Jose Espinoza-Rosales v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 20-71170
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE GUADALUPE ESPINOZA- No. 20-71170 ROSALES, Agency No. A209-805-575 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 19, 2026** Tucson, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, HURWITZ, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Jose Espinoza-Rosales seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen, which he sought to apply for

cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the

petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Espinoza-Rosales’s primary argument—that both we and the immigration

court below lack jurisdiction because the Notice to Appear did not include all of the

information required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)—is foreclosed by our en banc decision

in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1190–93 (9th Cir. 2022) (en

banc) (“[D]efects in an NTA . . . have no bearing on an immigration court’s

adjudicatory authority.”).

Espinoza-Rosales also argues that the BIA “unreasonably delayed

adjudication” of his motion for seventy-six days, but he cites no law or regulation

requiring the BIA to act within a specific time frame, let alone sooner than it

did. See Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 655, 666 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[P]rocedural

delays, such as routine processing delays, do not deprive aliens of a substantive

liberty or property interest unless the aliens have a legitimate claim of entitlement to

have their applications adjudicated within a specified time.” (internal quotation and

citation omitted)).

Finally, we reject Espinoza-Rosales’s argument that the BIA abused its

discretion in denying the motion to reopen because it was unopposed. See Limsico

v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding the BIA did not abuse its

discretion in denying unopposed motion to reopen). A petitioner seeking reopening

must “establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought,” Gonzalez-Lara v.

Garland, 104 F.4th 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2024), and the BIA concluded that

2 Espinoza-Rosales did not meet the requirements for cancellation of removal. See

Partap v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding no abuse

of discretion in denying motion to reopen where petitioner did not establish

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship). Espinoza-Rosales did not

meaningfully challenge this conclusion in his opening brief and thus forfeited the

issue. See Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITION DENIED.1

1 The stay of removal will be vacated on issuance of the mandate.