilitation versus life
imprisonment” and a possible commutation of his sentence. Ruesga argued that
the erroneous finding he had violated an institutional rule would have an impact
at such a hearing. Although Ruesga does not expressly so state, we read these
statements in his response as an assertion that he was sentenced to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a crime
committed while he was under eighteen years of age.
The district court sustained the State’s motion to dismiss. It noted that
Ruesga had lost no “earned time.” It concluded that the sanction of fifteen days
disciplinary detention did not result in any substantial deprivation of a liberty or
property interest. In support of its conclusion the court cited Iowa Code section
822.2(1)(f) (2011); Tabor v. State, 519 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 1994); and Ragan
v. Lynch, 113 F.3d 875, 876 (8th Cir. 1997).
Ruesga appeals. He asserts he was less than eighteen years of age at
the time of the crime for which he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole—an unconstitutional sentence
under Miller v. Alabama—and he is thus entitled to a “mitigating circumstances
hearing” as defined in that case. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2474,
183 L. Ed. 2d at 430. He contends that the finding he violated an institutional 4
rule results in a substantial deprivation of a liberty interest because it will have an
impact at such a hearing. This contention implicitly relies on the underlying
contention, expressly made in his application for postconviction relief, that the
finding of a rule violation was erroneous.
As a preliminary matter, we note that in his brief Ruesga asserts that his
July 5, 2012 resistance to the State’s motion to dismiss was “never ruled on.” If
this were true, Ruesga has arguably failed to preserve error, as the issue he
raises on appeal is essentially the same as an issue not expressly stated in his
application for postconviction relief but made clear in his response to the State’s
motion to dismiss. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012)
(noting that when a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a
party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in
order to preserve error for appeal). We do note, however, that in its order the
district court expressly mentioned that Ruesga had “filed a response to the
motion on July 5, 2012.” It thus seems clear that the court was aware of and
considered Ruesga’s resistance in sustaining the State’s motion. See id. at 864
(“If the court’s ruling indicates that the court considered the issue and necessarily
ruled on it, even if the court’s reasoning is ‘incomplete or sparse,’ the issue has
been preserved.”).
The State asserts that Ruesga has failed to preserve error on the issue he
presents on appeal. It points out he did not raise his present contention—that his
erroneous prison discipline will affect his sentence because it will have an impact
at his resentencing hearing—in the administrative proceeding. It further asserts 5
the issue was not “cited in his application for postconviction relief.” The State
cites and quotes Miller v. Iowa District Court, 603 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Iowa 1999),
and cites other cases, for the proposition that “[b]efore seeking postconviction
relief concerning action taken by a prison disciplinary committee, the prisoner
must first exhaust his administrative remedies by raising the basis for the
requested relief in the administrative process.” The next question is how to apply
this well-established principle to the particular facts of this case.
The warden’s response to Ruesga’s appeal, attached to and a part of
Ruesga’s application for postconviction relief, praises “the positive progress
you’ve demonstrated during your incarceration.” It acknowledges that Ruesga
“[d]isagree[s] with the decision” and states that the warden does not “accept
[Ruesga’s] contention” that Ruesga’s conduct did not violate the rule in question.
The warden’s response to Ruesga’s supplemental appeal, similarly attached to
and a part of Ruesga’s application, indicates that Ruesga “[d]en[ies] the
violations,” “disagree[s] with the decision,” and contends his conduct did not
violate the rule. The response states that the warden “disagrees with [Ruesga’s]
interpretation” of the rule, and the warden concludes Ruesga’s conduct did
“indeed meet the criteria of the charge.” We therefore conclude that Ruesga did
exhaust administrative remedies concerning his underlying claim that he was
erroneously found to have violated an institutional rule.
In his application for postconviction relief, however, and on appeal,
Ruesga goes somewhat further than merely contending his conduct did not
violate the institutional rule. He contends that the allegedly erroneous finding of 6
a rule violation implicates a liberty interest because it will have an impact on the
outcome of the resentencing hearing to which he is entitled to consider
“mitigating circumstances.” The State’s claim that Ruesga has not preserved
error must of necessity at least in part go to this further contention.
If the administrative process had been resolved in Ruesga’s favor with a
determination that his conduct did not violate the institutional rule in question,
Ruesga would have had no grounds on which to file an application for
postconviction relief raising this contention. Otherwise stated, his claim that the
erroneous administrative finding he violated an institutional rule will have an
impact on his resentencing hearing was not ripe until the conclusion of the
administrative process. We therefore do not agree with the State’s contention
that Ruesga has failed to preserve error on the issue he presents.
The State’s pre-answer motion to dismiss identifies the question it raises
as whether Ruesga’s application for postconviction relief “states a claim when the
only punishment is only 15 days of disciplinary detention.” The motion is thus
one to dismiss for “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which any relief may be
granted.” See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f).
A motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted] is properly granted only if a plaintiff’s petition on its face shows no right of recovery under any state of facts. A motion to dismiss is properly granted only when there exists no conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to relief. Under notice pleading, nearly every case will survive a motion to dismiss. The petition need not allege ultimate facts that support each element of the cause of action. The petition, however, must contain factual allegations that give the defendant fair notice of the claim asserted so the defendant can adequately respond to the petition. A petition complies with the fair notice requirement if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to 7
the claim and of the claim’s general nature. We view the plaintiff’s allegation in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with doubts resolved in that party’s failure.
Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004). “A motion to
dismiss admits the well-pleaded facts in the petition, but not the conclusions.”
Kingsway Cathedral v. Dep’t of Transp., 711 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2006).
Our review of a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which any relief may be granted is for correction of errors of
law. Id. at 7. However, when violation of a constitutional right is raised, we make
a de novo review of the evidence relevant to the constitutional issue. See, e.g.,
State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 2011) (holding that although
review of a certiorari action is for correction of errors at law, the evidence
relevant to an allegation of aviolation of a constitutional right is reviewed de
novo); Webster Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Iowa
1978) (same).
We conclude that under our notice pleading, in ruling on the motion to
dismiss, the district court was required to accept as fact that Ruesga was serving
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for a crime committed under the age
of eighteen (and was thus entitled to a resentencing hearing to consider
“mitigating circumstances” and the possible commutation of his sentence), and
that the prison officials erroneously interpreted and applied the rule he was
charged with violating, resulting in an erroneous finding that he had violated the
rule in question. The question that remains concerns Ruesga’s conclusion that a 8
liberty interest is implicated because the finding will necessarily have an impact
on the outcome of his resentencing hearing.
No person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. U.S.
Const. amend. V; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. In his resistance to the State’s motion
to dismiss, Ruesga cited Tabor, 519 N.W.2d at 378. In that case Tabor, an
inmate of the Iowa State Penitentiary, was disciplined for violating an institutional
rule. Tabor, 519 N.W.2d at 379. The district court denied postconviction relief.
Id. On appeal our supreme court identified two situations in which postconviction
relief procedures established in Iowa Code chapter 822 may be utilized to review
prison disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 380. Citing Iowa Code section 822.2(6)
(1993), the court identified the first as “when ‘[t]he persons’ reduction of sentence
pursuant to [statutes allowing an inmate to earn time toward early release] has
been unlawfully forfeited.’” Id. Citing Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa
1984), the court identified the second as the situation in which “the particular
discipline imposed, although not resulting in forfeiture of a sentence reduction
under those statutes, otherwise results in a substantial deprivation of the
applicant’s liberty [or] property interest.” Id. The court affirmed the denial of
relief, holding that the only discipline imposed, a reprimand, met neither of the
two described situations. Id.
About seven months later the United States Supreme Court decided
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).
Conner, an inmate serving thirty years to life in a Hawaii prison, was charged
with “high misconduct” and was also charged with “low moderate misconduct” for 9
violating various institutional rules. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 474-75, 115 S. Ct. at
2295-96, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 424. An institutional adjustment committee determined
he was guilty of the charged misconduct, and Conner was disciplined by the
imposition of thirty days of disciplinary segregation for the high misconduct and
four hours of disciplinary segregation for each of the two other misconducts. Id.
at 475-76, 115 S. Ct. at 2296, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 424. Conner sought
administrative review, resulting in a determination the high misconduct charge
was unsupported and the expungement of his records as to that charge. Id. at
476, 115 S. Ct. at 2296, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 424-25. Conner subsequently sued,
claiming his rights to due process of law had been violated by the disciplinary
committee denying his request to present witnesses at the disciplinary hearing.
Id. at 476, 115 S. Ct. at 2296, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 425.
In Sandin, the U.S. district court granted the prison officials summary
judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id. at 476-77, 115 S. Ct. at 2297, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 425.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 488, 115 S.
Ct. at 2296-97, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 432. It identified two instances in which liberty
interests of prisoners are implicated, “when a restraint imposes ‘atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life,’” and “when a restraint ‘will inevitably affect the duration of [the inmate’s]
sentence.’” See Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494-95 (Iowa 2010)
(citing and quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487, 115 S. Ct. 2300, 2302, 132 L.
Ed. 2d 418, 430-31. 10
We view the second situation identified in Tabor, a situation in which “the
particular discipline imposed, although not resulting in forfeiture of a sentence
reduction under the statutes, otherwise results in a substantial deprivation of the
applicant’s liberty . . . interest,” 519 N.W.2d at 380, as essentially the same as
the first instance described in Sandin—“when a restraint imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S. Ct. at 2302, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 430-31. Sandin
rejected the idea that thirty days of disciplinary segregation presented such a
deprivation as might create a liberty interest under this test. Id. We similarly
reject the idea that Ruesga’s fifteen days of disciplinary detention created a
liberty interest subject to due process protection under this test.
We view the second instance identified in Sandin—“when a restraint ‘will
inevitably affect the duration of [the inmate’s] sentence’”—as encompassing the
first situation identified in Tabor—“when ‘[t]he person’s reduction of sentence
pursuant to [statutes allowing an inmate to earn time toward early release] has
been unlawfully forfeited.’” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487, 115 S. Ct. at 2300,
2302, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 430-31; Tabor, 519 N.W.2d at 380.
Iowa’s statutes providing for earned time credits toward early release
create a liberty interest in any credits an inmate has accrued. Sanford v.
Manternach, 601 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Iowa 1999). A liberty interest also exists in
the right to accrue such credits. Holm v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 767 N.W.2d 409, 417-18
(Iowa 2009). Minimal requirements of procedural due process must therefore be
observed before an inmate may be deprived of either of these rights. See, e.g., 11
Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 464 (citing and quoting cases holding that an inmate has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in earned credits, and that minimum
requirements of procedural due process must be observed before earned time
can be forfeited). The discipline imposed in Ruesga’s case did not, however,
affect either earned credits or the right to accrue credits. We are left with the
question of whether Ruesga’s conclusion that his discipline—fifteen days of
disciplinary detention—will necessarily impact his application for resentencing in
his anticipated resentencing hearing. Otherwise stated, in the terms expressed
in Sandin, will that discipline “inevitably affect the duration of [Ruesga’s]
sentence.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487, 115 S. Ct. at 2300, 2302, 132 L.
Ed. 2d at 430-31. For the reasons that follow, we cannot reach such a
conclusion under any set of facts provable under the facts alleged in Ruesga’s
application.
“Inevitable” means “incapable of being avoided or evaded,” Webster’s
New Collegiate Dictionary 584 (1980), or “certain to happen” Webster’s New
Universal Unabridged Dictionary 936 (Deluxe 2nd Ed. 1979). In Tabor, an
inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary received a reprimand for being at an
improper location. 519 N.W.2d at 380. He asserted that the discipline would
affect his right to discretionary reduction of a Wyoming sentence that he was also
serving, resulting in a substantial deprivation of a liberty interest. Id. Our
supreme court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that “deprivations for which
postconviction relief may be cognizable . . . do not include the collateral
consequences of sanctions imposed by Iowa authorities on prisoner’s sentences 12
in other states.” Id. Although Ruesga’s request for relief is somewhat different,
in that it relates to an opportunity for reduction of an Iowa sentence rather than
the sentence of another state, it is also somewhat similar in that it involves
hypothetical “collateral consequences” of discipline rather than direct
consequences of discipline.
In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that inmate Conner’s situation did not
present a case in which the State’s action in disciplining him would inevitably
affect the duration of his sentence as state law did not “require[ ] the parole board
to deny parole in the face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence
. . . even though misconduct is by regulation a relevant consideration.” 515 U.S.
at 487, 115 S. Ct. at 2302, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 431-32. This analysis may
reasonably be viewed as indicating that when discretion is involved in imposing
or modifying a sentence, factors such as a record of discipline that may play
some small role but are not determinative do not implicate a liberty interest.
Our district court has broad discretion in sentencing, provided any
sentence imposed is within constitutional boundaries and statutory limits. State
v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 58 (Iowa 2013) (stating the supreme court has a
constitutional obligation to ensure sentences remain within constitutional
boundaries); State v. Dailey, 774 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (stating
Iowa Code “section 901.5 vests the district court with broad discretion in
imposing sentences within statutory limits”).
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of
mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a crime committed 13
while a juvenile violates the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 567 U.S.
at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. Citing and quoting its previous
cases that described numerous “gaps between juveniles and adults,” the court
stated that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.” Id. at ____, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418. The court
pointed out its previous insistence “that a sentencer had the ability to consider
the ‘mitigating qualities of youth,’” and that mandatory life-without-parole
sentences preclude sentencers “from taking account of an offender’s age and the
wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct.
at 2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
Recent Iowa cases are to the same effect. See, e.g., State v. Ragland,
836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013) (“In light of our increased understanding of the
decision making of youths, the sentencing process must be tailored to account in
a meaningful way for the attributes of juveniles that are distinct from adult
conduct.”); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Iowa 2013) (stating, in vacating
a juvenile’s lengthy sentence and remanding, that “a juvenile’s culpability is
lessened because the juvenile is cognitively underdeveloped relative to a fully-
developed adult,” and holding that in resentencing Pearson such “lessened
culpability is a mitigating factor that the district court must recognize and
consider”); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (stating, in vacating a juvenile’s lengthy
sentence and remanding, that “the district court must recognize that because
‘children are constitutionally different from adults,’ they ordinarily cannot be held 14
to the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal sentencing,” and “[t]he
constitutional difference arises from a juvenile’s lack of maturity, underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, and the less fixed nature of
the juvenile’s character”).
Miller, and the Iowa cases cited above, thus strongly suggest that in
sentencing or resentencing someone for a crime committed while a juvenile,
while other factors may be considered the strong emphasis is to be placed on the
age of the offender at the time of the crime and the characteristics and
circumstances attending that age.
Given the foregoing facts and law, can we accept Ruesga’s conclusion
that his one incident of prison misconduct will necessarily affect the outcome of
his anticipated resentencing hearing, and thus “inevitably affect the duration of
[his] sentence”? In Sandin, in reversing the Ninth Circuit and thus reinstating the
district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that Conner’s
situation did not “present a case where the State’s action will inevitably affect the
duration of his sentence.” 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S. Ct. at 2302, 132 L. Ed. 2d at
431. It noted that Hawaii law did not require the parole board to deny parole
because of the misconduct or grant parole in its absence. Id. at 487, 115 S. Ct.
at 2302, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 431-32. The court noted that parole decisions rest on
many considerations, stated that “[t]he chance that a finding of misconduct will
affect the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees
of the Due Process Clause,” and held that Conner therefore did not have a 15
protected liberty interest that would entitle him to procedural protections such as
the asserted right to present witnesses at the disciplinary hearing.
Ruesga has apparently been incarcerated for twenty years and the
warden praises his demonstrated progress. The misconduct and disciplinary
proceeding is entirely collateral to Ruesga’s criminal case. At any resentencing
that might occur, the district court would have broad discretion. The primary
focus at any resentencing hearing will be the “mitigating qualities of youth,” and
Ruesga’s age and attending characteristics and circumstances at the time of his
crime. As noted above, “inevitable” means “certain to happen.” We conclude
that under these facts and the applicable law, the chance Ruesga’s discipline
would affect the result of any resentencing in such a manner as to “inevitably
affect the duration of [Ruesga’s] sentence” is based on nothing but speculation
and conjecture and is thus too attenuated to give rise to a due-process-protected
liberty interest. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ruesga’s
AFFIRMED.