Jose Navarrete v. Rey & K Services, Reynol Gaytan and Karina Gaytan D/B/A Rey & K Services

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00175--CV

JOSE NAVARRETE, APPELLANT V.

REY & K SERVICES, REYNOL GAYTAN AND KARINA GAYTAN D/B/A REY & K SERVICES, APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 84th District Court Ochiltree County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV15395, Honorable Curtis W. Brancheau, Presiding

August 25, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

This appeal arises from an incident which occurred during the plugging of an oil well. Appellant, Jose Navarrete, challenges the granting of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, Rey & K Services, Reynol Gaytan and Karina Gaytan, d/b/a “Rey & K Services” (collectively “Rey & K”). Navarrete contends the trial court should not have granted summary judgment because: (1) genuine issues of material fact existed precluding the granting of a traditional summary judgment; (2) he presented sufficient evidence to preclude the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment; (3) the trial court

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resolved disputed fact issues by relying on extra-record knowledge; and (4) the trial court should not have struck his attached evidence which demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2022, Jose Navarrete, an employee of Phil Dollar Oilfield Services, Inc. (PDOS), was assisting a well-plugging crew with the removal of a wellhead. Navarrete and his coworkers unearthed the wellhead using a backhoe and some shovels. The wellhead needed to be separated from the casing of the well before the plugging process could be completed. To cut the casing, Navarrete and his coworkers raised the wellhead by rigging it to a chain wrapped around the teeth of the backhoe. Navarrete operated the backhoe and created tension in the chain, suspending the wellhead while his coworkers cut the inner and outer casing. At some point, Navarrete left the backhoe running unattended and climbed into the pit to help with the final cut. Unfortunately, during this process, the backhoe shifted; the chain came loose; and the wellhead fell, striking Navarrete and pinning him to the side of the excavation. The injury left Navarrete paralyzed from the waist down.

Since 2018, Rey & K had provided periodic safety training to PDOS’s workforce.

These training sessions included SafeLand training, H2S certification, first aid/CPR, and topic-specific classroom sessions (protective gear, lockout/tagout, safe driving, hazardous chemicals, hand/power tools). Specifically, in the two months prior to the incident, Rey & K conducted a lockout/tagout session and a fall-protection session. After the incident, PDOS hired Rey & K to assess the incident and determine its causes. Rey & K’s report cited the backhoe being left “ON” and unattended, attributing the unsafe

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conditions to “NOT FOLLOWING BASIC STEPS/PROCEDURES” and the cause of the unsafe acts to “MACHINERY UNATTENDED (BACKHOE), HUMAN ERROR.”

Following the incident, Navarrete sued the owner of the well, the operator of the well, and Rey & K under theories of negligence and premises liability. Navarrete also sought damages for gross negligence. Rey & K moved for both a no-evidence summary judgment and a traditional summary judgment on Navarrete’s claims. Navarrete responded with evidence of Rey & K having provided training to PDOS employees. Navarrete did not contest the premises-liability claim and waived his gross-negligence claims, leaving negligence as the only claim at issue. He argued Rey & K breached its duty to provide sufficient training which proximately caused Navarrete’s injuries.

The trial court held a hearing on Rey & K’s motions for summary judgment on March 15, 2026. At the hearing, Rey & K urged the trial court to strike Navarrete’s affidavit, his interrogatory responses, and certain evidence referenced in, but not attached to, Navarrete’s response. The trial court overruled the objection to the affidavit, but he granted the other evidentiary objections. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court granted summary judgment and granted Rey & K’s motion for severance, making the summary judgment final and appealable. Navarrete timely filed his notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

By his four issues, Navarrete argues summary judgment should not have been granted by the trial court. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor. JLB Builders, L.L.C v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021) (citations omitted). To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, the movant has

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the burden to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. By contrast, a party may obtain a no-evidence summary judgment when there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Id. A properly filed no-evidence motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion. Id. “[A] no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). Where, as here, a trial court does not specify the grounds on which it granted the motion for summary judgment, we must affirm if any of the grounds asserted in the motion are meritorious. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017). Further, when the motion asserts both no-evidence and traditional grounds, we review the no-evidence grounds first, Navarrete’s second issue.1 Id.

Rey & K’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment averred Navarrete lacked evidence for the elements of his claims for negligence, premises liability, and gross negligence. Because Navarrete failed to respond by pointing out evidence supporting each element of his claim for premises liability and gross negligence, a no-evidence summary judgment dismissing those claims against Rey & K was proper. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (West 2025, amended 2026); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Therefore, we only address Navarrete’s challenge to the summary judgment in favor of Rey & K on his claim of

1 By his second issue, Navarrete claims the trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary

judgment because he produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence on each challenged element of his negligence claim.

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negligence. Wilson v. Nw. Tex. Healthcare Sys., Inc., 576 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (“We will affirm a no-evidence summary judgment if the record shows . . . there is no evidence on the challenged element[.]”).

The elements of a negligence cause of action are: (1) the existence of a legal duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Tenaris Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor, 718 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. 2025). Proximate cause has two elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) foreseeability. Id. Cause in fact, in turn, also has two essential components: (1) “but for” causation, and (2) “substantial factor” causation. Id. (quotations orig.). The plaintiff must establish both elements of cause in fact in order to prevail on a negligence claim. Id.

Rey & K moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on Navarrete’s negligence claim arguing there is no evidence of a duty owed to Navarrette, no evidence of a breach of any duty, and no evidence any such breach proximately caused Navarrete’s injuries.2 Attached to his response, Navarrete presented his affidavit; copies of his answers to interrogatories from Rey & K; Rey & K’s incident report; transcript of the deposition of Lori Dollar, Vice President and Secretary of PDOS; safety records from PDOS, including certificates of training issued by Rey & K to Navarrete; transcript of the deposition of Reynol Gaytan; and an OSHA lockout/tagout fact sheet.3 In the body of his response, Navarrete also cited evidence Rey & K provided “lockout/tagout” training of some sort.

2 While Navarrete’s petition raised a general claim of negligence against all the defendants and

listed a variety of acts he attributed to all defendants, he conceded in his response that “Mr. Navarrete sued . . . [Rey & K] for negligence in its [sic] training of PDOS employees, including himself.”

3 The trial court excluded Navarrete’s interrogatory responses from the evidence pursuant to Rey

& K’s motion to strike. It appears from the pleadings, however, Navarrete only pointed to his interrogatory response as evidence he suffered paralysis from the incident. However, because our disposition does not turn on evidence of damages but rather evidence of causation, we do not address the exclusion.

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Navarrete contends this is more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating Rey & K, by providing training, owed him a duty to train him adequately, and by not training him adequately Rey & K breached that duty and caused the incident. Assuming, arguendo, Navarrete presented sufficient evidence of a duty owed by Rey & K, he still failed to present more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating Rey & K breached that duty and Rey & K’s breach proximately caused his injuries.4 Navarrete points to his affidavit as evidence demonstrating breach of duty and proximate causation. The affidavit only makes the following relevant statements:

• “I left the backhoe unattended and turned on so that I could help other workers plugging the well.”

• “When I left the backhoe unattended and turned on, I was acting consistently with the training that I received while working at Phil Dollar Oilfield Services.”

However, neither of these statements tie Navarrete’s actions to any specific training he received (or did not receive) from Rey & K. Nor do they articulate any appropriate standard of care in training of this kind or causation of the incident. He also points to the deposition of Reynol Gaytan—a principal of Rey & K Services—for the proposition Rey & K breached their duty by inadequately training him. However, Gaytan only confirmed the use of the backhoe by Navarrete was not “consistent with proper training.” Gaytan’s testimony does not indicate Rey & K gave him inadequate training. Neither does it

4 At the moment, the Texas Supreme Court has yet to recognize a cause of action for negligent

training, and whether a corresponding duty exists is still an open question. See Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 505 (Tex. 2017). However, we need not address whether Rey & K owed a duty as a matter of law because, as described infra, Navarrete failed to provide more than a scintilla of the remaining elements of his negligence claim.

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elucidate any training details, or whether, but for Navarrete following that training, the incident would not have occurred.

Lastly, Navarrete insists the evidence is more than a scintilla, arguing that Rey & K’s training was deficient because Rey & K’s accident report stated a cause of the accident was “NOT FOLLOWING BASIC STEPS/PROCEDURES.” He argues this is an “admission” by Rey & K that they inadequately trained Navarrete which caused the accident. But, again, there is no evidence of what procedures or basic steps were taught to Navarrete, whether he actually followed the procedures on the day of the accident, and whether, but for following the procedures, Navarrete would not have suffered his injuries.

Simply put, presenting evidence that Rey & K trained Navarrete is not enough.

Navarrete failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence for the essential elements of breach of duty and proximate causation for his negligence claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Rey & K’s motion for a no-evidence summary judgment on Navarrete’s claims. We overrule Navarrete’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

Because the no-evidence summary judgment was properly granted, we need not address his remaining issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Laura A. W. Pratt

Justice