1 May 11, 2026
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2
4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 JOSE M.,1 No. 4:25-cv-5141-EFS
8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE 9 v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, AND REMANDING FOR 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff Jose M. asks the Court to reverse the Administrative 14 Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Title 16 benefits. Plaintiff claims he is 15 unable to work due to several physical and mental impairments. The 16 17
18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform sedentary-exertional jobs
2 with some non-disabling mental limitations. Substantial evidence does 3 not support the ALJ’s evaluation of the two consulting psychiatric 4 opinions in the record. These errors impacted the nondisability
5 determination. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. 6 I. Background 7 Plaintiff filed his Title 16 application for benefits on August 12,
8 2022, alleging disability due to several conditions, including conditions 9 resulting from a gunshot wound and operations to his foot, chronic 10 pain, diabetes, and anxiety.2 ALJ Nathaniel Plucker held a hearing in
11 October 2024, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified.3 12 Plaintiff testified that as a result of multiple surgeries to his foot, 13 complications from diabetes, and back pain, he used a cane to walk,
14 spent most of his day seated or lying down, and had a caregiver from 15
16 2 Administrative Record (AR) 220. Because the application filing date 17 starts the relevant period for Title 16 claims, the ALJ appropriately 18 considered whether Plaintiff was disabled beginning August 12, 2022. 19 3 AR 43–84. 20 1 the State who assisted him with living tasks.4 He testified that due to
2 severe anxiety, he isolated at home, could not be around crowds, was 3 frequently agitated and paranoid, and had attention and memory 4 problems.5 The vocational expert testified that a hypothetical
5 individual who could perform sedentary work with certain physical, 6 postural, and environmental limitations could perform some jobs, but 7 the same individual with additional training, social, and attention
8 limitations could not adjust to competitive employment.6 9 Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in December 10 2024 finding Plaintiff not disabled.7 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged
11 symptoms were inconsistent with the medical evidence and other 12 evidence.8 The ALJ considered the lay statements from Plaintiff’s 13
14 4 AR 56–77. 15 5 AR 64, 66, 74–77. 16 6 AR 78–82. 17 7 AR 18–32. Per 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)–(g), a five-step evaluation 18 determines whether a claimant is disabled. 19 8 AR 25. 20 1 mother, who submitted a third-party statement consistent with
2 Plaintiff’s hearing testimony.9 As to the medical opinions, the ALJ 3 found: 4 • the reviewing opinion of Wayne Hurley, MD, partially
5 persuasive. 6 • the examining opinions of Leslie Smith, PMHNP, Marquetta 7 Washington, ARNP, and Jacob Franco, PMHNP, partially
8 persuasive. 9 • the treating opinion of Jesus Marcelo, MD, not persuasive. 10 • the opinion of case manager Ken Owens not persuasive.
11 • the reviewing opinions of Dennis K., MD, John W., PhD, and 12 Beth Fitterer were not considered because of incomplete 13 author names and credentials.10
14 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: 15 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 16 activity since August 12, 2022, the application date.
18 9 AR 30, 321. 19 10 AR 27–30. 20 1 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable
2 severe impairments: residuals of a gunshot wound to the left 3 foot with multiple surgeries; diabetes mellitus; lumbar 4 degenerative disc disease; obesity; and generalized anxiety
5 disorder. 6 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 7 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
8 severity of one of the listed impairments. 9 • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “sedentary work” as 10 defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) except he could not climb
11 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could occasionally climb stairs and 12 ramps; could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; 13 needed to use a cane when ambulating; must avoid exposure to
14 vibration and hazards; was limited to work involving simple, 15 routine tasks and simple work-related decisions; could 16 occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors; could
17 never interact with the public; and could not perform fast- 18 paced work such as work on an assembly line. 19 • Step four: Plaintiff had no past relevant work.
20 1 • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work
2 history, Plaintiff could perform work that existed in significant 3 numbers in the national economy, such as optical goods 4 assembler, circuit board screener, and machine tender.11
5 Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the 6 Appeals Council, which denied review.12 Plaintiff now appeals to 7 district court.13
8 II. Standard of Review 9 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by 10 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”14 and such error
11 impacted the nondisability determination.15 Substantial evidence is 12
13 11 AR 20–31. 14 12 AR 1. 15 13 ECF No. 1. 16 14 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 17 405(g). 18 15 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 19 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 20 1 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such
2 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 3 support a conclusion.”16 4 III. Analysis
5 Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed four consequential errors: (1) 6 improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence; (2) inadequately 7 evaluated the lay witness testimony; (3) erroneously rejected Plaintiff’s
8 subjective complaints; and (4) failed to meet the ALJ’s burden at step 9
10 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 11 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 12 16 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 13 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 14 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 15 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 16 detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion,” not simply the evidence 17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 five.17 The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s challenges amount to
2 an improper request to reweigh the evidence, that the ALJ committed 3 no consequential error, and that substantial evidence supports the 4 ALJ’s decision.
5 A. Medical Opinions: Plaintiff establishes consequential 6 error. 7 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the mental-
8 health opinions from NP Smith, NP Franco, and Mr. Owens, and the 9 physical-health opinion from Dr. Marcelo, by failing to properly 10 consider the consistency and supportability of those opinions. As is
11 explained below, the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the consulting 12 psychiatric opinions from NP Smith and NP Franco. These errors 13 impacted the nondisability determination despite there being no error
15 17 Plaintiff’s step-five argument is, effectively, a culmination of his 16 other arguments for why substantial evidence does not support the 17 RFC. Because substantial evidence does not support the RFC for the 18 reasons explained herein, the Court need not address the standalone 19 step-five challenge. 20 1 in the ALJ’s evaluation of the third mental-health opinion and
2 regardless of the ALJ’s evaluation of the physical-health opinion. 3 1. Standard 4 An ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all
5 medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings.18 The ALJ 6 need not however “give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to any 7 medical opinion(s).”19 The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of
8 medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings include, 9 but are not limited to, supportability, consistency, relationship with the 10 claimant, and specialization.20
11 When evaluating the persuasiveness of each medical opinion, the 12 regulations require the ALJ to consider and explain the supportability 13 and consistency of each medical opinion:
14 The factors of supportability . . . and consistency . . . are the most important factors we consider when we determine how 15 persuasive we find a medical source’s medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings to be. Therefore, we 16
17 18 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (b). 18 19 Id. § 416.920c(a). 19 20 Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)–(5). 20 1 will explain how we considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions 2 or prior administrative medical findings in your determination or decision.21 3 The regulations define these two required factors as follows: 4 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical 5 evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) 6 or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative 7 medical finding(s) will be.
8 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence 9 from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior 10 administrative medical finding(s) will be.22 The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the other listed 11 factors were considered.23 12 13 14 15 16
17 21 Id. § 416.920c(b)(2). 18 22 Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)–(2). 19 23 Id. § 416.920c(b)(2). 20 1 2. Leslie Smith, PMHNP
2 On December 13, 2022, NP Smith performed a psychiatric 3 consultative examination of Plaintiff.24 NP Smith opined that Plaintiff 4 was unable to sustain concentration and persist in work-related
5 activity at a reasonable pace, including regular attendance at work and 6 completing work without interruption, because of his intolerance to be 7 around people.25 NP Smith also opined that Plaintiff was unable to
8 interact with coworkers, superiors, and the public, and could not adapt 9 to the usual stresses encountered in the workplace.26 10 The ALJ found NP Smith’s opinion “partially persuasive” because
11 it was “generally supported by the exam findings, with the claimant 12 found to be able to answer simple questions, perform number repetition 13 forward, and have immediate three-item recall, but made a mistake
14 when performing repetitions backwards, made a mistake when 15 16
17 24 AR 838–43. 18 25 AR 843. 19 26 Id. 20 1 performing serial 7s, and appeared anxious and irritated.”27 But NP
2 Smith’s opinion was “not fully consistent with the record overall” 3 because other evidence showed that Plaintiff could “interact 4 occasionally with supervisors” and was limited to “no fast-paced work,
5 as supported by findings of the claimant being cooperative, having 6 normal speech on exam, and reporting that he got along well with 7 authority figures, and the claimant being found to have a normal mood,
8 affect, and judgment.”28 9 Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s rejection of NP 10 Smith’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to sustain a reasonable work
11 pace or interact with others, with the ALJ instead finding that Plaintiff 12 was precluded from performing only fast-paced work and could interact 13 occasionally with supervisors.
14 The Court considers the whole record to determine whether the 15 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, but starts with the 16 three records the ALJ cited in explaining why NP Smith’s opinion was
18 27 AR 29 (citing AR 843). 19 28 Id. (citing AR 266, 412, 1049). 20 1 inconsistent with the overall record: (1) Plaintiff’s function report; (2)
2 emergency department treatment records; and (3) NP Franco’s 3 psychiatric consultative examination report.29 As relevant, Plaintiff’s 4 function report asked, “How well do you get along with authority
5 figures?”, and Plaintiff wrote, “ok.”30 Plaintiff presented to the 6 emergency department on June 14, 2022, for treatment of facial 7 swelling and a leg wound, and two lines in the physical examination
8 report read, “Speech normal” and “Psychiatric: Normal mood, affect 9 and judgment.”31 NP Franco conducted a psychiatric consultative 10 examination on August 6, 2023, and reported “Cooperation – Fair” on
11 the mental status exam.32 12 Cumulatively, these records are at best a “mere scintilla” of 13 evidence with which NP Smith’s opinion was not consistent.33 The brief
15 29 AR 29 (citing AR 266, 412, 1049). 16 30 AR 266. 17 31 AR 412. 18 32 AR 1049. 19 33 See Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159. 20 1 notes that Plaintiff had normal speech, mood, affect, and judgment
2 upon examination in the emergency department for treatment of 3 unrelated physical-health conditions bear little relevance to Plaintiff’s 4 social capabilities at work.34 Additionally, NP Franco’s note of “fair”
5 cooperation is a single cherry-picked normal finding surrounded by 6 many more significant abnormal findings.35 NP Franco also reported 7
8 34 See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (comparing 9 psychologist’s mental health findings against findings from other 10 mental health professionals); Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 641 11 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that courts do “not necessarily expect” someone 12 who is not a mental-health professional to document observations 13 about the claimant’s mental-health symptoms); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 14 615, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring examination notes to be read in 15 their proper context). 16 35 See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) 17 (disallowing the ALJ from cherry picking evidence to support a 18 conclusion that contradicts the overall diagnostic record); Ghanim v. 19 Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that 20 1 Plaintiff “kept falling asleep throughout the interview and questions
2 needed to be repeated throughout the entire interview”; speech was 3 “[s]lurred at times”; mood was “[a]nxious”; affect was “depressed,” 4 “blunted,” and “withdrawn”; “[a]ttention/[c]oncentration (during
5 conversational portion of evaluation)” was “[p]oor”; made errors on fund 6 of knowledge and recall tasks; had “difficulties staying on task”; and 7 had “difficulties concentrating with the stress of this minimal
8 testing.”36 9 The other mental-health opinions that the ALJ considered are 10 just as, if not more, limiting than NP Smith’s opinion.37 Additionally,
11 12
13 treatment records must be viewed considering the overall diagnostic 14 record). 15 36 AR 1049–51. 16 37 See AR 29–30, 1051 (NP Franco opining that Plaintiff was not able to 17 understand, remember, and carry out simple or complex instructions; 18 sustain concentration and a reasonable work pace; interact with others; 19 or adapt to usual stresses in the workplace), 1056 (Mr. Owens, 20 1 psychotherapy notes from March and April 2023 and behavioral
2 medicine case management follow-ups through September 2024 3 described Plaintiff regularly struggling with taking care of himself and 4 keeping up with daily tasks.38 His primary care provider for physical-
5 health conditions routinely noted normal mood, affect, orientation, 6 grooming, appearance, and insight, which says little about Plaintiff’s 7 ability to interact with others and sustain pace at work, and such notes
8 were recorded as part of physical exams and treatment for unrelated 9 conditions such as diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, and pain.39 And 10 Plaintiff’s testimony and his mother’s statements are consistent with
11 NP Smith’s opinion.40 12 13
15 Plaintiff’s behavioral medicine case manager, opining Plaintiff had 16 several marked limitations in mental functioning). 17 38 AR 870, 875, 880, 1194, 1199, 1204, 1214, 1229–30. 18 39 See, e.g., AR 791, 797, 802, 806, 835, 1019, 1116. 19 40 See AR 64, 66, 74–77, 321. 20 1 In finding NP Smith’s opinion inconsistent with the overall
2 record, the ALJ may have considered other evidence without citing it.41 3 Throughout his brief, the Commissioner points to a batch of records 4 which, according to the Commissioner, support both the inconsistency
5 of NP Smith’s opinion and the crafted mental RFC.42 The Court has 6 already addressed most of these records. As to the additional evidence, 7 the January 2016 psychiatric evaluation is well outside the relevant
8 time-period and, in any event, is not inconsistent with NP Smith’s 9 opinion; the evaluator reported a marked limitation in communicating 10 at work and memory and concentration outside of normal limits.43 The
11 additional mental status exams in the record are inapposite to the 12
13 41 See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 14 2003) (“[I]n interpreting the evidence and developing the record, the 15 ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence.” (quotation marks 16 omitted)). 17 42 ECF No. 15 at 4, 10–11, 15 (citing AR 327, 416, 432, 465, 478, 791, 18 797, 802, 806, 841–43, 1019, 1049, 1116). 19 43 AR 323–27. 20 1 consistency of NP Smith’s opinion. In one, a urologist who treated
2 conditions related to Plaintiff’s foreskin noted Plaintiff was “alert and 3 oriented to person, place, and time.”44 In another, an urgent care 4 provider who treated facial abscess and cellulitis noted, “He is alert
5 and oriented to person, place, and time” and “Behavior normal.”45 And 6 in two others, a CRNA noted, “Mental Status Performs simple tasks” 7 as part of a post-anesthesia evaluation after foot surgeries.46 These
8 records are cherry-picked normal findings, summarily noted by non- 9 mental-health providers treating unrelated conditions, that are not 10 substantial evidence undermining NP Smith’s opinion.
11 3. Jacob Franco, PMHNP 12 On August 6, 2023, NP Franco performed a psychiatric 13 consultative examination of Plaintiff.47 NP Franco opined that Plaintiff
14 was unable to understand, remember, and carry out simple or complex 15
16 44 AR 416. 17 45 AR 432. 18 46 AR 465, 478. 19 47 AR 1046–51. 20 1 instructions; unable to sustain concentration and persist in work-
2 related activity at a reasonable pace, including regular attendance at 3 work and completing work without interruption; unable to interact 4 with coworkers, superiors, and the public; and unable to adapt to the
5 usual stresses encountered in the workplace.48 6 The ALJ found NP Franco’s opinion “partially persuasive” 7 because it was “somewhat supported by the examiner’s findings, with
8 the claimant found to have struggled with performing serial 3s, 9 delayed word recall, money manipulation, the need to repeat questions, 10 and difficulties staying on task and concentrating.”49 But NP Franco’s
11 abnormal findings were “not supportive of the claimant being unable to 12 perform the tasks opined in the opinion, as evidenced by generally 13 normal findings of unremarkable thought content, normal thought
14 process, appropriate dress, and fair insight.”50 Additionally, the ALJ 15 found NP Franco’s opinion “only partially consistent with the record 16
17 48 AR 1051. 18 49 AR 29 (citing AR 1051). 19 50 Id. (citing AR 1049). 20 1 overall with additional exam findings and limited mental health
2 treatment overall supporting no more than moderate limits in each 3 domain, and the claimant being limited as identified in the [RFC],” 4 based on “normal findings, including normal recent and remote
5 memory, cooperative behavior, good attention and concentration, 6 appropriate dress and ‘well groomed’ appearance.”51 The ALJ 7 considered NP Franco’s opinion “more persuasive” than NP Smith’s
8 opinion “given the greater evidentiary support in the records.”52 9 Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s rejection of NP 10 Franco’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to sustain a reasonable work
11 pace, interact with others, or remember and carry out simple 12 instructions, with the ALJ instead finding that Plaintiff was precluded 13 from performing only fast-paced work, could interact occasionally with
14 supervisors, and could perform work involving simple work-related 15 decisions. 16
18 51 Id. (citing AR 797, 841, 1049). 19 52 AR 30. 20 1 First, it is unclear which parts of NP Franco’s opinion the ALJ
2 found “more persuasive” than NP Smith’s opinion or which parts of NP 3 Franco’s opinion had “greater evidentiary support in the records.”53 NP 4 Franco’s opinion was more disabling than NP Smith’s opinion, yet the
5 ALJ incorporated NP Smith’s simple-instructions capability into the 6 RFC while rejecting NP Franco’s more-limited opinion.54 7 Second, the ALJ cited three records in explaining why NP
8 Franco’s opinion was inconsistent with the overall record: (1) a primary 9 care record from June 2022; (2) NP Smith’s report; and (3) NP Franco’s 10 report.55 The primary care record, like the several mental-status notes
11 discussed above in the context of NP Smith’s opinion, documented 12 treatment of unrelated physical conditions and contained a single 13 summary of Plaintiff’s normal psychiatric condition upon physical
14 examination.56 NP Smith found that Plaintiff had delayed recall, 15
16 53 See AR 30. 17 54 See AR 23–24, 843, 1051. 18 55 AR 29 (citing AR 797, 841, 1049). 19 56 AR 797. 20 1 wandered off-topic, had to be asked to put his phone away, was anxious
2 and irritable, was irritated by waiting less than five minutes, and 3 found the interview stressful.57 And, as discussed above in the context 4 of NP Smith’s opinion, NP Franco’s own findings were consistent with
5 his and NP Smith’s opinion.58 Therefore, these records are not 6 substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that NP Franco’s 7 opinion was inconsistent with the overall record.
8 The rest of the relevant overall record—which, as discussed 9 above, consists of summary mental-status notes by non-mental-health 10 professionals during treatment for unrelated physical conditions that
11 are tenuously related to Plaintiff’s social and pace capabilities at 12 work—does not support finding NP Franco’s opinion inconsistent for 13 the same reasons as explained above in discussing NP Smith’s opinion.
14 Finally, what the ALJ described as “limited mental health 15 treatment overall” in the record is not substantial evidence 16 inconsistent with NP Franco’s opinion. True, the record does not
18 57 AR 841–43. 19 58 AR 1049–51. 20 1 contain, for example, evidence of psychiatric hospitalizations or
2 frequent therapy. But there is ample evidence of psychotherapy, 3 behavioral-health case management, and medication for Plaintiff’s 4 mental-health symptoms,59 and three specialized mental-health
5 professionals gave opinions consistent with each other.60 6 4. Ken Owens, Case Manager 7 Mr. Owens, Plaintiff’s behavioral medicine case manager,
8 provided an opinion on a mental-RFC check-box form.61 Mr. Owens 9 checked boxes indicating that Plaintiff was markedly limited in 21 10 mental activities and moderately limited in 3 others.62 Mr. Owens
11 wrote that Plaintiff’s limitations were a direct result of mental 12 illness.63 13
15 59 See AR 868–80, 1191–99, 1204, 1214, 1229–30. 16 60 AR 838–43, 1046–51, 1252–55. 17 61 AR 1252–55. 18 62 AR 1252–54. 19 63 AR 1255. 20 1 The ALJ found Mr. Owens’ opinion not persuasive because it was
2 “not supported by treatment records showing objective findings 3 supportive of the marked limitations identified, nor does the opinion 4 provider identify specific relevant findings.”64 Additionally, the opinion
5 was inconsistent with the overall record because Plaintiff “generally 6 did not have mental health treatment during the period at issue, but 7 limited exams during this time showed the claimant to have normal
8 recent and remote memory, cooperative behavior, good attention and 9 concentration, appropriate dress and ‘well groomed’ appearance.”65 10 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Mr. Owens’
11 opinion.66 As the ALJ found, Mr. Owens did not support his opinion 12 13
15 64 AR 30. 16 65 Id. (citing AR 797, 841, 1049). 17 66 While the ALJ’s consideration of Mr. Owens’ opinion by itself is 18 adequate, it is worth noting that the opinion appears consistent with 19 NP Smith’s and NP Franco’s opinions. 20 1 with any findings or explanations, and Mr. Owens’ opinion is
2 conclusory.67 3 5. Consequential Error 4 The erroneous evaluation of the consulting psychiatric opinions
5 from NP Smith and NP Franco resulted in an unsupported RFC. 6 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion from his 7 treating physician, Dr. Marcelo, which the Court need not address
8 9 10
11 67 See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th 12 Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a medical opinion may be rejected if it is 13 conclusory and inadequately supported); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 14 1111, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining that the doctor’s opinion 15 that the claimant would have “some” diminution in her concentration 16 skills was conclusory and was not supported by relevant medical 17 documentation); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432–33 (9th Cir. 18 1995) (determining that the doctor’s conclusory opinion was not 19 substantiated by relevant medical evidence). 20 1 because Dr. Marcelo’s opinion did not concern Plaintiff’s mental
2 health.68 3 B. Symptom Reports: The ALJ must reevaluate on remand. 4 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity,
5 persistence, and limiting effect of his symptoms were not entirely 6 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 7 record.69 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide valid reasons for
8 discounting his mental symptom reports. The ALJ discounted 9 Plaintiff’s testimony based on the medical opinions and largely the 10 same description of the overall record as used when discounting the
11 psychiatric opinions.70 As the ALJ is to reevaluate the consistency of 12 the psychiatric opinions with the overall record on remand, 13
14 15 16
17 68 AR 1054–56. 18 69 AR 27. 19 70 See AR 27, 29–30. 20 1 consequentially the ALJ is also to reevaluate the consistency of
2 Plaintiff’s testimony with the overall record on remand.71 3 C. Lay Witness: The ALJ must reevaluate on remand. 4 The ALJ stated that he reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s
5 mother’s statements,72 whose third-party report described Plaintiff’s 6 functioning consistently with Plaintiff’s testimony and the psychiatric 7 opinions.73 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by effectively rejecting
8 Plaintiff’s mother’s statement without comment. 9 10
11 71 If the ALJ finds inconsistency between the claimant’s reported 12 symptoms and the evidence, the ALJ must identify what symptom 13 claims are being discounted and clearly and convincingly explain the 14 rationale for discounting the symptoms with supporting citation to 15 evidence. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022); 16 Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163; 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); Soc. Sec. Rlg. 16-3p, 17 2016 WL 1119029, at *7. 18 72 AR 30. 19 73 See AR 321. 20 1 As highlighted by the Commissioner, per regulation 20 C.F.R.
2 § 416.920c(d), the ALJ need not articulate whether a nonmedical 3 source statement (as opposed to a medical source statement) is 4 supported by or consistent with the evidence. However, once a
5 medically determinable impairment is established, the Program 6 Operations Manual System (POMS) directs the ALJ to “consider 7 evidence from nonmedical sources for all other findings in [the] claim,
8 as appropriate.”74 Accordingly, “when evidence from [a] nonmedical 9 source is material to other analyses or conclusions in a claim,” the ALJ 10 must articulate that in the determination.75
11 Here, Plaintiff’s mother’s statement is an important source of 12 information about the limiting impacts of Plaintiff’s impairments and 13 is notably consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony and the psychiatric
14 15
16 74 POMS DI 24503.020C. The Court recognizes that the POMS 17 guidance is not binding on this Court or the ALJ. Lockwood v. Comm’r 18 Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9hth Cir. 2010). 19 75 POMS DI 24503.020D. 20 1 opinions.76 Accordingly, the ALJ on remand is to again consider the
2 third-party statement. 3 IV. Conclusion 4 Plaintiff establishes the ALJ erred. The ALJ is to develop the
5 record and reevaluate—with meaningful articulation and evidentiary 6 support—the sequential process. 7 When engaging in the five-step disability evaluation on remand,
8 the ALJ must meaningfully articulate the supportability and 9 consistency of each medical opinion. If the ALJ discounts a medical 10 opinion based on a perceived inconsistency with the evidence, the ALJ
11 should include sufficient explanation and citations to show that an 12 inconsistency truly exists and why the inconsistency tends to 13 undermine the medical opinion in question.77 Similarly, if the ALJ
14 discounts Plaintiff’s reported symptoms, the ALJ must articulate clear 15 16
18 76 See Regennitter v. Comm’r, 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999). 19 77 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (b)(2), (c)(2). 20 1 convincing reasons for discounting the identified symptoms and
2 ||cite the evidence that undermines the symptoms.78 3 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
4 1. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this
5 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social
6 Security for further proceedings pursuant to
7 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 8 2. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF
9 Nos. 14 and 15, enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, 10 and CLOSE the case.
11 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to file this
12 ||order and provide copies to all counsel.
13 DATED this 11% day of May 2026.
heed I flew 15 EDWARD F.SHEA Senior United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 30