Jose Carranza v. Pamela Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 2, 2025
Docket16-70575
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jose Carranza v. Pamela Bondi (Jose Carranza v. Pamela Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jose Carranza v. Pamela Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 2 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE NUMAN CARRANZA, No. 16-70575

Petitioner, Agency No. 089-670-327

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted January 11, 2022 Submission Withdrawn May 6, 2022 Resubmitted June 16, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: WALLACE, BOGGS,** and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Jose Numan Carranza, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions this court

for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his

application for asylum and withholding of removal, and protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Carranza v. Bondi 16-70575 Convention Against Torture (CAT). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16(c).

When the BIA issues its own decision, while relying in part on the reasoning

of the immigration judge (IJ), we review the BIA’s decision and those parts of the

IJ’s decision upon which the BIA relies. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d

1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2019). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Rodriguez v.

Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012). Factual findings underlying the BIA’s

determination that a petitioner is not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or

CAT relief are reviewed for substantial evidence. Fakhry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d

1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny

the petition.

In 2007, Carranza left El Salvador after receiving threats from gangs and

corrupt law-enforcement officials as a result of his work as a narcotics police officer.

He entered the United States on a six-month nonimmigrant visitor’s visa in

December 2007. Carranza’s wife, who was already in the United States and working,

filed two adjustment-of-status applications based on her employment status. 8

U.S.C. § 1255(i), (k). Carranza sought adjustment as a derivative of his wife’s

applications.

In December 2008, while their adjustment applications were pending,

Carranza was convicted of indecent exposure. In January 2009, he was served with

2 Carranza v. Bondi 16-70575 a Notice to Appear on grounds that he was unlawfully present for overstaying his

visa and had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B),

(a)(2)(A)(i). Carranza filed a motion to terminate proceedings based on his pending

adjustment applications. The IJ denied the motion and his removal proceedings

continued.

In 2011, after USCIS had denied all of his adjustment applications, Carranza

moved for de novo review of his wife’s applications by the IJ. However, in

December 2011, Carranza’s counsel discovered an error in Carranza’s wife’s

application and realized that she and Carranza were ineligible for adjustment under

§ 1255(i).1 On January 24, 2012, four years after entering the United States, Carranza

submitted to the immigration court an application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT protection.

In September 2014, the IJ held that Carranza was not eligible for asylum

because his application was not filed within one year of his arrival in the United

States, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), and that he had not demonstrated changed or

extraordinary circumstances that would excuse his late filing, id. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8

C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i), (a)(5). In February 2016, the BIA affirmed the IJ, and

1 Carranza’s wife had also applied for Temporary Protected Status, which she was granted in December 2011.

3 Carranza v. Bondi 16-70575 Carranza timely filed this appeal.2

1. We hold that Carranza’s pursuit of other avenues of relief with USCIS and

the immigration court are not extraordinary circumstances and do not qualify him

for an exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

He and his wife’s pending adjustment applications did not prevent, preclude, or

excuse him from also seeking asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). Even if it did, the

BIA held that the application was not filed within a “reasonable” period of time.

Petitioner has failed to show that substantial evidence compels a different finding.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii), (a)(5). The BIA also did not err by not considering

Carranza’s argument that the country-conditions evidence established changed

circumstances because Carranza did not present that argument to the IJ. See

Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019).3

2. The BIA also held that Carranza was not eligible for withholding of

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To be eligible for withholding, an applicant must

demonstrate past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution to the extent

that his life or freedom is imperiled because of his race, religion, nationality,

2 After oral argument in January 2022, the case was administratively closed in May 2022. In May 2025, the government filed a motion to reopen, and the case was resubmitted on June 16, 2025. 3 We decline to consider Carranza’s claim that the BIA violated procedural due process by failing to accept his application for asylum, because he did not exhaust that claim before the BIA. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023); Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013).

4 Carranza v. Bondi 16-70575 membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.; 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(b)(1). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harm

Carranza suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez,

918 F.3d at 1028 (“Persecution is ‘an extreme concept that does not include every

sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.’” (quoting Nagoulko v. INS, 333

F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003))).

The BIA held that Carranza’s claimed fear of future persecution based on his

membership in a disfavored social group of former narcotics officers of El

Salvador’s police force was not objectively reasonable as Carranza failed to present

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Related

Rene Lopez Rodriguez v. Eric H. Holder Jr.
683 F.3d 1164 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Rosaura Sola v. Eric Holder, Jr.
720 F.3d 1134 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Fakhry v. Mukasey
524 F.3d 1057 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Wakkary v. Holder
558 F.3d 1049 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Halim v. Holder
590 F.3d 971 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Jose Duran-Rodriguez v. William Barr
918 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Denys Honcharov v. William Barr
924 F.3d 1293 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Josue Umana-Escobar v. Merrick Garland
69 F.4th 544 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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