Jose Campuzano-Campoverde v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 25-1306
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1306

JOSE LUIS CAMPUZANO-CAMPOVERDE, ROXANA LOURDES ZAMBRANO-VELEZ, L.M. C.Z., Petitioners

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _____________________________ On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals Appellate Immigration Judge Joan B. Geller, Nos. A220-441-015, A220-441-016, & A220-441-017

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted Jan. 29, 2026; Decided Feb. 19, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION ∗

BOVE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jose Campuzano-Campoverde, an Ecuadorian

citizen joined on the Petition For Review by two relatives, seeks review of a BIA decision

affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of various forms of relief from otherwise-final

removal orders. Petitioner primarily contends that his family was denied due process by

the IJ. He did not exhaust this argument before the BIA. Accordingly, we will dismiss the

Petition For Review and deny the government’s motion for summary relief as moot.

∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and

issues on appeal.

Petitioner, his common law wife, and his minor daughter filed the Petition For

Review. They entered the United States without admission or parole and were charged as

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A). Petitioners conceded removability but filed an

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ denied the

application. The BIA dismissed the appeal. Petitioners timely filed the Petition For

Review.

II.

The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g), and 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)

and 1240.15. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

“We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings under the

substantial-evidence standard.” Darby v. AG, 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2025). 1

III.

Petitioner relied almost exclusively on an ineffective-assistance claim before the

BIA. The BIA rejected that argument and explained—in a conclusion not challenged

here—that Petitioner had waived any other challenges to the IJ’s findings with respect to

the claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. In the Petition For

Review, Petitioner asserts for the first time that the IJ violated due process by “creat[ing]

1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history.

2 a hostile environment regarding errors made by Petitioner’s attorney.” Pet. Br. 2.

Petitioner failed to exhaust this argument with the BIA.

“[W]e will not require the BIA to guess which issues have been presented and which

have not.” Inestroza-Tosta v. AG, 105 F.4th 499, 520 (3d Cir. 2024). A petitioner must

“exhaust all remedies available to [him] in order to preserve [his] right to appellate review

of a final order of removal.” Gomez-Gabriel v. AG, 146 F.4th 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2025); see

also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). While § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional bar, “once the

government raises the issue, we must enforce it.” Gomez-Gabriel, 146 F.4th at 330.

The government has invoked § 1252(d)(1). On these facts, that argument is

dispositive. And though Petitioner cursorily argues on appeal that the BIA deprived him

of due process by failing to consider how poorly the IJ treated his attorney, the BIA could

not have acted unconstitutionally by failing to credit an argument that Petitioner did not

make. Accordingly, we will dismiss the Petition For Review, deny as moot the

government’s motion for summary relief, and deny as moot the government’s motion to

submit on the briefs.