Jose R. C. v. Christopher Chestnut, California City Correctional Facility; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Kristi Noem, in her Official Capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, in her Official Capacity, Attorney General of the United States

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 1, 2026·No. 1:26-cv-01494·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JOSE R. C.,1 No. 1:26-cv-01494-KES-FJS (HC) 10 Petitioner, A-Number: 242-314-825 11 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 12 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, California CORPUS City Correctional Facility; TODD LYONS, 13 Acting Director, Immigration and Customs (Doc. 1) Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland 14 Security; KRISTI NOEM, in her Official [14-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE] Capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of 15 Homeland Security; and PAMELA BONDI, in her Official Capacity, Attorney General 16 of the United States, 17 Respondents. 18 19 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner Jose R. C. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 20 along with a motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On the same date, the 21 district court issued an order directing Respondents to show cause as to whether there were any 22 factual or legal issues in this case that distinguish it from the court’s prior orders in Crispin M.C. 23 v.Noem, No. 1:25-CV-01487-KES-HBK (HC), 2026 WL 70553 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2026); 24 J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 25 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits petitioner’s full name, using only his 26 first name and last initial, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum re: Privacy 27 Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), 28 https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 1 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2025). (ECF No. 7.) On February 24, 2 2026, Respondents filed a response, and Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 10, 11.) On February 3 28, 2026, the district court converted the motion for temporary restraining order into a motion for 4 preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 12.) As Respondents had not made new legal arguments, or 5 identified factual or legal issues that distinguished the case from the court’s prior decisions noted 6 above, the court granted the motion, ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, and enjoined the 7 government from re-detaining Petitioner unless it provided no less than seven (7) days’ notice and 8 held a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter. (ECF No. 12 at 2.) The matter was 9 referred to the magistrate judge2 for further proceedings. 10 On March 2, 2026, the court issued an order directing the parties to advise within five (5) 11 days whether they sought to provide additional briefing on the petition. (ECF No. 10.) Over five 12 (5) days have passed, and no party has replied. The court, therefore, proceeds on the papers 13 submitted for the temporary restraining order turned preliminary injunction. There is, to be sure, a 14 split among the district courts as to whether 8 U.S.C. §1226 or 8 U.S.C. § 1225 applies to aliens 15 like Petitioner here. Compare Lepe, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1118, with Alonzo v. Noem, No. 25-cv- 16 01519 WBS SCR, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1073-74 (E.D. Cal. 2025). Here, the district court judge 17 assigned to this case has repeatedly embraced the former view (as have most district court judges 18 to address the question). See Lepe, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1118; Crispin M.C., 2026 WL 70553, at *3- 19 6. This court recommends that Petitioner be treated the same as similarly situated aliens whose 20 claims the district court judge assigned to this case previously adjudicated. Thus, the court 21 recommends granting the petition and ordering Petitioner’s immediate release. 22 The district court also noted that Respondents’ request, in the alternative, that the Court 23 hold the case in abeyance pending the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir.). 24 The district court stated that the undersigned could consider whether deferring a ruling on the 25 petition is warranted pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bostock. Whether the Ninth Circuit 26 will resolve the specific question that is presented here is unknown and this court is disinclined to 27

28 2 On March 23, 2026, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned. (Doc. 18.) 1 postpone resolution of this case on the grounds that the Ninth Circuit might supply controlling 2 precedent in another case at some point in the future. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends 3 denying Respondents’ request to hold the matter in abeyance. 4 The court’s preliminary injunction restrained the government from re-detaining Petitioner 5 without (1) first providing no less than seven (7) days’ notice to him and (2) holding a pre- 6 deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing 7 regulations. (ECF No. 12 at 2.) In the context of granting the preliminary injunction, this restraint 8 furthered the aim of “preserv[ing] the status quo ante litem pending a determination of the action 9 on the merits.” L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. N.F.L., 634 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2009), 10 quoted in Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 557 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Tanner 11 Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963) (defining the status quo as “the 12 last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy”) (internal citations and 13 quotations omitted). Whether that provisional restraint should be incorporated in a permanent 14 injunction warrants further analysis. A party seeking a permanent injunction must show “(1) that 15 it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 16 damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 17 hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 18 public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” W. Watersheds Project v. 19 Abbey, 719 F.3d 1035, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013). This court recommends against incorporating the 20 pre-detention notice and hearing restraint recited in the preliminary injunction for two primary 21 reasons. 22 • First, a prospective permanent injunction imposing a seven-day notice and hearing 23 requirement for this Petitioner before re-detention would necessarily require 24 caveats. See, e.g., Munoz-Soto v. Chestnut, No. 26-cv-02310-KES-SKO, 2026 WL 25 913047, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Cal. April 2, 2026) (restraining respondents from re- 26 detaining petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing except when petitioner 27 becomes subject to an executable final order of removal); Lovedeep A. v. Warden, 28 26-cv-01070-JLT-FJS, 2026 WL 947012, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. April 8, 2026) 1 (preliminarily restraining respondents from re-detention without a pre-deprivation 2 hearing except when legally-sufficient circumstances justify arrest without notice 3 in advance). It is unclear whether the court can currently anticipate all possible 4 exceptions to a notice-and-hearing requirement that might reasonably apply to 5 future immigration enforcement activity. A permanent restraint that is judicially 6 created, proves to be unintentionally overbroad in future unanticipated scenarios, 7 and consequently frustrates congressionally authorized future immigration 8 enforcement activity does a disservice to the public interest.

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Jose R. C. v. Christopher Chestnut, California City Correctional Facility; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Kristi Noem, in her Official Capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, in her Official Capacity, Attorney General of the United States, (E.D. Cal. 2026).

Jose R. C. v. Christopher Chestnut, California City Correctional Facility; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Kristi Noem, in her Official Capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, in her Official Capacity, Attorney General of the United States (Jose R. C. v. Christopher Chestnut, California City Correctional Facility; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Kristi Noem, in her Official Capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, in her Official Capacity, Attorney General of the United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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