Jose Estrada Hernandez v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Jose Estrada Hernandez v. Loretta E. Lynch

606 F. App'x 403

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided June 30, 2015·No. 14-71422·Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Raul Mauro Centeno-Rodríguez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

In his brief to the BIA, Centeno-Rodrí-guez argued he established eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal based on his membership in a social group of young men who refused recruitment by gangs. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Centeno-Rodríguez failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent' ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir.2008) (evidence supported conclusion that gang victimized petitioner for economic and personal reasons rather than on account of a protected ground),, abrogated on other grounds as stated in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc). We lack jurisdiction to consider Centeno-Rodriguez’s contentions regarding new social groups that he did not raise *404 to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004). Thus, we deny Centeno-Rodriguez’s petition as to his asylum and withholding of removal claims.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Cen-teno-Rodriguez failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Salvadoran government if returned to El Salvador. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2008). Thus, we deny Centeno-Rodriguez’s petition as to his CAT claim as well.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Raul Mauro Centeno-Rodríguez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

In his brief to the BIA, Centeno-Rodrí-guez argued he established eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal based on his membership in a social group of young men who refused recruitment by gangs. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Centeno-Rodríguez failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent' ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir.2008) (evidence supported conclusion that gang victimized petitioner for economic and personal reasons rather than on account of a protected ground),, abrogated on other grounds as stated in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc). We lack jurisdiction to consider Centeno-Rodriguez’s contentions regarding new social groups that he did not raise *404 to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004). Thus, we deny Centeno-Rodriguez’s petition as to his asylum and withholding of removal claims.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Cen-teno-Rodriguez failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Salvadoran government if returned to El Salvador. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2008). Thus, we deny Centeno-Rodriguez’s petition as to his CAT claim as well.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Jose Estrada Hernandez v. Loretta E. Lynch, 606 F. App'x 403 (9th Cir. 2015).

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