Jose Elmer Menendez-Antonio v. Merrick B. Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 22, 2023
Docket21-3607
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jose Elmer Menendez-Antonio v. Merrick B. Garland (Jose Elmer Menendez-Antonio v. Merrick B. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jose Elmer Menendez-Antonio v. Merrick B. Garland, (6th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0099n.06

No. 21-3607

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Feb 22, 2023 JOSE ELMER MENENDEZ-ANTONIO; DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) ANA ISABEL MENENDEZ-ANTONIO, ) Petitioners, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) FROM THE UNITED STATES v. ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) APPEALS MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, ) Respondent. ) OPINION ) )

Before: GRIFFIN, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Jose Elmer Menendez-Antonio and Ana Isabel Menendez-Antonio,

siblings who are natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition this court for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from the denial of their

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. As set forth below, we DENY the petition

for review.

The petitioners entered the United States as unaccompanied minors (Jose was 15 and Ana

was 10) in May 2014. The Department of Homeland Security subsequently served the petitioners

with notices to appear in removal proceedings, charging them with removability under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as aliens present in the United States without being

admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Appearing with counsel and their guardian

before an immigration judge (IJ), the petitioners admitted the factual allegations set forth in the

notices to appear and conceded removability as charged. No. 21-3607, Menendez-Antonio v. Garland

The petitioners then filed asylum applications with the United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services (USCIS). See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C). Following the petitioners’

interviews with an asylum officer, the USCIS referred their applications back to the IJ for a de

novo hearing.

At the hearing before the IJ, the petitioners sought asylum and withholding of removal

based on their membership in a particular social group—“Salvadoran youth who oppose and defy

the gangs.” The petitioners proffered their declarations in lieu of testifying, and the parties

stipulated to findings of fact based on the petitioners’ declarations and applications. According to

those stipulated findings, the petitioners came to the United States because they believe that El

Salvador is dangerous and because they are afraid of gangs. In El Salvador, the petitioners lived

in a neighborhood between territories controlled by two different gangs. Gang members once

stopped Jose on his way to school and threatened to kill him; Jose did not respond and rode off on

his bike. Both petitioners had witnessed gang members shooting at each other.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied the petitioners’ applications for asylum and

withholding of removal and ordered their removal to El Salvador. The IJ found that the petitioners

had failed to establish past persecution, observing that their encounters with gangs in El Salvador

appeared to be opportunistic rather than targeted from the gang members’ standpoint. Although

the IJ credited the petitioners’ subjective fear of future persecution based on the violent conditions

and gang activities in El Salvador as well as their young age at the time of their encounters with

gangs, the IJ found that they had failed to establish that their claimed fear was objectively

reasonable. According to the IJ, the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that they could not

relocate within El Salvador or that the Salvadoran government would be unwilling or unable to

assist them. The IJ went on to determine that the petitioners had failed to show that their particular

-2- No. 21-3607, Menendez-Antonio v. Garland

social group was cognizable under the INA, pointing out that caselaw established that gang

recruitment and opposition to gangs did not constitute a group defined with immutability,

particularity, and social distinction. The IJ further observed that “[t]he entire population of El

Salvador with the exception perhaps of the gang members opposes the gangs and defies the gangs.”

Even if the petitioners had established a cognizable particular social group, the IJ determined, they

had failed to demonstrate a nexus between their alleged persecution and their membership in that

group. The IJ reiterated that the petitioners’ encounters with gangs were “opportunistic criminal

events” and not targeted incidents. Because the petitioners had failed to establish eligibility for

asylum, the IJ concluded, they had necessarily failed to satisfy the higher burden required for

withholding of removal.

The petitioners appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Dismissing the appeal, the BIA

adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision denying the petitioners’ applications for asylum and

withholding of removal. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate

their membership in a cognizable particular social group because their proposed group lacked the

requisite particularity and social distinction. The BIA also agreed with the IJ that the petitioners

had failed to demonstrate a nexus between any alleged persecution and their membership in a

particular social group, discerning no clear error in the IJ’s factual finding that the petitioners were

the victims of “opportunistic criminal events.” In light of these dispositive grounds, the BIA

declined to address other issues raised by the petitioners.

This timely petition for review followed. “Where, as here, the BIA issues its own decision

rather than summarily affirming the IJ, the BIA decision is reviewed as the final agency decision,

but the IJ’s decision is also reviewed to the extent that the BIA adopted it.” Harmon v. Holder,

758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 2014). “Questions of law are reviewed de novo, but substantial

-3- No. 21-3607, Menendez-Antonio v. Garland

deference is given to the [agency’s] interpretation of the INA and accompanying regulations.”

Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009). We review the agency’s factual findings for

substantial evidence, reversing only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Khalili, 557 F.3d at 435.

In their brief in support of their petition, the petitioners seek review of the denial of their

applications for asylum and do not address the denial of their applications for withholding of

removal. The petitioners have therefore forfeited any challenge to the agency’s denial of

withholding of removal by failing to raise the issue before this court. See Amezola-Garcia v.

Lynch, 846 F.3d 135, 139 n.1 (6th Cir. 2016); Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 327 n.1 (6th Cir.

2005).

An applicant for asylum must establish that he or she is a “refugee”—a person “who is

unable or unwilling to return to” his or her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded

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Related

Bonilla-Morales v. Holder
607 F.3d 1132 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Bi Xia Qu v. Holder
618 F.3d 602 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Khalili v. Holder
557 F.3d 429 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Ethel Harmon v. Eric Holder, Jr.
758 F.3d 728 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
Jonathan Cruz-Guzman v. William P. Barr
920 F.3d 1033 (Sixth Circuit, 2019)
Amezola-Garcia v. Lynch
846 F.3d 135 (Sixth Circuit, 2016)

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