Jose Pilar Guadarrama v. Ur Mendoza Jaddou, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSE PILAR GUADARRAMA, Case No. 25-cv-00340-KAW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 9 v. JUDGMENT

10 UR MENDOZA JADDOU, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 26 11 Defendants.

13 14 On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff Jose Pilar Guadarrama filed the instant action, seeking to 15 compel Defendants Ur Mendoza Jaddou, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), 16 and Connie Nolan to adjudicate the Form I-130 petition (the “Petition”) filed by Plaintiff for his 17 son, Francisco Guadarrama Nava. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Pending before the Court is Defendants’ 18 motion for summary judgment. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 26.) 19 The Court previously found this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument 20 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). (Dkt. No. 32.) Having considered the parties’ filings and the 21 relevant legal authorities, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On or around January 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Petition with Defendant USCIS on behalf 24 of his son, Nava. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. No. 26-1.) The Petition states that Nava was married to 25 Sylvia Gomez but is currently separated, although there were no documents submitted with the 26 Petition showing that the marriage had been legally terminated. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 7.) Thus, the 27 Petition fell in the family third-preference (“F3”) visa category for married sons and daughters of 1 Preference visa categories have statutorily set numerical limits for each fiscal year. 2 (Frazier Decl. ¶ 9.) When a Form I-130 petition is for a visa that is in one of these limited 3 preference categories, the beneficiary is placed in line in the appropriate preference category 4 according to the petition’s priority date, i.e., the date the petition was filed. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 9.) 5 Per the Visa Bulletin published by the Department of State for December 2025, the F3 category is 6 oversubscribed, such that a visa is not available unless the priority date is earlier than May 1, 7 2001. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 10.) Further, applicants for such visas cannot submit required documents 8 to the Department of State’s Visa Center unless their priority date is before July 1, 2001. (Frazier 9 Decl. ¶ 10.) USCIS Service Centers prioritize the adjudication of I-130 petitions when the Visa 10 Bulletin shows that an immigrant visa is available or will soon become available, as this provides 11 the greatest processing efficiencies because it is only when a visa is available that the beneficiary 12 can adjust status or consular process based on an approved petition. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 11.) 13 On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant case, seeking to compel Defendants to 14 adjudicate the Petition pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and Mandamus 15 Act. (See Compl. ¶ 9.) On January 29, 2026, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary 16 judgment. On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 29.) On March 17 23, 2026, Defendants filed a reply. (Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 30.) 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of... a claim or 20 defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate 21 discovery, there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to 22 judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 23 Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 24 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient 25 evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 26 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 27 basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses 1 the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 2 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. City 3 of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving 5 party may discharge its burden of production by either (1) “produc[ing] evidence negating an 6 essential element of the nonmoving party's case” or (2) after suitable discovery “show[ing] that the 7 nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to 8 discharge its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz 9 Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. 324-25. 10 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth 11 specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “A party opposing summary judgment may not 13 simply question the credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. 14 at 254. “Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence set 15 forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 16 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). The non-moving party must 17 produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the 18 dispute exists.” Bhan v. NMS Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). Conclusory or 19 speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 20 material fact to defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics 21 Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). 22 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light 23 most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 24 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff asserts that the factual assertions 27 provided in the declaration of Nicholas D. Frazier, Associate Portfolio Director, are “untested” and 1 however, neither provides any authority in support nor identifies any areas of discovery that would 2 be warranted. See Ahmed v. United States Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-02474-SVK, 2024 U.S. Dist. 3 LEXIS 14461, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2024) (denying request for discovery because the 4 plaintiff failed to show by affidavit or declaration that he could not present facts essential to justify 5 his opposition, as required by Rule 56(d), as well as because the plaintiff failed to proffer 6 sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought existed and would prevent summary judgment). 7 Moreover, Plaintiff provides no evidence in support of his opposition at all, such that the Court 8 cannot find there is a genuine dispute of material fact. See Kiani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 9 Servs., No. 8:24-cv-00422-JDE, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220724, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2024) 10 (“As Plaintiffs have not cited evidence in the Opposition that contradicts the evidence relied upon 11 in the Motion, the Court finds that no genuine dispute of material fact exists here.”). 12 Defendants make three arguments for summary judgment: (1) Plaintiff has failed to 13 identify a clear, non-discretionary duty, (2) the delay is not unreasonable pursuant to the TRAC 14 factors, and (3) Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief under the Mandamus Act. 15 A. Clear, Non-Discretionary Duty 16 First, Defendants argue that under both the APA and Mandamus Act, a claim exists “only 17 where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to 18 take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004); see also Plaskett v. 19 Wormuth, 18 F.4th 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2021) (“the showing required to support a request for an 20 order under [the APA] compelling an agency to take a discrete action mirrors the showing that is 21 required to obtain mandamus-type relief”). Defendants contend that “Plaintiff cannot surmount 22 this initial obstacle because no law compels Defendant to complete administrative processing 23 within a time certain.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) 24 Defendants cite no authority in support. Rather, Plaintiff correctly points to 5 U.S.C. § 25 555(b), which states that “within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a 26 matter presented to it.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) Courts have thus found such language to impose a 27 clear, certain, and mandatory duty to process I-130 petitions within a reasonable time. Kiani, 2024 1 Dist. LEXIS 129006, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008). Thus, Defendants are not entitled to 2 summary judgment on this ground. 3 B. TRAC Factors 4 Second, Defendants argue that the delay is not unreasonable under the TRAC factors. In 5 determining whether an agency has unreasonably delayed an action, the Ninth Circuit has adopted 6 the TRAC factors as follows:

7 (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or 8 other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply 9 content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human 10 health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher 11 or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay; and (6) the 12 court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably 13 delayed.” 14 Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Telecommunications Research & 15 Action v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 16 i. TRAC Factor 1: Rule of Reason 17 While no TRAC factor is itself determinative, “[t]he most important is the first factor, the 18 ‘rule of reason.’” Cmty. Voice v. U.S. EPA, 878 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2017). “The essence of 19 the rule of reason inquiry is whether the agency’s response time is governed by an identifiable 20 rationale.” Ahmed, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14461, at *9. Further, “[w]hen the alleged delay 21 involves the processing of an immigrant visa application, district courts have examined both the 22 length of the delay and the reasons for the delay.” Id. 23 Here, the Court finds that Defendants have identified a rule of reason. Specifically, 24 Defendants consider I-130 petitions in the order received, as “the beneficiary is placed in line in 25 the appropriate preference factor category according to the Form I-130’s priority date[,] which is 26 the date that the Form I-130 was filed.” (Frazier Decl. ¶ 9.) Further, because visas are limited in 27 number, Defendants prioritize the adjudication of I-130 preference petitions when an immigrant 1 can only adjust status or consular process when an immigrant visa is available. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 2 11.) Courts have found that both the “processing [of] applications in the order they were filed” 3 and the “processing [of] applications based on visa availability” to be rules of reason. Kiani, 2024 4 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220724, at *14; see also Jain v. Renaud, No. 21-cv-03115-VKD, 2021 U.S. 5 Dist. LEXIS 113113, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (“Indeed, all of the district courts that 6 have considered this question have concluded that the visa availability approach satisfies the rule 7 of reason.”); Vijetha Mulky Kamath v. Campagnolo, No. SACV 21-01044-CJC(ADSx), 2021 U.S. 8 Dist. LEXIS 213298, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021) (“Courts have unanimously held that 9 USCIS’s ‘first in, first out’ policy for adjudicating immigration applications like Plaintiffs’ 10 qualifies as a ‘rule of reason’ that satisfies the first TRAC factor.”). 11 Plaintiff complains Defendants have failed to provide a concrete timeline or processing 12 benchmark but fails to explain why these are required. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.) Plaintiff also challenges 13 whether Defendants’ decision to associate the pending Petition with the availability of an 14 immigrant visa is a rule of reason but cites no authority suggesting otherwise. (Id.) Instead, 15 Plaintiff argues that the unavailability of a visa is not a valid reason because visas are issued by the 16 Department of State rather than Defendant USCIS. (Id.) Plaintiff provides no explanation for 17 why this is relevant; it is still undisputed that no visa is available to Nava. Finally, Plaintiff argues 18 that Defendants have failed to provide a case-specific explanation here, such as outstanding 19 evidence requests, pending interviews, or unresolved background checks. (Id. at 5.) Again, 20 Plaintiff cites no authority in support and ignores that Defendants have provided a case-specific 21 explanation -- specifically, Defendants’ consideration of I-130 petitions in the order received and 22 the unavailability of a visa. The lack of a separate reason, applicable only to Plaintiff, does not 23 mean Defendants have failed to identify a rule of reason. 24 Whether there is a rule of reason, however, does not end the analysis. See Kiani, 2024 25 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220724, at *15 (“Even though each of USCIS’s processing procedures (based 26 on the order submitted and based on country-by-country visa availability) may satisfy the ‘rule of 27 reason’ requirement, this alone does not necessarily render a delay reasonable.”). Rather, the 1 LEXIS 14461, at *9. Here, there is no dispute that the Petition has been pending for four years. 2 Courts in this district have found that delays of nearly five years not unreasonable. See id. at *11 3 (collecting cases). Thus, viewing this delay with the rule of reason identified by Defendants, the 4 Court finds that the first TRAC factor weights in favor of Defendant. 5 ii. TRAC Factor 2: Congressional Timeline 6 The second factor considers whether Congress has set a specific timetable. Courts have 7 found that “Congress has not set [a specific] timetable to process I-130 petitions,” and Plaintiff 8 makes no argument to the contrary. Id. at *14; see also Ahmed, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14461, at 9 *13. “Because Congress has not provided a timetable for adjudication of immigrant visa 10 applications, the second TRAC factor is neutral.” Ahmed, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14461, at *13 11 (internal quotation omitted). 12 iii. TRAC Factors 3 and 5: Human Health and Welfare, and Nature of Interests 13 “The third and fifth TRAC factors overlap, requiring the court to consider whether human 14 health and welfare are at stake, and the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay.” 15 Poursohi v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-01960-TSH, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221350, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. 16 Nov. 16, 2021); see also Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 509 (9th Cir. 1997). Courts 17 have found that the hardship caused by a prolonged separation from a loved one to be an example 18 of harm. See Ahmed, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14461, at *14. Here, however, Plaintiff does not 19 address these factors at all, let alone provide evidentiary support. In the absence of evidence of 20 any harm to Plaintiff, the Court finds that these factors are neutral. 21 iv. TRAC Factor 4: Effect of Expediting Action 22 “The fourth TRAC factor considers the effect of expediting an agency action on other 23 agency actions of higher or competing priorities, including others’ pending administrative 24 requests.” Kiani, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220724, at *18. Thus, “[c]ourts will generally not 25 compel agency action where the result would be merely to expedite the consideration of a 26 plaintiff’s application ahead of others. Id. 27 Such is the case here. Plaintiff appears to argue that he is not requesting that his Petition 1 reasonable time. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) It is not apparent how requiring the adjudication of Plaintiff’s 2 Petition now -- while other I-130 petitions filed before his continue to wait -- is not the type of 3 “line skipping” that courts have rejected. In short, Plaintiff effectively asks that his Petition be 4 decided before the petitions of others who filed before him. Courts have declined to do so, finding 5 that “[e]arlier adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Petition only unavoidably delays adjudication of others’ I- 6 130 petitions even if a visa would become available no earlier for Plaintiffs -- Plaintiffs’ Petition 7 would be adjudicated earlier [than that] of other similarly situated applicants merely because 8 Plaintiffs sued.” Kiani, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220724, at *19-20; see also Ahmed, 2024 U.S. 9 Dist. LEXIS 14461, at *16 (“Defendants have demonstrated that the fourth TRAC factor weighs in 10 their favor because expediting the application of Plaintiff’s spouse would result in no net gain in 11 the appointment backlog while disadvantaging visa applicants of higher priority or of the same 12 priority but whose applications have been pending longer.”). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of 13 Defendants. 14 v. TRAC Factor 6: Impropriety 15 The sixth TRAC factor considers any allegations of impropriety. Plaintiff argues that “the 16 specter of impropriety is not beyond the realm of possibility” given that “[t]he current 17 Administration has made several policy decisions that have had an anti-immigrant impact.” (Pl.’s 18 Opp’n at 6.) Plaintiff, however, fails to explain how those policies have any connection with the 19 processing of I-130 petitions. Thus, this factor is neutral. 20 vi. Weighing the TRAC Factors 21 “In evaluating the TRAC factors, courts routinely afford the most weight to the first and 22 fourth factors.” Ahmed, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14461, at *17 (internal quotation omitted). Both 23 the first and fourth factors weigh in favor of Defendants, while the remaining factors are neutral. 24 Thus, the Court finds that Defendants have established that they are entitled to summary 25 judgment. See id. at *17-18; Kiani, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220724, at *21-22 (finding that the 26 TRAC factors favored Defendants where there was a 12-year delay in processing the plaintiff’s I- 27 130 petition). 1 C. Mandamus Act 2 Finally, Defendant argues that the Mandamus Act also does not create a duty to adjudicate 3 Plaintiff's Petition. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is available to compel a federal 4 || official to perform a duty only if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the official’s 5 duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no 6 || other adequate remedy is available.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) 7 || (internal quotation omitted). 8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish these three factors. (Defs.’ Mot. for 9 Summ. J. at 10.) Plaintiff, in turn, merely identifies the factors and states: “All three requirements 10 || are satisfied here.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) Plaintiff provides no further legal analysis, authority, or 11 argument. 12 As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to establish unreasonable delay under the TRAC 13 factors. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a clear and certain claim, and Defendants are 14 || entitled to summary judgment. 2g 15 IV. CONCLUSION A 16 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 17 || judgment. Z 18 Dated: June 5, 2026 dda 20 United*States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28