Opinion issued April 8, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00308-CR ——————————— JOSE FELICIANO CASANOVA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 25th District Court Colorado County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 21-153
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Jose Feliciano Casanova guilty of felony murder for his role in
a drive-by shooting that caused the death of Keaton Hancock.1 The trial court
assessed Casanova’s punishment at confinement for life.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.32, 19.02(b)(3), (c), 22.05(b)(2). In his sole issue on appeal, Casanova contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter or as a party to the offense.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Prior to the Murder
On September 8, 2021, two days prior to the murder at issue in this case, Eagle
Lake Police Department (“ELPD”) officers responded to a report of gunfire at the
residence of Hector and Heather Flores on North Walnut Street in Eagle Lake, Texas.
ELPD Officer D. Weatherall testified that numerous people were at the scene
when he arrived—including Heather’s brother, Casanova, who was living at the
house, and Heather’s son, Ethan Dulaney. According to Casanova, he and others
were in the front yard when Daegan Mendoza, Dontrae Johnson, and Dante Stevens
arrived. Daegan and Dontrae, who thought Casanova had “stole[n] some dope,”
approached the house with AR-15 rifles. As Daegan and Dontrae began firing at the
house, Casanova “took off running.”
There were no injuries, but the gunshots caused property damage. Daegan’s
parents came to the scene, and a heated argument ensued with Casanova—requiring
officers to physically restrain him.
ELPD Officer G. Ocot also testified that “a lot of people on the scene were
very, very angry and upset,” and he noted that Casanova threatened to retaliate.
2 At 10:30 p.m. the next night, September 9, 2021, Officer Ocot conducted a
traffic stop on an older-model, silver Infiniti sedan with a paper license tag. The car
was driven by Casanova’s nephew, Ethan, and registered to Andrew Segura. During
the stop, Officer Ocot heard gunshots coming from the vicinity of the Eagle Lake
Funeral Home—located behind the Flores residence—and went to investigate.
At the funeral home, Officer Ocot observed window damage and spent
casings. He circled the block and saw Casanova, Hector, and Cairo Ruvalcaba, Jr.,
standing outside the Flores residence. They told Ocot that someone had been
shooting at them and that one of the shooters from the day before had posted online
a photo of himself at the funeral home. Officer Ocot testified that Casanova and
Cairo were “very upset and angry.” Casanova had a “long barrel rifle slung across
his neck,” and he again threatened to retaliate, stating, “They’re dead, bro.”
The Murder
Less than four hours later, the murder at issue in this case occurred. Dante’s
cousin, Keaton, was shot and killed on the front porch of his house on Martin Luther
King Street in Columbus, Texas.
Keaton’s mother, Kelly Venghaus, testified that Keaton had gone out to the
porch to smoke a cigarette. After Kelly and her husband heard a “loud thump,”
Kelly opened the front door and saw Keaton deceased on the front porch. Kelly
3 noted that Keaton was very close with his cousin Dante and that Dante had spent
considerable time at their house.
Ashleigh Bidales, a neighbor on Martin Luther King Street, testified that, at
approximately 2:05 a.m., she was headed outside to smoke a cigarette when she
heard gunshots. She looked outside and “heard a [car] engine picking up speed.”
She then saw a four-door, silver-gray car pass her house at “faster than a normal
speed” and run a stop sign. She called Keaton’s brother and then called Dante.
Dr. J. Dierksen of the Travis County Medical Examiner’s Office testified that
Keaton’s death was caused by two gunshot wounds to his head and neck.
The Events After Keaton’s Murder and the Investigation
One hour and 40 minutes after Keaton’s murder in Columbus, another murder
occurred back in Eagle Lake—at the home of Shelly Casanova2 and her sons,
Andrew and Jonathon Segura. Officer Ocot testified that he arrived at the scene
shortly after 3:45 a.m. and that, minutes later, Cairo and Casanova’s brother,
Charlie—who is Jonathon’s step-father—arrived. Andrew was on the front porch
holding Jonathon, who had gunshot wounds. Andrew explained that Jonathon was
sleeping on a couch near the front door when men kicked in the door and began
shooting. Andrew fired back, and Jonathon died on the porch. Columbus Police
2 It appears from the record that Shelly is Casanova’s sister-in-law.
4 Department (“CPD”) Captain W. Alley opined that Jonathon’s murder appeared to
be related to, or in retaliation for, Keaton’s murder.
CPD Officer C. Mayfield testified that “several” bullet fragments were
recovered at the scene of Keaton’s murder. No shell casings were found. He
testified that the lack of casings suggested that the “shooter was more than likely in
a vehicle.” And CPD Officer K. Daniel testified that the numerous bullet holes in
Keaton’s house indicated that the weapon was fired “from a moving object, across a
wide range,” going west to east, “like a drive-by shooting.”
Based on an anonymous tip, Captain Alley viewed surveillance video taken
at a Buc-ee’s store in Eagle Lake on the night of the murder. The trial court admitted
videos and still photographs into evidence. These show a silver, four-door Infiniti
with a paper license tag driven up to a gas pump at 1:37 a.m. Captain Alley testified
that Ethan is shown driving, Casanova is shown in the front passenger seat, and Cairo
is shown in the back seat. Casanova, who bears distinctive facial tattoos, is shown
entering the store at 1:38 a.m. And the Infiniti left the store parking lot at 1:41 a.m.
Captain Alley further testified that surveillance video from the Farris Hotel in
Eagle Lake shows a silver-gray, four-door vehicle coming from the direction of
Buc-ee’s and turning north onto FM 102 towards Columbus. The trial court admitted
the video into evidence. Captain Alley noted that the distance between the Buc-ee’s
5 in Eagle Lake and Keaton’s residence in Columbus was about 18 miles and that the
drive would take about 23 minutes.
The trial court also admitted surveillance video of Keaton’s house, taken on
the night of the murder from the school campus across the street. The video depicts
a light-colored car turning under a streetlight onto the street in front of Keaton’s
house at 2:05 a.m. The car slows in front of Keaton’s house and quick flashes of
light—“several bursts of muzzle flash,” according to Captain Alley— emanate from
its passenger side before driving away.
Captain Alley opined: “The Infiniti four-door vehicle that’s on the Buc-ee’s
video is the same vehicle that’s in the Farris Hotel video” and “the same vehicle
that’s in the [school] video.” She testified that the videos show an older model,
silver-gray, four-door sedan with similar hood and trunk lines, low profile tires, fog
lights under the headlights, “quarter panel side lights,” and “rear quarter panel
lights.” And the shots were fired from the passenger side of the vehicle, where
Casanova was shown riding in the Buc-ee’s video, with Cairo behind him.
Two weeks after the murder, Casanova, Ethan, and Cairo were arrested in
Sinton, Texas. United States Marshals Service Deputy C. Marrero testified that
surveillance was set up on a house in Sinton and that a car matching the Infiniti was
seen at the house. Ethan and Cairo were arrested while leaving the house, and four
cell phones and a handgun were recovered from the car. Casanova was found hiding
6 from law enforcement four houses away, where he falsely posed as a member of the
homeowner’s family.
Colorado County Attorney’s Office Investigator M. Mayfield testified that
one of the cell phones recovered, a rose gold iPhone, showed that, nine days after
the shooting, Casanova sent a series of text messages trying to sell the Infiniti and
trade his gun. The trial court admitted the extracted cell phone data into evidence.
The messages include a “selfie” photograph of Casanova with the Infiniti in the
background sent to “Jo Jo Girl” and, ten minutes later, messages with “Og,” in which
the sender identified himself as Casanova. Casanova then sent photos of the Infiniti,
a description of its condition, and an offer to sell it to Og for $2,000.00. Og replied
that a family member was interested. Casanova replied: “Thanks and I may have to
get rid of my gun to gun [sic].” Og asked “What you gonna want for the gun[?]”
Casanova asked for an address, and Og complied.
Texas Department of Public Safety Ranger C. Rogers interviewed Casanova
after his arrest. Casanova was upset with ELPD because he believed that “they were
not doing their job to protect them during this time frame with this group of people
that they had issues with.” Casanova admitted that, after the shooting near the
funeral home, he and others were “attempt[ing] to get out of town” and stopped at
Buc-ee’s for gas and cigarettes. He asserted that they then went to see his brother,
Charlie Casanova, at his house in Eagle Lake. He denied having gone to Columbus.
7 Ranger Rogers and Captain Alley noted that Charlie lived on Willis Street, south of
the Eagle Lake Buc-ee’s, but the surveillance video showed the Infiniti heading
north toward Columbus. Ranger Rogers opined that, based on his investigation, “the
video from the Buc-ee’s and the video from the [school]; it’s the same vehicle.”
The trial court’s charge authorized the jury to convict Casanova for the death
of Keaton Hancock as a principal actor, a party, or a co-conspirator. It instructed the
jury to consider whether Casanova, or a co-actor (Ethan or Cairo), while in the
course of committing deadly conduct (discharging a firearm at or in the direction of
a habitation), committed an act clearly dangerous to human life (discharging a
firearm at an individual—Keaton) that caused Keaton’s death. The jury returned a
general verdict finding Casanova guilty of felony murder.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, Casanova contends that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support his conviction because it does not establish that he was “at the scene when
the shooting occurred” or that he was “responsible for the shooting” of Keaton.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In assessing the legal sufficiency of
the evidence under the Jackson standard, “we consider all of the evidence in the light
8 most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633,
638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).
In conducting our review, we defer to the responsibility of the factfinder to
“fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–
19). We therefore “may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility” of the evidence
or “substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.” Id. The jury, as the sole judge
of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, may choose to believe or disbelieve any
witness or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume
that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that
determination.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt;
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a
defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish
guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If the
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
9 conviction, each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt. Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
“The key question is whether the evidence presented actually supports a
conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.” Morgan v.
State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). And
our role on appeal is “restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a fact
finder does not act rationally.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
B. Felony Murder
Felony murder is, “an unintentional murder committed in the course of
committing a felony.” Rodriguez v. State, 454 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (internal quotations omitted). A person commits the offense of felony murder
if he “commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, . . . the person commits
or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death
of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3). “[F]iring a gun in the direction
of an individual is an act clearly dangerous to human life.” Forest v. State, 989
S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
The felony murder doctrine “dispenses with the necessity of proving [the]
mens rea accompanying the homicide itself; the underlying felony supplies the
culpable mental state.” Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
10 Here, the underlying felony offense is deadly conduct.3 A person commits
felony deadly conduct if he “knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction
of . . . a habitation . . . and is reckless as to whether the habitation . . . is occupied.”
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.05(b)(2), (e).
C. Discussion
Casanova argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
conviction because it does not identify him as Keaton’s shooter.4 He does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction generally or
supporting the other elements of the offense—that felony deadly conduct (discharge
of a firearm at or in the direction of a habitation with recklessness as to whether it
3 “[A] conviction for felony murder . . . will not lie when the underlying felony is manslaughter or a lesser included offense of manslaughter.” Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “[F]elony deadly conduct [is] not a lesser-included offense of manslaughter.” Washington v. State, 417 S.W.3d 713, 721–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (“[I]t appears well established under Texas law that deadly conduct can be the underlying felony for felony murder.” (internal quotations omitted)). 4 Because we conclude below that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict against Casanova as a principal actor, we do not reach the evidence to support his conviction as a party or co-conspirator. When a trial court’s charge authorizes a jury to convict a defendant under more than one theory, as it did in this case, the verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient to support any theory authorized by the trial court’s charge. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (jury unanimity with respect to guilt as principal actor or party not required); Covington v. State, No. 06-15-00190-CR, 2016 WL 2997121, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 25, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (jury must be unanimous that defendant committed offense but need not be unanimous as to theory of responsibility).
11 was occupied) was committed and that, while in the course of and in furtherance of
such deadly conduct, an act clearly dangerous to human life (discharge of a firearm
at or near an individual) was committed that caused Keaton’s death. See TEX. PENAL
CODE §§ 19.02(b)(3), 22.05(b)(2). Accordingly, we limit our review to the essential
element of identity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.5
Identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, or by reasonable
inferences from the evidence. Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018). The evidence must establish that the accused is the person who
committed the offense. Greene v. State, 124 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). “[E]yewitness identification is not necessary.” Id.
Casanova argues that “the State only proved that [he] was seen in a silver
Infiniti at the Eagle Lake Buc-ee’s about 30 minutes before the shooting occurred”
and that the video from the hotel and school are not clear enough to establish that it
is the same vehicle or that he was in the vehicle. We disagree.
5 See also English v. State, No. 01-20-00139-CR, 2021 WL 4202159, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 16, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ostrander v. State, No. 14-20-00286-CR, 2021 WL 2470390, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 17, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because appellant has challenged the proof relating to just a single element of both offenses, we limit our review accordingly.”); see, e.g., Burks v. State, No. PD-0992-15, 2017 WL 3443982, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2017) (not designated for publication) (holding that reviewing court should not address unbriefed elements in legal sufficiency challenge).
12 The video evidence, coupled with the circumstantial evidence of the events
before, during, and after the commission of the offense, supports the jury’s
determination that the vehicle from which the shots were fired is the Infiniti in which
Casanova was riding and that Casanova was Keaton’s shooter.
Before the shooting, Casanova was in a heated feud with Dante, Daegan, and
Dontrae. Believing that Casanova had stolen drugs, Dante, Daegan, and Dontrae
came to Casanova’s residence to retaliate. There, Daegan and Dontrae opened fire
with AR-15 rifles in the front yard at Casanova and his friends and family—
including Casanova’s nephew, Ethan. There was testimony that “a lot of people on
the scene were very, very angry and upset.” And, later at the scene, law enforcement
restrained Casanova when he ran at Daegan’s parents. Casanova voiced to law
enforcement that he intended to retaliate.
At 10:30 p.m. the next night, Officer Ocot conducted a traffic stop on the
Infiniti—an older-model, silver, sedan with a paper license tag. The Infiniti was
driven by Ethan and registered to Andrew.
During the stop, gunfire ensued nearby at the funeral home behind Casanova’s
residence. Officer Ocot saw Casanova, Cairo, and others standing outside the
residence, and they said that someone had been shooting at them. Casanova said
that one of the shooters from the day before—Dante, Daegan, or Dontrae—had
posted online a photo of himself at the funeral home. Casanova and Cairo were
13 “very upset and angry.” Casanova was also upset with ELPD because he believed
that “they were not doing their job to protect them during this time frame with this
group of people that they had issues with.” Casanova had a “long barrel rifle slung
across his neck” and again stated to law enforcement that he intended to retaliate,
stating: “They’re dead, bro.”
Three hours later, at 1:37 a.m., the Eagle Lake Buc-ee’s surveillance video
shows the Infiniti— a silver, four-door with a paper license tag—driven up to a gas
pump by Ethan, with Casanova in the front passenger seat and Cairo in the back seat.
Casanova entered the store at 1:38 a.m., and the Infiniti left the store at 1:41 a.m.
Surveillance video from the Farris Hotel in Eagle Lake then shows a silver
sedan passing by the hotel. There was testimony that the Infiniti was coming from
the direction of Buc-ee’s and turned north onto FM 102 towards Columbus. And
there was testimony that the drive from the Buc-ee’s in Eagle Lake to Keaton’s
residence in Columbus was about 18 miles and took about 23 minutes to travel.
Twenty-four minutes later, at 2:05 a.m., surveillance video from the school
campus shows a light-colored car turning under a streetlight onto the street in front
of Keaton’s house. The car slows in front of Keaton’s house and quick flashes of
light—“several bursts of muzzle flash,” according to Captain Alley— emanate from
its passenger side before it swiftly drives away.
14 The jury saw the video evidence and could compare the likeness of the
vehicles shown. The jury also heard Captain Alley’s testimony that the videos show
an older model, silver-gray, four-door sedan with similar hood and trunk lines, low
profile tires, fog lights under the headlights, “quarter panel side lights,” and “rear
quarter panel lights.” And Captain Alley opined: “The Infiniti four-door vehicle
that’s on the Buc-ee’s video is the same vehicle that’s in the Farris Hotel video” and
“the same vehicle that’s in the [school] video.” Ranger Rogers also opined that,
based on his investigation, “the video from the Buc-ee’s and the video from the
[school]; it’s the same vehicle.” The jury also heard Bidales’s testimony that she
saw a four-door, silver-gray car leaving the scene.
Based on the evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the shots
that killed Keaton were fired from the Infiniti. See Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638 (we
defer to responsibility of factfinder “to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts” and “may not re-evaluate the weight
and credibility” of the evidence or “substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
finder”).6
6 See also Alexander v. State, No. 01-09-00630-CR, 2010 WL 5187678, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 23, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication ) (jury reasonably concluded that car depicted in surveillance video was that of defendant); Greene v. State, 124 S.W.3d 789, 792–93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (evidence that car fleeing scene matched that which appellant was seen driving on day of offense constituted circumstantial evidence of identity). 15 In addition, based on the temporal evidence—that the drive from Buc-ee’s to
Keaton’s house generally took 23 minutes and that the shooting occurred on the
school surveillance video 24 minutes after the Infiniti left Buc-ee’s—the jury could
have reasonably inferred that the Infiniti traveled directly from Buc-ee’s to Keaton’s
house. See Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at 509 (identity may be proven by circumstantial
evidence or by reasonable inferences from evidence).
Casanova admitted that, after the shooting near the funeral home, he and
others were “attempt[ing] to get out of town” and stopped at Buc-ee’s for gas and
cigarettes. Casanova stated that they then went to his brother Charlie’s house.
Ranger Rogers testified, however, that Charlie lived on Willis Street—south of Buc-
ee’s—but that the video evidence shows the Infiniti headed north toward Columbus.
“[I]mplausible explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are
also circumstances of guilt.” Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50. And we “presume that the
jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.”
Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26.
With respect to the identity of the shooter, the evidence shows a history of
acrimony, threats, and retaliation between Casanova and Dante, Daegan, and
Dontrae. And, less than four hours before Keaton was shot and killed, Casanova
was very angry and threatened to retaliate against Dante’s group by killing
someone—saying, “They’re dead, bro.” See Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 286
16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“increasing ire” and threats constituted inculpatory
circumstantial evidence of appellant’s identity as shooter); Greene, 124 S.W.3d at
792 (acrimonious history and threats constituted circumstantial evidence of
identity).7 Notably, Casanova voiced his threat to law enforcement, while wearing
a firearm around his neck. There was also testimony that Keaton was very close
with his cousin Dante and that Dante spent considerable time at Keaton’s house.
And the video evidence showed Casanova in the passenger seat of the Infiniti when
it left Buc-ee’s at 1:41 a.m. and gunfire emanating from the passenger side of the car
in front of Keaton’s house 22 minutes later.
Further, nine days after the shooting, Casanova sent text messages trying to
sell the Infiniti—which the evidence shows was registered to Andrew—and also
tried to “get rid of” his gun. “Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence . . . are
probative of wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.” See Guevara,
152 S.W.3d at 50.
Two weeks after the shooting, Casanova, Ethan, and Cairo were arrested in
Sinton—some two hours away from Eagle Lake. Ethan and Cairo were arrested in
the Infiniti, and Casanova was found hiding at a house, where he attempted to
deceive law enforcement by falsely posing as the homeowner’s family member.
7 See also Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Although motive and opportunity are not elements of [an offense] and are not sufficient to prove identity, they are circumstances indicative of guilt.”).
17 Evidence of flight is a “circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be
drawn.” Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Based on the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational juror could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Casanova was Keaton’s shooter. See Jackson,
443 U.S. at 318–19; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. “This
was not a determination so outrageous that no rational trier of fact could agree.”
Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 527 (internal quotations omitted); see Morgan, 501 S.W.3d
at 89 (our role on appeal is “restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when
a fact finder does not act rationally”). Casanova does not challenge the other
elements of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(3), 22.05(b)(2). We thus
hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Casanova’s conviction for the
offense of felony murder.
We overrule Casanova’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Terry Adams Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Guiney.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 18