Jose Garcia v. Cathedral City Police

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 15, 2024
Docket5:24-cv-00237
StatusUnknown

This text of Jose Garcia v. Cathedral City Police (Jose Garcia v. Cathedral City Police) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jose Garcia v. Cathedral City Police, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 Dean Gazzo Roistacher LLP Mitchell D. Dean, Esq. (SBN 128926) 2 John A. Kelly, Esq. (SBN 324463) 440 Stevens Avenue, Suite 100 3 Solana Beach, CA 92075 Telephone: (858) 380-4683 4 Facsimile: (858) 492-0486 E-mai: mdean@deangazzo.com 5 jkelly@deangazzo.com

6 Attorneys for Defendants, Cathedral City and Cathedral City Police 7 Department

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JOSE GARCIA, individually, Case No.: 5:24-cv-00237-JGB (DTBx) 11 Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 12 ORDER v. 13 Judge: Jesus G. Bernal CATHEDRAL CITY POLICE Mag. Judge: David T. Bristow 14 DEPARTMENT, a public entity; CATHEDRAL CITY, a Complaint Filed: February 1, 2024 15 public entity, JEFFREY AGUIRRE, Trial Date: None set individually, 16 Defendants. 17

18 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 19 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 20 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 21 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may 22 be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 23 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this 24 Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 25 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends 26 only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 27 under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth 28 in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them 1 to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the 2 procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a 3 party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 4 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 5 Defendants Cathedral City and Cathedral City Police Department 6 (“Cathedral City Defendants”) contend that there is good cause and a 7 particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality 8 and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or 9 confidential records for the following reasons. 10 First, Cathedral City Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal 11 privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of 12 privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the 13 Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police 14 Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 15 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while 16 “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal 17 claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent 18 significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); 19 Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace 20 officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” 21 in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. 22 Code §§ 1040-1047. Cathedral City Defendants further contend that uncontrolled 23 disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non- 24 party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 25 Second, Cathedral City Defendants contend that municipalities and law 26 enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, 27 federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and 28 federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests 1 in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of 2 peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal 3 deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the 4 purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including 5 but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or 6 reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or 7 reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or 8 rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon 9 Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); 10 Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668- 11 671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); 12 Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. 13 Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Cathedral 14 City Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from 15 disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable 16 California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless 17 intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party 18 witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement 19 investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion 20 regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a 21 public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures 22 that may be required. 23 Third, Cathedral City Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not 24 have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, 25 it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled 26 release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los 27 Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 28 Accordingly, Cathedral City Defendants contend that, without a protective 1 order preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will 2 likely substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid 3 self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information 4 from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace 5 officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers 6 of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally 7 undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as 8 can and often does result in litigation. 9 Plaintiff does not agree with and do not stipulate to Cathedral City 10 Defendants’ contentions stated above. Plaintiff agrees, however, that there is good 11 cause for a Protective Order so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties. 12 Plaintiff recognizes that, absent this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties’ 13 respective privilege interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated 14 Protective Order may mitigate such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate 15 discovery with reduced risk that confidential information will become matters of 16 public record. 17 Because of these sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these 18 documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. 19 2. DEFINITIONS 20 2.1 Action: This pending federal law suit. 21 2.2 Challenging Party: A Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation 22 of information or items under this Order. 23 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: Information (regardless of 24 how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for 25 protection under

Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Jose Garcia v. Cathedral City Police, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jose-garcia-v-cathedral-city-police-cacd-2024.