Opinion issued December 16, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00055-CV ——————————— JOSE E. PERLERA, Appellant V. PATRICIA HERNANDEZ NAJERA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 245th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2012-52297
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order for child support and medical
support arrearages. In two issues, appellant Jose Perlera contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in granting cumulative judgments for child support arrearages and medical support arrearages in favor of appellee Patricia Hernandez
Najera.1
We affirm.
Background
Perlera and Najera were divorced in May 2014. They have two sons, J.P.P.
and J.A.P.2 At the time of trial, J.P.P. was twenty-one years old, and J.A.P was
twenty years old.3
Under the terms of the final divorce decree, Najera was appointed the sole
managing conservator of J.P.P. and J.A.P. The divorce decree states, in pertinent
part:
IT IS ORDERED that JOSE E. PERLERA shall pay to PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA child support of $3,250.00 per month, payable in two equal installment payments per month of $1,625.00, with the first installment payment of $1,625.00 being due and payable on May 1, 2014, and the second installment payment of $1,625.00 being due and payable on May 15, 2014, and with a like installment payment of $1,625.00 being due and payable on the 1st and 15th of each month thereafter until further order modifying this child support. ....
1 The Office of the Texas Attorney General (“OAG”) declined to file a brief in this appeal. 2 Perlera and Najera have a daughter who is not a subject of this appeal. 3 The final divorce decree refers to the then-minor children as J.P.P. and J.A.P. For ease of reference, we will also refer to them by their initials.
2 The parties agree, and the Court therefore finds, that J.A.P., a child of this marriage, requires substantial care and personal supervision at this time, because of a mental or physical disability and at this time will not be capable of self-support, that payments for the support of this child should be continued after the child’s eighteenth birthday for an indefinite period, and that both parents have a duty to support the child.
....
In accordance with Texas Family Code section 154.130, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions regarding the child support rendered in this case . . . :
1. The application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in this case;
2. The net resources of JOSE E. PERLERA per month are $8,640.00;
3. The net resources of PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA per month are $0;
4. The percentage applied to JOSE E. PERLERA’s net resources for child support is 38% percent; and
5. The specific reasons that the amount of child support ordered by the Court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines of Section 154.125 or 154.129 of the Texas Family Code, as applicable, are:
J.A.P. is a minor disabled child at this time with proven needs exceeding guideline child support, and the Obligee is not working at this time.
Pursuant to Section 154.182(b-1) of the Texas Family Code JOSE E. PERLERA is ordered to pay PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA, as additional child support, cash medical support of
3 $90.00 per month, which equals one-half (1/2) of the insurance premiums with the first payment of $90.00 being due and payable on May 1, 2014, and with a like payment of $90.00 being due and payable on or before the 1st day of each month until there is a change in the actual cost of the health insurance for the children.
In September 2023, Najera filed a motion for enforcement of child support
order, alleging that Perlera had violated the divorce decree by failing to pay Najera
the monthly obligation of $3,250.00 in child support and $90.00 in medical
support. Najera requested confirmation of the total child support and medical
support arrearages owed by Perlera and that Perlera be held in contempt for his
violations of the divorce decree. Najera attached as exhibits to her motion the
divorce decree and a financial activity report from the Child Support Division of
the OAG reflecting the total arrears to date.
Perlera answered, generally denying the allegations in Najera’s enforcement
motion and asserting, among other things, that the divorce decree was incapable of
enforcement and required modification to be valid under the Texas Family Code,
and that he lacked the ability, both past and present, to provide the court-ordered
support.
Perlera also filed a motion to specially except and/or dismiss Najera’s
motion for enforcement of child support and medical support. He asserted that the
motion for enforcement was not specific because it did not identify the provisions
of the divorce decree he allegedly violated or how he failed to comply with them.
4 According to Perlera, the decree was not capable of enforcement because (1) it was
ambiguous and not sufficiently clear and specific in its terms and (2) it did not
include a stepdown provision for child support for more than one child as required
under the Texas Family Code.
The trial court held a hearing on Najera’s enforcement motion and Perlera’s
motion to specially except and/or motion to dismiss Najera’s motion. The court
took judicial notice of the underlying divorce decree signed by the trial court on
May 19, 2014.
At the hearing, Najera testified that Perlera had paid his court-ordered
monthly child support in full through April 2022, but he did not make any payment
in May, June, or July of that year. Najera testified that Perlera began paying
$700.00 a month in August 2022. The OAG’s financial activity report, a copy of
which was admitted into evidence, showed that Perlera had failed to pay a total of
$51,231.10 in child support and $1,771.20 in medical support between May 2022
and the date of trial. Najera requested that the court confirm the child support and
medical support arrearages and order Perlera to pay them according to a schedule
to be determined by the court.
Najera testified that J.P.P. turned eighteen years old on March 31, 2020, and
he graduated from high school in May 2020. She testified that J.A.P. received
Medicaid and that he began receiving it through his own disability when he turned
5 eighteen years old in October 2022. Najera testified that there were certain
medications and therapies that J.A.P. needed that are not covered by Medicaid.
Perlera testified that he was ordered by the court to pay $3,250.00 per month
in child support to Najera, due and payable in two installments of $1,625.00 on the
1st and 15th of each month beginning on May 1, 2014. He was also ordered to pay
$90.00 per month in medical support to Najera beginning on May 1, 2014. Perlera
admitted that he failed to make any payment for child support or medical support
to Najera from May 2022 through July 2022 and, since August 2022, he had only
been paying Najera $700.00 a month in child support. Perlera testified that he
worked part-time as a supervisor for his wife’s company, Quality Homes and
Services, LLC, and he earned between $2,600.00 and $2,800.00 per month.
Perlera testified that he was seeking modification of the trial court’s original child
support order.
The trial court entered an order on confirmation of arrearages on December
18, 2023. The court found that the child support and medical support obligations
in the final decree of divorce were unenforceable by contempt, but it denied
Perlera’s motion to dismiss Najera’s motion for enforcement. It further found that
Perera was in arrears in the amount of $51,231.10 for child support and $1,771.20
for medical support, and it granted cumulative judgments in favor of Najera for
those amounts. The court ordered Perlera to pay the child support judgment by
6 making monthly payments of $300.00 and the medical support judgment by
making monthly payments of $90.00, beginning on January 1, 2024, until the
judgments were paid in full. The order stated that Perlera’s payment of these
cumulative judgments was in addition to, and not in lieu of, his regular child
support and medical support payments due and payable under the divorce decree.
Judgment for Child Support Arrears
In two issues, Perlera contends that the trial court erred in granting
cumulative judgments in Najera’s favor for child support arrearages of $51,231.10
and medical support arrearages of $1,771.20. He asserts that the final divorce
decree was too ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain to confirm arrearages, and the
evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling confirming child support arrearages for an
abuse of discretion. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); In re Roisman,
651 S.W.3d 419, 440 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.). A trial court
abuses its discretion when it rules without reference to guiding rules and principles
or when its decision is unreasonable or arbitrary. Transcor Astra Grp. S.A. v.
Petrobras Am., Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 482 (Tex. 2022).
In family law cases, legal and factual sufficiency challenges do not
constitute independent grounds for asserting error but are relevant factors in
7 determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Reddick v. Reddick, 450
S.W.3d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). To determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or
factually insufficient to support the trial court’s decision, we consider whether the
trial court (1) had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion and
(2) erred in its application of that discretion. Id. We conduct the applicable
sufficiency review when considering the first prong of the test. Id. We then
determine whether, based on the evidence, the trial court made a reasonable
decision. Id. For legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in a light favorable
to the finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could do so
and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City
of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). For factual sufficiency, we
consider all the evidence for and against the challenged finding and set the finding
aside “only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.”
Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). A trial court does not
abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative
character to support the decision. Banakar v. Krause, 674 S.W.3d 564, 573 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.).
8 B. Applicable Law
“[A]n arrearage in the child-support context occurs when an obligor has not
satisfied his obligation.” Ochsner v. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tex. 2016).
Section 157.263 of the Texas Family Code provides for confirmation of the
amount of child support and medical support arrearages when a party moves to
enforce the payment of child support:
(a) If a motion requests a money judgment for child support [or] medical support . . . arrearages, the court shall confirm the amount of arrearages and render cumulative money judgments . . . .
(b) A cumulative money judgment for the amount of child support owed includes:
(1) unpaid child support not previously confirmed;
(2) the balance owed on previously confirmed arrearages or lump sum or retroactive child support judgments;
(3) interest on the child support arrearages; and
(4) a statement that it is a cumulative judgment for the amount of child support owed.
(b-1) A cumulative money judgment for the amount of medical support owed includes:
(1) unpaid medical support not previously confirmed;
(2) the balance owed on previously confirmed medical support arrearages or lump sum or retroactive medical support judgments;
(3) interest on the medical support arrearages; and
9 (4) a statement that it is a cumulative judgment for the amount of medical support owed.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.263.
Subsection (b-3) provides: “In rendering a money judgment under this title
that includes child support [or] medical support . . . arrearages, the court may not
reduce or modify the amount of arrearages but, in confirming the amount of
arrearages, may allow a counterclaim or offset as provided by this title.” Id.
§ 157.263(b-3). As the Texas Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he plain language of
this provision means that a trial court in an enforcement action cannot alter the
amount deemed payable in the original child-support order.” Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d
at 723. “[A] trial court instructed to ‘confirm the amount of arrearages’ is to
determine the quantity of the child-support obligation that the obligor has failed to
meet.” Id. at 721 (emphasis omitted). The arrearage calculation simply calculates
the difference between the payments made by the obligor and the payments
required under the child support order. Haden v. Granmayeh, No.
01-19-01013-CV, 2020 WL 7391708, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.
17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting arrearages is “an arithmetic procedure: What
the obligor owes less what the obligor has paid”) (quotation omitted). Although
the trial court has discretion to determine child support arrearages, its “discretion is
very limited” because the “calculations must be based on the payment evidence
presented,” not the trial court’s assessment of what is fair or reasonable. Id. at *3 10 (quoting Chenault v. Banks, 296 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). The trial court “acts as a mere scrivener in mechanically
tallying up the amount of arrearage.” White v. White, No. 01-12-00192-CV, 2013
WL 1183293, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (internal quotations omitted).
C. Child Support
In his first issue, Perlera asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting a cumulative judgment of $51,231.10 in child support arrearages to Najera
because the divorce decree is ambiguous, indefinite, and uncertain in that it sets his
child support obligation at an amount that exceeds the statutory guidelines and
without identifying which portion of the amount was for each child. He complains
that the child support order also failed to include a partial termination of support
provision as required under Texas Family Code section 154.127.
Texas Family Code section 154.125 sets out the child support guidelines that
courts apply when rendering a child support order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.125. These statutory guidelines are presumed to be in the best interest of the
child, but that presumption is rebuttable, and the trial court “may determine that the
application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate under the
circumstances.” Id. § 154.122. If it does so, and the evidence rebuts the
presumption that applying the guidelines is in the best interest of the child, the trial
11 court may order payments in an amount other than that established by the
guidelines. Id. § 154.123(a). If the court deviates from the statutory guidelines,
then the law requires the trial court to state its reasons for making such findings.
Id. § 154.130(b)(4).4
Here, the final divorce decree states:
Statement on Guidelines
4 Texas Family Code section 154.130 provides: (a) . . . [I]n rendering an order of child support, the court shall make the findings required by Subsection (b) if: .... (3) the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines under Section 154.125 or 154.129, as applicable. .... (b) If findings are required by this section, the court shall state whether the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate and shall state the following in the child support order: “(1) the net resources of the obligor per month are $ _______; “(2) the net resources of the obligee per month are $ _______; “(3) the percentage applied to the obligor’s net resources for child support is ___%; and “(4) if applicable, the specific reasons that the amount of child support per month ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines under Section 154.125 or 154.129, as applicable.” (c) Findings under Subsection (b)(2) are required only if evidence of the monthly net resources of the obligee has been offered. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.130.
12 In accordance with Texas Family Code section 154.130, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions regarding the child support order rendered in this case on April 28, 2014, because a party has filed a written request with the Court not later than 10 days after April 28, 2014, or the amount of child support ordered by the Court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines under Section 154.125 or 154.129 of the Texas Family Code, as applicable:
1. The application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in this case;
2. The net resources of JOSE E. PERLERA per month are $8,640.00;
3. The net resources of PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA per month are $0;
4. The percentage applied to JOSE E. PERLERA’s net resources for child support is 38% percent; and
5. The specific reasons that the amount of child support ordered by the Court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines of Section 154.125 or 154.129 of the Texas Family Code, as applicable, are:
J.A.P. is a minor disabled child at this time with proven needs exceeding guideline child support, and the Obligee is not working at this time.
The trial court made the requisite findings under Texas Family section
154.130(b) and provided its reasons for deviating from the guidelines, finding that
“J.A.P. is a minor disabled child at this time with proven needs exceeding
guideline child support, and the Obligee is not working at this time.” Perlera’s
complaint that the child support arrearages cannot be confirmed because his child
13 support obligation under the final divorce decree exceeded the statutory guidelines
is unavailing.
Perlera asserts that the final divorce decree is ambiguous, indefinite, and
uncertain because it does not include a partial termination of support provision as
required under Texas Family Code section 154.127.5
“Where divorced parents have more than one child, the obligor parent’s duty
to pay child support in the amount mandated by the order or decree does not
terminate when one of the children reaches majority, unless the order so provides.”
Gross v. Gross, 808 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no
writ). If one or both parents decide that a child support order should be modified,
they may file suit to modify the order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.002(a).
5 Texas Family Code section 154.127 provides: (a) A child support order for more than one child shall provide that, on the termination of support for a child, the level of support for the remaining child or children is in accordance with the child support guidelines. (b) A child support order is in compliance with the requirement imposed by Subsection (a) if the order contains a provision that specifies: (1) the events, including a child reaching the age of 18 years or otherwise having the disabilities of minority removed, that have the effect of terminating the obligor’s obligation to pay child support for that child; and (2) the reduced total amount that the obligor is required to pay each month after the occurrence of an event described by Subdivision (1). Id. § 154.127.
14 Here, the divorce decree states that Perlera’s child support obligation to pay Najera
$3,250.00 per month remains in effect “until further order modifying this child
support.” At the hearing on Najera’s enforcement motion, Perlera testified that he
was currently seeking a modification of the child support order. 6 See Gross, 808
S.W.2d at 219 (concluding where trial court found divorce decree had never been
modified, and appellant had never moved to modify prior support order, he could
not be heard to complain that order was too uncertain to be enforceable by money
judgment).
The evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial court’s confirmation
of child support arrearages. Najera testified that Perlera initially paid his
court-ordered monthly child support in full through April 2022, but he failed to
make any payment in May, June, and July 2022. Najera testified that, beginning in
August until the date of trial, Perlera had been paying a total of $700.00 per month.
The OAG’s financial activity report showed that Perlera had failed to pay a total of
$51,231.10 in child support and $1,771.20 in medical support at the time of trial.
When asked whether she was requesting that the court confirm the child support
6 On the second day of the hearing, Najera’s counsel informed the trial court that his client had been served with a motion for modification that same morning. The motion for modification was not set or decided before the trial court ruled upon the enforcement motion.
15 and medical support arrearages and order Perlera to pay them, Najera replied,
“Yes.”
Perlera testified that he was ordered by the court to pay $3,250.00 per month
in child support to Najera, due and payable in two installments of $1,625.00 on the
1st and 15th of each month beginning on May 1, 2014. He was also ordered to pay
$90.00 per month in medical support to Najera beginning on May 1, 2014. Perlera
admitted that from May through July 2022, he failed to make any payment for
child support or medical support to Najera. He further admitted that, since August
2022, he had only been paying Najera $700.00 a month in child support.
Based on this evidence, there is no factual dispute that Perlera was in arrears
at the time the trial court entered its order confirming arrearages. The trial court
had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion. See Reddick, 450
S.W.3d at 187. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
confirming that Perlera owed Najera $51,231.10 in child support arrearages.
We overrule Perlera’s first issue.7
7 We decline to address Perlera’s additional argument that the divorce decree was ambiguous, indefinite, and uncertain because it does not distinguish what portion of the court-ordered child support was for each child as Perlera has not supported this argument with appropriate citations to authority. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
16 D. Medical Support
In his second issue, Perlera asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting a cumulative judgment for medical support in the amount of $1,771.20 in
favor of Najera.
Texas Family Code section 154.183 provides:
(a) An amount that an obligor is ordered to pay as medical support or dental support for the child under this chapter, including the costs of health insurance coverage or cash medical support under Section 154.182 and the costs of dental insurance under Section 154.1825:
(1) is in addition to the amount that the obligor is required to pay for child support under the guidelines for child support;
(2) is a child support obligation; and
(3) may be enforced by any means available for the enforcement of child support, including withholding from earnings under Chapter 158.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.183. Under section 154.302, “[t]he court may order
either or both parents to provide for the support of a child for an indefinite period
and may determine the rights and duties of the parents if the court finds that:
(1) the child, whether institutionalized or not, requires substantial care and personal
supervision because of a mental or physical disability and will not be capable of
self-support; and (2) the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to
exist, on or before the 18th birthday of the child.” Id. § 154.302.
The final divorce decree states:
17 Health insurance is available or is in effect for the children through PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA’S employment or membership in a union, trade association, or other organization at a reasonable cost of $180.00 per month.
Pursuant to Section 154.182(b-1) of the Texas Family Code JOSE E. PERLERA is ORDERED to pay PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA, as additional child support, cash medical support of $90.00 per month, which equals one-half (1/2) of the insurance premiums with the first payment of $90.00 being due and payable on May 1, 2014, and with a like payment of $90.00 being due and payable on or before the 1st day of each month until there is a change in the actual cost of the health insurance for the children. Beginning on the first day (1st) of the month following each change in the actual cost of health insurance for the children, JOSE E. PERLERA is ORDERED to pay to PATRICIA HERNANDEZ PERLERA one-half (1/2) of the actual cost of health insurance for the children, as additional child support, with the first payment of the changed amount being due and payable on the first (1st) day of the first month after the change becomes effective, and with a like payment of the changed amount being due and payable the first (1 st) day of each month thereafter until there is another change in the actual cost of the health insurance for the children.
In support of his contention that his obligation to pay medical support
terminated, Perlera points to the language in the divorce decree ordering him to
pay “a like payment of $90.00 being due and payable on or before the 1st day of
each month until there is a change in the actual cost of the health insurance for the
children.” Perlera points to Najera’s testimony at the hearing that the actual cost of
the health insurance had changed “for years,” and the value had gone up and down.
He argues that this evidence established a change in the actual cost of health
18 insurance for the children, and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the
medical support arrearages.
Although the trial court can award certain offsets and credits, it has no
discretion to forgive or decrease a past child support obligation. See George v.
Jeppeson, 238 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
Thus, in a proceeding to confirm child support arrearages, the trial court’s child
support calculations must be based on the payment evidence presented, not the trial
court’s assessment of what is fair or reasonable. See Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d at 731;
In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet.
denied).
When Najera moved for enforcement, the court conducted an “arithmetic
procedure” to determine Perlera’s arrearages. See Buzbee, 870 S.W.2d at 340.
Najera provided testimony supporting that the lowest she ever paid for health
insurance was $487.00 per month, but that she was asking for only $90.00 per
month from Perlera for the total amount of medical support accrued between May
1, 2014 and November 15, 2023. Based on the evidence, including that Perlera
had made various payments totaling $8,640.00 in medical support during this
period, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it on which to exercise its
discretion and award $1,771.20. See Reddick, 450 S.W.3d at 187. We hold that
19 the trial court did not abuse its discretion by confirming that Perlera owed Najera
$1,771.20 in medical support arrearages.
We overrule Perlera’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Kristin Guiney Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.