1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JOSE ARELLANO, individually, and No. 2:23-cv-1540 WBS DMC on behalf of all others 13 similarly situated, 14 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL 15 v. APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, AND FOR 16 THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY, a ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND corporation; SMUCKER NATURAL ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS 17 FOODS, INC., a corporation; SMUCKER NATURAL FOODS, LLC, a 18 limited liability company; SMUCKER FOODSERVICE, INC., a 19 corporation; SMUCKER FRUIT PROCESSING CO., a corporation; 20 SMUCKER RETAIL FOODS, INC., a corporation; SMUCKER SALES AND 21 DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, a corporation; FIDELITY 22 INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC, a 23 limited liability company; FIDELITY INVESTMENTS 24 INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., a corporation; 25 SMUCKER FRUIT PROCESSING COMPANY, a corporation; 26 TRUROOTS, LLC, a limited liability company; and DOES 1 27 through 10, inclusive, 28 1 Defendants. 2
3 ----oo0oo---- 4 Jose Arellano (“plaintiff”), individually and on behalf 5 of similarly situated individuals, brought this putative class 6 action against defendants The J.M. Smucker Company; Smucker 7 Natural Foods, Inc.; Smucker Natural Foods, LLC; Smucker 8 Foodservice, Inc.; Smucker Fruit Processing Co.; Smucker Retail 9 Foods, Inc.; Smucker Sales and Distribution Co.; Fidelity 10 Investments Institutional Operations Co., LLC; Fidelity 11 Investments Institutional Operations Co., Inc.; and TruRoots, 12 LLC,1 alleging violations of California wage and hour laws. (See 13 Docket No. 1-4 Ex. A.) Before the court is plaintiff’s unopposed 14 motion for final approval of a class action settlement, and for 15 attorneys’ fees, costs, and enhancement payments.2 (See Docket 16 No. 56.) Defendant does not oppose the motion. (See Docket No. 17
18 1 On November 18, 2023, the parties stipulated to voluntarily dismiss defendants The J.M. Smucker Company; Smucker 19 Natural Foods, Inc.; Smucker Natural Foods, LLC; Smucker Foodservice, Inc.; Smucker Fruit Processing Co.; Smucker Retail 20 Foods, Inc.; and Smucker Sales and Distribution Co. (See Docket No. 34.) Thus, defendant TruRoots, LLC (“defendant” or 21 “TruRoots”) is the only defendant remaining. (Cf. Docket No. 1-1 22 at ¶¶ 3-4 & n.1 (explaining defendant’s corporate structure).) 2 Plaintiff only filed a “Motion for Final approval of 23 Class Action Settlement,” and did not file a separate motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and enhancement payments (see Docket No. 24 56.); however, the court construes plaintiff’s motion as being for final approval of class settlement as well as for fees, 25 costs, and payments. This is because plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities frames those fees, costs, and payments as 26 included within the terms of the settlement agreement now before 27 the court and also contains the kind of substantive analysis that would typically be filed separately in support of a stand-alone 28 motion for fees, costs, and payments. 1 57.) 2 The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy 3 favoring settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City 4 of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 5 Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) 6 (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, 7 non-collusive, negotiated resolution[.]”) (citation omitted). 8 Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a 9 certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s 10 approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 11 “Approval under 23(e) involves a two-step process in 12 which the Court first determines whether a proposed class action 13 settlement deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice 14 is given to class members, whether final approval is warranted.” 15 Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 16 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third), 17 § 30.41 (1995)). This court satisfied step one by granting 18 plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class 19 action settlement on April 15, 2025. (Order Granting Prelim. 20 Approval (Docket No. 51).) Now, following notice to the class 21 members, the court will consider whether final approval is 22 merited by evaluating: (1) the treatment of this litigation as a 23 class action and (2) the terms of the settlement. See Diaz v. 24 Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 25 1989). 26 I. Class Certification 27 The putative class consists of all current and former 28 hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for defendant in 1 California between October 31, 2018, and April 14, 2025. 2 (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1.4, 1.11.) 3 To be certified, the putative class must satisfy the 4 requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). 5 Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013). 6 A. Rule 23(a) 7 Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: “(1) 8 the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 9 impracticable [numerosity]; (2) there are questions of law or 10 fact common to the class [commonality]; (3) the claims or 11 defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 12 or defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) the representative 13 parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 14 class [adequacy of representation].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 15 In the court’s order granting preliminary approval of 16 the settlement, the court found that the putative class satisfied 17 the Rule 23(a) requirements. (See Order Granting Prelim. 18 Approval at 5-14.) The court is unaware of any changes that 19 would affect its conclusion that the putative class satisfies the 20 Rule 23(a) requirements, and the parties have not indicated that 21 they are aware of any such developments. The court therefore 22 finds that the class definition proposed by plaintiffs meets the 23 requirements of Rule 23(a). 24 B. Rule 23(b) 25 After fulfilling the threshold requirements of Rule 26 23(a), the proposed class must satisfy the requirements of one of 27 the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512. 28 Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides 1 that a class action may be maintained only if (1) “the court 2 finds that questions of law or fact common to class members 3 predominate over questions affecting only individual members” and 4 (2) “that a class action is superior to other available methods 5 for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 7 In its order granting preliminary approval of the 8 settlement, the court found that both the predominance and 9 superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied. 10 (Order Granting Prelim. Approval at 10-12.) The court is unaware 11 of any changes that would affect its conclusion that Rule 12 23(b)(3) is satisfied. Because the settlement class satisfies 13 both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the court will grant final class 14 certification of this action. 15 C. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements 16 If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it 17 “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable 18 under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 19 members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and 21 content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 22 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 23 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be 24 “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff 25 class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 26 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 27 The notice explains the proceedings, defines the scope 28 of the class, and explains what the settlement provides and how 1 much each class member can expect to receive in compensation. 2 (See Notice of Class Action Settlement (Docket No. 56-2 at 22-29) 3 at 20-27.) The notice further explains the opt-out procedure, 4 the procedure for objecting to the settlement, and the date and 5 location of the final approval hearing. (See id. at 25-26.) The 6 content of the notice therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. 8 Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory 9 if it ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in 10 sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to 11 investigate and to come forward and be heard.’”) (quoting Mendoza 12 v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)). 13 The parties selected Phoenix Settlement Administrators 14 (“Phoenix”) to serve as the Settlement Administrator. (See 15 Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 56-2) ¶ 7.1; see also Decl. of 16 Kevin Lee (“Lee Decl.”) (Docket No. 56-7) ¶ 2.) Defendant timely 17 provided Phoenix with the class contact information and data, 18 which included the name, last known address, Social Security 19 Number, dates of employment, and pertinent employment information 20 for each class member. (See Lee Decl. (Docket No. 56-7) ¶ 3.) 21 The class list contained 116 members. (Id.) The Settlement 22 Administrator updated the mailing addresses using the National 23 Change of Address Database maintained by the U.S. Postal Service. 24 (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) 25 The Settlement Administrator delivered notice of the 26 settlement via mail on May 28, 2025. (Id. ¶ 5.) Eight notices 27 were returned as undeliverable. (Id. ¶ 6.) For those without a 28 forwarding address, the Settlement Administrator performed a skip 1 trace address search to locate updated addresses. (Id.) Of the 2 eight notices returned as undeliverable, eight notices were 3 remailed to new addresses. (Id.) Following these efforts, a 4 total of zero notices were ultimately undeliverable by mail. 5 (Id. ¶ 7.) The Settlement Administrator received zero requests 6 for exclusion, zero objections, and zero workweek disputes. (Id. 7 ¶¶ 8-11.) 8 The court appreciates the thorough efforts taken by the 9 Settlement Administrator to effectuate notice and is satisfied 10 that the notice procedure was “reasonably calculated, under all 11 the circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the proposed 12 settlement. See Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 13 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019). 14 II. Final Settlement Approval 15 Having determined that class treatment is warranted, 16 the court must now address whether the terms of the parties’ 17 settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To determine the fairness, adequacy, and 19 reasonableness of the agreement, Rule 23(e) requires the court to 20 consider four factors: “(1) the class representatives and class 21 counsel have adequately represented the class; (2) the proposal 22 was negotiated at arm’s length; (3) the relief provided for the 23 class is adequate; and (4) the proposal treats class members 24 equitably relative to each other.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has 25 also identified eight additional factors the court may consider, 26 many of which overlap substantially with Rule 23(e)’s four 27 factors: 28 The strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, 1 expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class 2 action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery 3 completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of 4 a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. 5 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 6 A. Adequate Representation 7 The court must first consider whether “the class 8 representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the 9 class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). This analysis is 10 “redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . .” Hudson 11 v. Libre Tech., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-1371 GPC KSC, 2020 WL 2467060, 12 at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) (quoting 4 Newberg on Class 13 Actions § 13:48 (5th ed.)); see also In re GSE Bonds Antitr. 14 Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d 686, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting 15 similarity of inquiries under Rule 23(a)(4) and Rule 16 23(e)(2)(A)). 17 Because the Court has found that the proposed class 18 satisfies Rule 23(a)(4) for purposes of class certification, the 19 adequacy factor under Rule 23(e)(2)(A) is also met. See Hudson, 20 2020 WL 2467060, at *5. 21 B. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement 22 Prior to mediation and settlement negotiations, counsel 23 engaged in thorough investigation of the claims and informal 24 discovery, including securing employee records and policy 25 documents, obtaining and reviewing defendant’s wage and hour 26 practices, analyzing defendant’s payroll and timekeeping records, 27 and preparing a damage analysis to assess defendant’s potential 28 1 liability. (See Decl. of Tyler J. Woods (“Woods Decl.”) (Docket 2 No. 56-1) ¶¶ 5-6; see also Docket No. 56 at 8-9.) 3 On May 21, 2024, the parties participated in a full-day 4 private mediation over Zoom with an experienced class action 5 mediator. (See Woods Decl. ¶ 7.) Despite both sides entering 6 into mediation fully prepared to litigate this case should 7 negotiations fail, the parties were ultimately able to reach a 8 settlement. (Id.) The parties spent several months negotiating 9 the final terms of the Settlement Agreement, executing the 10 agreement on December 11, 2024. (See Settlement Agreement at 18- 11 19 (Docket No. 56-2 at 19-20).) Plaintiff’s counsel represents 12 that the parties’ settlement negotiations were “professional” yet 13 “adversarial,” and were conducted “at arms-length.” (See Woods 14 Decl. ¶ 7.) 15 Given that the settlement reached was the product of 16 arms-length bargaining following extensive informal discovery and 17 with the help of an experienced mediator, this factor weighs in 18 favor of final approval. See La Fleur v. Med. Mgmt. Int’l, Inc., 19 No. 5:13-cv-00398, 2014 WL 2967475, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 20 2014) (“Settlements reached with the help of a mediator are 21 likely non-collusive.”). The court is satisfied that the outcome 22 of the negotiations was not infected by counsel’s pursuit of 23 their own self-interests. See In re Apple Inc. Device 24 Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2022). 25 C. Adequate Relief 26 In determining whether a settlement agreement provides 27 adequate relief for the class, the court must “take into account 28 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the 1 effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to 2 the class, including the method of processing class-member 3 claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, 4 including timing of payment; and (iv) any [other] agreement[s]” 5 made in connection with the proposal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 23(e)(2)(C); Baker v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-cv-02129-MMA- 7 AGS, 2020 WL 4260712, at *6-8 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2020). 8 The court notes that, in evaluating whether the 9 settlement provides adequate relief, it must consider several of 10 the same factors outlined in Hanlon, including the strength of 11 the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 12 duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class 13 action status throughout the trial; and the amount offered in 14 settlement. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 15 In determining whether a settlement agreement is 16 substantively fair to class members, the court must balance the 17 value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement 18 offer. See In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 19 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007). When a settlement was reached prior to 20 class certification, it is subject to heightened scrutiny for 21 purposes of final approval. See In re Apple Inc., 50 F.4th at 22 782. The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel will not be 23 given a presumption of reasonableness, but rather will be subject 24 to close review. See id. at 782-83. The court will particularly 25 scrutinize “any subtle signs that class counsel have allowed 26 pursuit of their own self-interests to infect the negotiations.” 27 See id. at 782 (quoting Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 28 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019)). 1 The Settlement Agreement includes a gross settlement 2 amount of $350,000.00, which includes the following: (1) a 3 $5,000.00 plaintiff incentive award for Jose Arellano, the lead 4 plaintiff; (2) maximum attorneys’ fees of $116,666.67, or 33.33% 5 of the gross settlement amount, plus reasonable documented costs 6 up to $17,000.00; and (3) settlement administration costs of 7 approximately $7,000.00. (See Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 56- 8 2) ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3.) 9 Plaintiff estimates that the claims are worth up to 10 $665,770.15. (See Decl. of Molly Desario (“Desario Decl.”) ¶ 21 11 (Docket No. 44-1).) The portion of the gross settlement amount 12 allocated to class claims -- $204,802.48 -- constitutes 13 approximately 30.76% of the $665,770.15 maximum valuation. This 14 amount is comfortably within the range of percentage recoveries that 15 California courts have found to be reasonable. See Cavazos v. Salas 16 Concrete, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00062 DAD EPG, 2022 WL 2918361, at *6 17 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (collecting cases). 18 Plaintiff faced numerous hurdles in the litigation, 19 including proving all elements of the claims, obtaining and 20 maintaining class certification, establishing liability, and the 21 costliness of litigation on these issues. Plaintiff’s counsel 22 represents that, given the strength of plaintiff’s claims and 23 defendant’s potential exposure, the settlement and resulting 24 distribution provides a strong result for the class. (See Docket 25 No. 56 at 20.) 26 In light of the risks associated with further 27 litigation and the relative strength of defendant’s arguments, the 28 court finds that the value of the settlement counsels in favor of 1 granting final approval. The court further finds the method of 2 processing class member claims to be adequate. Each class member’s 3 individual share of the settlement is proportional to the number of 4 workweeks worked for defendant during the time period covered by 5 the Settlement Agreement. The court is also satisfied that 6 counsel’s requested fees are reasonable and support approval of the 7 settlement, which it will address in greater detail below. 8 D. Equitable Treatment of Class Members 9 Finally, the court must consider whether the Settlement 10 Agreement “treats class members equitably relative to each 11 other.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In doing so, the court 12 determines whether the settlement “improperly grant[s] 13 preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of 14 the class.” Hudson, 2020 WL 2467060, at *9 (quoting Tableware, 15 484 F. Supp. at 1079. 16 Here, the Settlement Agreement does not improperly 17 discriminate between any segments of the class, as all class 18 members are entitled to monetary relief based on the number of 19 workweeks they spent working for defendant. (See Settlement 20 Agreement ¶ 3.2.4.) 21 While the Settlement Agreement allows plaintiff to seek 22 an incentive payment, plaintiff has submitted evidence 23 documenting his time and effort spent on this case, which, as 24 discussed further below, has satisfied the court that his 25 additional compensation above other class members is justified. 26 See Hudson, 2020 WL 2467060, at *9. The court therefore finds 27 that the settlement treats class members equitably. See Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 23(e)(D). 1 E. Remaining Hanlon Factors 2 In addition to the factors already considered as part 3 of the court’s analysis under Rule 23(e)(A)-(D), the court must 4 also examine “the extent of the discovery completed . . ., the 5 presence of government participation, and the reaction of class 6 members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 7 As explained above, counsel engaged in thorough 8 informal discovery. This factor thus weighs in favor of final 9 approval of the settlement. 10 The seventh Hanlon factor, pertaining to government 11 participation, however, does not weigh in favor of approval 12 because, here, there is no government participation. See Hanlon, 13 150 F.3d at 1026. 14 That said, the eighth Hanlon factor, the reaction of 15 the class members to the proposed settlement, weighs heavily in 16 favor of final approval, as zero of the 116 class members 17 requested to be excluded, and no class members objected. See 18 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 19 In sum, the four factors that the court must evaluate 20 under Rule 23(e) and the eight Hanlon factors, taken as a whole, 21 weigh in favor of approving the settlement. The court will 22 therefore grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement. 23 III. Attorneys’ Fees 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a 25 certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s 26 fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 27 parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). If a negotiated 28 class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees, 1 that fee award must be evaluated in the overall context of the 2 settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th 3 Cir. 2002); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 4 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court “ha[s] an 5 independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the 6 settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have 7 already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. 8 Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). “Under the 9 ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a 10 common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his 11 client is entitled to a reasonable [attorneys’] fee from the fund 12 as a whole.’” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 969 (9th Cir. 13 2003) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 14 (1980)). In common fund cases, the district court has discretion 15 to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to be drawn from the 16 fund by employing either the percentage method or the lodestar 17 method. Id. The court may also use one method as a “cross- 18 check[ ]” upon the other method. See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d 19 at 944. 20 As explained above, the settlement agreement appears to 21 provide adequate recovery for the class members. Further, the 22 payments will be quickly available to class members without the 23 delay associated with further litigation. 24 Like other complex employment class actions, this case 25 presented both counsel and the class with a risk of no recovery 26 at all, as already discussed above. Plaintiff’s counsel took on 27 this matter on a contingency basis. (See Woods Decl. ¶ 25.) The 28 nature of contingency work inherently carries risks that counsel 1 will sometimes recovers very little to nothing at all, even for 2 cases that may be meritorious. See Kimbo v. MXD Group, Inc., No. 3 2:19-cv-00166 WBS KNJ, 2021 WL 492493, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 4 2021). Where counsel do succeed in vindicating statutory and 5 employment rights on behalf of a class of employees, they depend 6 on recovering a reasonable percentage-of-the-fund fee award to 7 enable them to take on similar risks in future cases. See id. 8 Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that, in light of the result obtained 9 and substantial risk taken in this case, a $116,666.67 fee 10 constituting 33.33% of the fund, as requested here, is 11 reasonable. 12 The Ninth Circuit has established 25% of the fund as 13 the “benchmark” award that should be given in common fund cases. 14 Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 15 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). As this court has explained, “a review of 16 California cases . . . reveals that courts usually award 17 attorneys’ fees in the 30-40% range in wage and hour class 18 actions that result in recovery of a common fun[d] under $10 19 million.” Watson v. Tennant Co., No. 2:18-cv-02462 WBS DB, 2020 20 WL 5502318, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2020) (awarding 33.33% of 21 settlement fund); see also Osegueda v. N. Cal. Inalliance, No. 22 18-cv-00835 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 4194055, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 23 2020) (same). Given that the requested fee is in line with the 24 typical practice in the Ninth Circuit and in this district, the 25 court agrees that plaintiff’s counsel’s requested percentage of 26 the common fund is reasonable. 27 “Calculation of the lodestar, which measures the 28 lawyers’ investment of time in the litigation, provides a check 1 on the reasonableness of the percentage award.” Vizcaino v. 2 Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 Here, a lodestar cross-check confirms the 4 reasonableness of the requested award. Counsel represent that 5 they have dedicated 119.1 hours of work to these cases. (See 6 Woods Decl. ¶ 18.) Counsel states that their customary hourly 7 rates in class actions range from $800.00 to $1,500.00. (See 8 id.) The firms specialize in wage and hour matters and class 9 action cases, and counsel represents that comparable hourly rates 10 have been approved by multiple federal and state courts in 11 California. (See Woods Decl. ¶ 36; see also Docket No. 56 at 18- 12 20.) For purposes of the lodestar calculation, the court will 13 apply the rate at the lower end of the range provided by counsel. 14 Based on 139.13 hours billed at an hourly rate of $800.00, the 15 lodestar figure is $111,280.00. This figure is nearly identical 16 to the $116,666.67 award requested, with a multiplier of 0.98, 17 confirming the reasonableness of the requested award. Cf. 18 Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1051 (affirming fee award with lodestar 19 cross-check multiplier of 3.65). 20 Accordingly, the court finds the requested fees to be 21 reasonable and will grant counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees. 22 IV. Costs 23 “There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a 24 common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to 25 reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” 26 3 This accounts for the 119.1 hours already billed (see 27 Woods Decl. ¶ 18), as well as the up to 20 additional hours that counsel anticipates needing to bill “to monitor the process 28 leading up to payments made to the class” (id. ¶ 23). 1 In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. 02-cv-1475, 2005 WL 1594403, at 2 *23 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). Here, the parties agreed that 3 plaintiff’s counsel shall be entitled to recover reasonable, 4 documented litigation costs. (See Settlement Agreement ¶ 3.2.2.) 5 Counsel’s litigation expenses and costs currently total 6 approximately $16,530.85, though they seek up to $17,000.00. 7 (See Woods Decl. ¶ 26.) These expenses include copying and 8 mailing expenses, filing fees, mediation fees, consultant fees, 9 and travel expenses. (See Docket No. 56-3 at 2-3.) The court 10 finds these are reasonable litigation expenses. Therefore, the 11 court will grant class counsel’s request for costs up to the 12 amount of $17,000.00. 13 V. Representative Service Award 14 “Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action 15 cases.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958. “[They] are intended to 16 compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the 17 class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken 18 in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their 19 willingness to act as a private attorney general.” Id. at 958- 20 59. 21 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that 22 “district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive 23 awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the 24 class representatives . . . .” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. 25 Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). In 26 assessing the reasonableness of incentive payments, the court 27 should consider “the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect 28 the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has 1 benefitted from those actions” and “the amount of time and effort 2 the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.” Staton, 327 3 F.3d at 977 (citation omitted). The court must balance “the 4 number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the 5 proportion of the payments relative to the settlement amount, and 6 the size of each payment.” Id. 7 In the Ninth Circuit, an incentive award of $5,000 is 8 presumptively reasonable. Davis v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., No. 9 1:13-cv-01211 LJO BAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 10 2015) (citing Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., No. 08-cv-5198 11 EMC, 2012 WL 381202, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (collecting 12 cases)). 13 Plaintiff seeks a $5,000.00 incentive award for Jose 14 Arellano, the lead plaintiff. Plaintiff’s efforts included 15 interviewing and selecting counsel, providing documents to 16 counsel, providing statements to counsel, providing information 17 to counsel, keeping counsel informed of developments and relevant 18 new information, reviewing documents and discovery responses, 19 making himself available to assist counsel in mediation, spending 20 roughly 14 hours litigating the case, and actively participating 21 in decisionmaking in the case. (See Woods Decl. ¶¶ 12-16.) 22 Counsel represents that plaintiff’s efforts were “instrumental” 23 and that “the recovery provided for in the Settlement Agreement 24 would have been impossible to obtain without Plaintiff’s 25 participation.” (Id. ¶ 13.) In light of plaintiffs’ efforts and 26 the risks incurred in bringing this action, the court finds the 27 requested incentive awards to be reasonable and will approve the 28 awards. 1 VI. Conclusion 2 Based on the foregoing, the court will grant final 3 certification of the settlement class and will approve the 4 settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement as fair, 5 reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement Agreement shall be 6 binding upon all participating class members who did not exclude 7 themselves. 8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s unopposed 9 motion for final approval of the class action settlement and for 10 attorneys’ fees, costs, and enhancement payments (Docket No. 56) 11 be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 13 (1) Solely for the purpose of this settlement, and 14 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby 15 certifies the following class: all persons employed by defendant 16 in California and classified as hourly-paid or non-exempt 17 employees who worked for defendant or defendant’s predecessor 18 between October 31, 2018, and April 14, 2025. 19 (2) The court appoints Jose Arellano as class 20 representative and finds that he meets the requirements of Rule 21 23; 22 (3) The court appoints Justin F. Marquez, Arsine 23 Grigoryan, and Dorota James of the law firm Wilshire Law Firm PLC 24 as class counsel and finds that they meet the requirements of 25 Rule 23; 26 (4) The settlement agreement’s plan for class notice 27 satisfies the requirements of due process and Rule 23. The plan 28 is approved and adopted. The notice to the class complies with 1 Rule 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is approved and adopted; 2 (5) The court finds that the parties and their counsel 3 took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members 4 of the settlement. Zero employees have requested to be excluded 5 from the class. Given that no class member filed an objection to 6 the settlement, the court finds that no additional notice to the 7 class is necessary; 8 (6) As of the date of the entry of this order, 9 plaintiff and all class members who have not timely opted out of 10 this settlement hereby do and shall be deemed to have fully, 11 finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, 12 relinquished, and discharged defendants of and from any and all 13 settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the 14 parties’ settlement agreement; 15 (7) Plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to fees in the 16 amount of $116,666.67, and litigation costs up to the amount of 17 $17,000.00; 18 (8) Phoenix Settlement Administrators is entitled to 19 administration costs in the amount of $7,000.00; 20 (9) Plaintiff Jose Arellano is entitled to an 21 incentive award in the amount of $5,000.00; 22 (10) The remaining settlement funds shall be paid to 23 participating class members and aggrieved employees in accordance 24 with the terms of the Settlement Agreement; and 25 (11) This action is dismissed with prejudice. However, 26 without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall 27 retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, 28 implementation, and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement with en EE I OI OSI IIE
1 respect to all parties to this action and their counsel of 2 | record. . 3 | Dated: January 6, 2026 illo A. dé WILLIAM B. SHUBB 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21