Jose Raul Angeles-Delgado v. Julio Costa Benitez

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 3D2023-0939
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 8, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D23-0939 Lower Tribunal No. 17-22498

Jose Raul Angeles-Delgado, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Julio Costa Benitez, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos Lopez, Judge.

Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Kevin D. Franz, and Lara J. Edelstein (Boca Raton), for appellants.

The Gutierrez Firm and Jorge P. Gutierrez, Jr.; Dohan Law Group, P.A., and Russell A. Dohan; Philip D. Parrish, P.A., and Philip D. Parrish, for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and BOKOR, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, J. Jose Raul Angeles-Delgado and Jessica Carrillo (“Appellants”) appeal

the trial court’s order granting Julio Costa Benitez’s (“Benitez”) motion for

new trial. We reverse the order granting a new trial, as the trial court abused

its discretion in finding that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight

of the evidence, and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and

enter judgment consistent with the verdict.

Benitez filed an action against Appellants alleging that Carrillo acted

negligently when, while operating Angeles-Delgado’s car, she collided with

Benitez’s bicycle allegedly causing Benitez permanent bodily injury.

Appellants denied liability and asserted affirmative defenses. The case

proceeded to trial on the issues of liability, causation, and noneconomic

damages.

At trial, the parties’ experts disagreed as to the method used to

measure the tire skid marks of the vehicle, which resulted in differing

testimony as to whether Carrillo was speeding and whether she could have

avoided hitting Benitez. The jury returned a verdict finding Appellants not

negligent. The jury did not reach the question of damages. The jury was

polled, and each juror indicated that this was his or her verdict.

Subsequently, Benitez moved for a new trial arguing that the jury

verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, claiming that the

2 jury was deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence. Appellants

responded that a new trial was not warranted because there was conflicting

evidence regarding Carrillo’s negligence. The trial court entered an initial

order simply granting a new trial and, after a motion for reconsideration,

entered an order including the court’s reasoning as is required by the

applicable rules.

An order granting a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Miami-Dade Cty. v. Davis, 307 So. 3d 883, 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Even

though the trial court is given a high level of discretion given its superior

vantage point, the trial judge cannot assert himself or herself as an additional

juror if he or she disagrees with the jury’s verdict. See Brown v. Estate of

Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490, 496 (Fla. 1999).

Based on the trial court’s reasoning provided in the order, we disagree

with the trial court that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. The trial court had concerns regarding Carrillo’s testimony that she

did not see Benitez before hitting him when both parties’ experts stated that

she had to have seen him due to her breaking before impact.1 The trial court

1 Carrillo consistently claimed that she did not see Benitez until he hit her windshield. She testified that the accident happened “super fast,” and she had no time to avoid it. She stated she put on the brakes because she did not know what hit her. Carrillo was not distracted by anything that would have “impaired” her driving, such as texting or looking at social media. 3 was also concerned that the jury requested the police report during

deliberations, but the trial court did not state the reason for concern.2 Despite

these concerns, due to the conflicting testimony of the parties’ experts

regarding the method used to measure the skid marks, whether Carrillo was

speeding, and whether she could have avoided the accident, we find that the

trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial in this case.

“For a verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, so as

to warrant a new trial, the evidence must be clear, obvious, and indisputable;

where there is conflicting evidence, the weight to be given that evidence is

within the province of the jury.” Davis, 307 So. 3d at 890 (citing Harlan

Bakeries, Inc. v. Snow, 884 So. 2d 336, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). Carrillo’s

expert claimed that Carrillo had only a quarter of a second to break and could

not have avoided impact; versus Benitez’s expert claimed that she had

anywhere from 1.3 to 2.9 seconds to break and could have avoided impact.

Therefore, as this Court found in Davis, the conflict in testimony was properly

decided by the jury, and the jury verdict should be reinstated. See also

Weatherly v. Louis, 31 So. 3d 803, 806-06 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (quoting

Rosario–Paredes v. J.C. Wrecker Serv., 975 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 5th

2 The jury simply asked, “Can we see a copy of the police report?” The jury provided no explanation or reason for the request.

4 DCA 2008) (“Reversal of a jury verdict is appropriate only in the absence of

conflicting evidence, when there is no rational basis in the evidence to

support the verdict.”); City of Gainesville v. Rodgers, 377 So. 3d 626, 631

(Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (quoting Bachman v. Oliveros, 293 So. 3d 555, 560 (Fla.

5th DCA 2020) (“A jury's verdict is generally not against the manifest weight

of the evidence if the record shows conflicting testimony from two or more

witnesses.”); Graham Companies v. Amado, 305 So. 3d 572, 578 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2020) (same).

For the reasons stated, we reverse the order granting a new trial and

remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment

consistent with the verdict.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.