Jose Pedro Saldana Meza v. Warden, Golden State Annex Detention Facility, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-01912
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE PEDRO SALDANA MEZA, No. 1:26-cv-01912-DJC-EFB 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX 15 DETENTION FACILITY, et al. 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Jose Pedro Saldana Meza brings a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 19 and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order challenging the outcome of an 20 allegedly unconstitutional bond hearing and seeking release from immigration 21 custody. The Court informed the parties that it intended to rule on the merits of the 22 Petition. As explained below, however, the Petition is referred to the assigned 23 Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. In the interest of judicial efficiency, the 24 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is converted to a Preliminary Injunction and 25 DENIED. 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner Jose Pedro Saldana Meza previously filed a petition for writ of habeas 3 corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order in this Court. Saldana Meza v. 4 Warden, No. 1:26-cv-00800-DJC-EFB, 2026 WL 323255 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026). This 5 Court granted the petition as to the procedural due process claim and ordered the 6 Government to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond hearing 7 before a neutral arbiter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing 8 regulations. (See Prior Order (ECF No. 12) at 4.) After the Court issued its order, the 9 case was closed. 10 Petitioner subsequently received a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge 11 on February 10, 2026. (IJ Order (ECF No. 12-2) at 1.) During the bond hearing, 12 Petitioner was represented by counsel and, after hearing argument, the Immigration 13 Judge denied bond. (Transcript (“Tr.”) (ECF No. 15-8) at 1.) The Immigration Judge 14 found that she had “significant concerns about the danger” Petitioner posed to the 15 community with respect to his prior criminal history. (Id. at 4.) The Immigration Judge 16 concluded that Petitioner did not meet his burden to show that he is not a danger to 17 the community. (IJ Order at 1.) Petitioner retained his appeal rights and the deadline 18 to appeal the Immigration Judge’s order was March 12, 2026. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner did 19 not file an appeal. (See generally MTD (ECF No. 12) at 2.) 20 On March 10, 2026, Petitioner filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 in this Court. (Pet. (ECF No. 1).) The Government filed a Motion to Dismiss. (See 22 generally MTD.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (Mot. TRO 23 (ECF No. 15).) The Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is fully briefed. (Opp’n 24 (ECF No. 19); Reply (ECF No. 20).) The Court informed the parties that it intended to 25 rule on the merits of the Petition. (ECF No. 16.) 26 LEGAL STANDARD 27 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 28 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 1 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 2 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 3 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 4 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 5 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 6 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 7 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 8 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 9 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 10 DISCUSSION 11 I. Administrative Exhaustion 12 The parties disagree whether prudential exhaustion should be waived. (Opp’n 13 at 2–4; Reply at 1–2.) While the habeas statute itself, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, does not 14 require exhaustion, Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004), “[a]s a 15 prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available judicial 16 and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241[,]” Ward v. Chavez, 17 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2004). Waiver of the prudential exhaustion requirement 18 is appropriate here as this Court and many other district courts have previously found. 19 See, e.g., Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01543-DJC-SCR, 2025 WL 3523057, at *2 20 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025). 21 II. Winter Factors 22 A. Due Process 23 Petitioner’s claim that there was a procedural due process violation during the 24 February 10, 2026 bond hearing is not likely to be successful on the merits. In 25 constitutional challenges to an Immigration Judge’s detention determination, a 26 habeas court generally reviews mixed questions of fact and law under an “abuse of 27 discretion” standard. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024). This type of 28 review does not involve “reweigh[ing] evidence” but rather determines whether the 1 Immigration Judge “applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (citation and quotations 2 omitted). “In reviewing the IJ’s determination, a district court may not second guess 3 the IJ’s weighing of the evidence. . . review is limited to whether the IJ’s decision 4 ‘reflects clear legal error or is unsupported by sufficient evidence.’” Quan v. Barr, No. 5 20-cv-08118-LB, 2021 WL 308610, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021) (citation and 6 quotations omitted). The reviewing court must bear in mind that “the government’s 7 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due 8 process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts may 9 review an Immigration Judge’s finding that an alien poses a flight risk for abuse of 10 discretion. See Zaitsev v. Warden, No. 2:26-cv-00454-SPG-AS, 2026 WL 391429, at 11 *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (collecting cases). 12 1. Burden of Proof 13 Here, although Petitioner contends that the Immigration Judge applied the 14 incorrect standard by not requiring the Government to bear the burden of proof (Mot. 15 TRO ¶¶ 40–43), the Immigration Judge in fact complied with the terms of this Court’s 16 prior order, which ordered the Government to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing 17 “pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations[.]” (See Prior Order.) In 18 a section 1226(a) bond hearing, the Ninth Circuit has held that the burden of proof is 19 on the detainee. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1212 (2022).1 The 20 Immigration Judge cited the correct standard, as the transcript shows. She noted that 21 “it is [Petitioner’s] burden to show that he is not a danger and that he is not a flight 22 risk . . . and that placing the burden on [Petitioner] is consistent with the TRO itself.” 23 (Transcript (Doc. 15-8) 2:47–50.) Per Rodriguez, this is the correct burden to apply in a 24 section 1226(a) bond hearing and the Immigration Judge did not abuse her discretion 25

26 1 Petitioner claims that the Government should bear the burden pursuant to Ninth Circuit authority, citing to Lima v. Wofford, 2025 WL 3535009, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). (Mot. TRO at 7.) Lima, in 27 turn, cites to Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), which held that the burden should fall on the Government. But Singh has been abrogated by more recent Ninth Circuit authority in 28 Rodriguez-Diaz v. Garland, as noted above. Petitioner’s reliance on Singh is therefore unavailing. 1 in applying this burden. If the immigration court “expressly cited and applied the 2 relevant case law in rendering its decision,” the Court accepts that it “applied the 3 correct legal standard,” unless there is an indication that “something is amiss.” 4 Martinez, 124 F.4th at 785 (cleaned up). There is no indication in the record that the 5 Immigration Judge misapplied the standard. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 6 its prior order was followed. 7 2. Translation Services 8 Petitioner also challenges the procedures used during the bond hearing, 9 specifically the Immigration Judge’s decision to pause the Spanish translation partway 10 through the hearing. (Reply at 3.) Petitioner contends that although he consented to 11 have the Immigration Judge speak with his attorney about his case, the Immigration 12 Judge never specifically asked him in Spanish whether he consented to not having the 13 entire hearing interpreted. (Reply at 3.) The transcript reflects the following 14 exchange:

15 Immigration Judge: To the respondent through the Spanish language interpreter: Hello again, sir. Can you 16 hear and understand the interpreter well today?

17 Petitioner: I'm hearing him. Yes I am.

18 Immigration Judge Mullins: Thank you sir. If at any time you have difficulty hearing or understanding the 19 interpreter, please tell us right away.

20 Petitioner: I’m hearing him, yes I am.

21 Immigration Judge Mullins: Okay. So sir, we're accompanied today by your attorney, Mr. Beasley. 22 Do I have your permission to talk with him about your case and for him to represent you today? 23 Petitioner: Yes. 24 Immigration Judge Mullins: Please pause interpretation. 25 To Mr. Beasley, do you waive full and complete interpretation for purposes of this next conversation with 26 you, me, and Mr. Uday?

27 Mr. Beasley (Petitioner’s Counsel): Yes, we waive.

28 1 Immigration Judge Mullins: Alright, Mr. Beasley, I usually explain to respondents at the beginning of their bond 2 hearings, their rights and responsibilities in a bond proceeding. Do you waive a reading of those advisals? 3 Mr. Beasley (Petitioner’s Counsel): Yes, we can waive 4 those. 5 (Tr. 1:15–39.) The Ninth Circuit has held that “if the IJ properly exercises his discretion 6 to afford the alien his reasonable opportunities, the alien receives a full and fair 7 hearing, and all the process he is due. El Rescate Legal Servs v. EOIR, 959 F.2d 742, 8 751 (9th Cir. 1991). “The IJ exercises his discretion to determine whether protection 9 of an alien’s reasonable opportunities requires additional translation.” Id. at 752 10 (citation omitted). Of course, in some situations an Immigration Judge must directly 11 question an applicant to confirm that he understands the legal consequences of his 12 decisions. But those circumstances typically involve an applicant who is proceeding 13 pro se. See, e.g., Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. 14 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). On the other hand, 15 Immigration Judges may rely on representations by counsel. See United States v. 16 Galicia-Gonzalez, 997 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Troncoso-Oviedo v. 17 Garland, 43 F.4th 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2022). In Troncoso-Oviedo, the petitioner 18 contended that the immigration judge violated due process when she allowed 19 petitioner’s counsel to waive certain claims without directly questioning petitioner 20 herself. 43 F.4th at 939. The Ninth Circuit concluded there was no due process 21 violation and the immigration judge was entitled to rely on counsel’s statements, who 22 confirmed petitioner’s agreement to waive claims. Id. at 942. Here, like in Tronscoso- 23 Oviedo, Petitioner was represented by counsel and explicitly gave consent to the 24 Immigration Judge to speak with his counsel about his case. 25 But even assuming without deciding that the Immigration Judge’s failure to 26 translate the entire hearing or obtain Petitioner’s explicit consent was a due process 27 violation, He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Due process requires that 28 an applicant be given competent translation services.”) (citation omitted), Petitioner 1 must also plausibly establish “error and substantial prejudice[,]” see Lata v. I.N.S., 204 2 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (petitioner must show “error and substantial 3 prejudice” to establish due process violation). This he does not do. Petitioner objects 4 that his “inability to hear the hearing, and preclusion from offering testimony at the 5 hearing, certainly prejudiced him because he could not refute the Immigration 6 Judge’s assumption that he did not engage in rehabilitation after his DUI convictions.” 7 (Reply at 3.) Regarding Petitioner’s dangerousness, the Immigration Judge made the 8 following findings:

9 I have significant concerns about the criminal history in this case. I too recognize that the criminal cases are older in 10 relative terms. Um, however, in a 236(a) bond proceeding where it's respondent that bears the burden, I'm really 11 troubled by what's not in this record. I don't have, for example, um, proof of rehabilitation. I don't have, for 12 example, proof that respondent satisfactorily completed the terms of, um, for example, DUI programming. I really 13 carefully reviewed the letters of support to see if any of the letters of support addressed the topic of rehabilitation and 14 what concrete steps respondent has taken to avoid re- offending. And I really just came up, um, short and blank 15 and, and relatively empty. Um, the letters of support just don't meaningfully address this topic. So given the repeat 16 pattern, um, I am going to deny respondent's request for bond based on danger. I do not, need not, reach the issue 17 of flight at this time during today's bond hearing. Um, but again, uh, danger being a threshold issue, I am 18 determining that respondent has not met his burden with regards to danger and I am denying bond on that basis. 19 20 (Tr. 3:136–57.) To the extent there was probative evidence the Immigration Judge 21 allegedly failed to consider, Petitioner’s counsel could have raised such objections on 22 his behalf at the hearing and did not do so. Petitioner does not claim that his counsel 23 was ineffective, nor does he provide authority demonstrating that, absent the 24 complete translation, he would plausibly be entitled to relief. The Ninth Circuit has 25 made clear that an Immigration Judge must consider “the recency and severity of the 26 offenses” when determining dangerousness. Singh, 638 F.3d at 1206; see also 27 Obregon v. Sessions, No. 3:17-cv-01463-WHO, 2017 WL 1407889, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 28 Apr. 20, 2017) (“courts must consider the remoteness of the DUI and intervening 1 events that might undermine a finding of dangerousness”). On this record, the 2 Immigration Judge evaluated both the age of Petitioner’s DUI convictions and the lack 3 of probative evidence that might undermine a dangerousness finding.2 (See Tr. 4 3:136–57.) “Driving under the influence represents a grave danger to the community 5 and is a significant adverse consideration in bond proceedings.” Matter of Siniauskas, 6 27 I&N Dec. 207, 209 (BIA 2018); see also Luna-Corona v. Bondi, 159 F.4th 1210, 7 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2025) (affirming BIA and IJ’s determination that petitioner was a 8 danger to the community for prior DUI because of “repeat[ ] serious misconduct for 9 which he had [previously] been convicted”). The Court thus concludes that Petitioner 10 fails to establish a due process violation. Because Petitioner has not satisfied the first 11 Winter factor, the Court declines to address the remaining factors. 12 B. Prolonged Detention 13 Petitioner’s alternative argument is that he is subject to prolonged detention 14 and entitled to release because he has been in immigration custody for more than 7 15 months. (See Reply.) Under 1226(a), “an individual detained pursuant to § 1226(a) 16 may request an additional bond hearing whenever he experiences a material change 17 in circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). This pathway for relief remains available to 18 Petitioner. See Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 772 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If, 19 where here, an alien is denied bond, he may request another bond hearing ‘upon a 20 showing that . . . circumstances have materially changed since the prior 21 determination.’”) (citation omitted). To the extent Petitioner claims the Immigration 22 Judge “misinterpreted or failed to consider probative evidence, the Court may review 23

24 2 Petitioner’s moving papers state that “[t]he Immigration Judge ignored the fact that [Petitioner] successfully completed probation terms that required participation in substance abuse treatment . . . . 25 The Immigration Judge also failed to acknowledge that twelve years without an arrest for driving while intoxicated is itself evidence of rehabilitation.” (Mot. TRO at 8–9.) In reviewing Petitioner’s attached 26 records, the Court finds only limited and mixed evidence of completed substance abuse treatment. (See, e.g., Ex. A (ECF No. 15-6) at 51–52 (On 10/23/2014, “Drug and/or Alcohol Program proof of 27 completion filed. First Offender 3 month program.”); (Ex. A at 51 (“Defendant failed to complete Decisions for Life on 4/16/14.”)). The Court does not find the Immigration Judge erred as a matter of 28 law. 1 | such errors under its habeas review.” Id. The Court concludes that Petitioner's claim 2 | related to prolonged detention may benefit from further factual development. 3 | Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on the underlying Petition at this time. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for a 6 || Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 15) is converted to a Preliminary Injunction 7 | and DENIED. Because Petitioner's claim related to prolonged detention may benefit 8 | from further factual development, the Court declines to rule on the underlying Petition 9 | atthis time. This matter is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for further 10 | proceedings. 11 12 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 13 | Dated: _May 20, 2026 “Daal J □□ bnettn— Hon. Daniel alabretta 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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