1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ANGEL SANTOS, 2:25-cv-1988-DAD-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Jose Santos, a state prisoner, proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis and seeks 18 relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. See 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) is before the court for screening. 20 (ECF No. 10.) Because it clearly appears plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief based on the 21 underlying facts, the FAC should be dismissed without further leave to amend for failure to state 22 a claim. 23 I. Screening Requirement 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 26 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 27 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 1 II. Allegations in the Complaint 2 Plaintiff was assigned without his permission or knowledge to “DRP” CBI.602 Life Skills 3 Group was compelled against his will to sign an Assignment Card to participate under duress and 4 threat of disciplinary action. (ECF No. 10 at 23-25.) Plaintiff alleges the course is a Drug 5 Addiction Intervention & Rehabilitation Program administered under the authority of 15 CCR § 6 3040.1 which specifies certain criteria for placement he does not meet. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff does 7 not believe the defendants can require him to take the course and asserts they have refused to 8 provide written proof of authorization to mandate attendance for all inmates. (Id. at 28.) 9 III. Discussion 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a right 11 secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) the violation was 12 committed by a person or entity acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 13 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC do not state a claim under § 1983 for the same 14 reasons the original complaint failed to state a claim. Because plaintiff has not stated any federal 15 claim under § 1983, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law 16 claims. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c). 17 The FAC does not plausibly allege a violation of plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right 18 regarding self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment privileges an individual not to answer official 19 questions put to him in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 20 might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 21 (1976). The FAC does not allege any facts from which the court can infer that participation in 22 DRP group could potentially incriminate plaintiff in future criminal proceedings. 23 The FAC does not state a due process claim. “The requirements of procedural due process 24 apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 25 protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). In the 26 prison context, procedural due process protections apply only where the specific deprivation at 27 issue constitutes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 28 incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 1 Plaintiff alleges he does not meet the criteria for placement set forth in 15 CCR § 3040.1, 2 which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 3 (a)(2) CBI Life Skills eligibility criteria and priority placement shall be for incarcerated persons based upon a health care services referral 4 for incarcerated persons who do not have a specific substance use disorder or for incarcerated persons who have a criminogenic need 5 for any CBI program as identified by the automated risk or needs assessment tools as listed in sections 3375.6 and 3768.1. 6 (b) Assignments and changes within CBI programs can be made 7 based upon a health care services referral without a classification committee action. 8 9 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3040.1. 10 Plaintiff does not allege there is no health care services referral applicable to him, but 11 rather, only that defendants have failed to show him the referral. In any event, the existence of a 12 prison regulation by itself does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 13 Rather, the Due Process Clause applies in this context only where the freedom from restraint 14 “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 15 prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 16 Plaintiff’s alleged deprivation—being mandated to participate in DRP group— does not 17 impose an atypical and significant hardship on plaintiff relative to the basic conditions of life as a 18 prisoner. See, e.g., Williams v. Wilkinson, 51 F. App’x 553, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2002) (being 19 required to participate in a substance abuse program that interferes with an inmate’s ability to 20 earn money does not qualify as a “significant and atypical hardship”); Ross v. Keelings, 2 F. 21 Supp. 2d 810, 815 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“Mandatory participation in the Therapeutic Community 22 program was not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. Indeed, 23 rehabilitation programs are commonplace at all correctional facilities. Otherwise, a facility would 24 never achieve its goal of returning inmates to society as law abiding citizens. Moreover, a large 25 part of prison life for inmates is regimented—or mandatory. Otherwise, the residents at 26 correctional facilities would not be called ‘inmates’ or ‘prisoners.’”); Sanders v. Cohen, No. 09- 27 61451-CIV, 2009 WL 4421265, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009) (“The plaintiff has not set forth a 28 cognizable constitutional claim with regard to forced placement in a substance abuse program.”). 1 Here, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim based on mandatory participation in 2 DRP group. 3 Finally, the FAC does not state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 4 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates with 5 humane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832. (1994). To violate the 6 Eighth Amendment, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal 7 civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 834. A cognizable Eighth 8 Amendment claim requires facts showing: (1) the deprivation alleged is objectively sufficiently 9 serious; and (2) the prison official possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ANGEL SANTOS, 2:25-cv-1988-DAD-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Jose Santos, a state prisoner, proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis and seeks 18 relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. See 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) is before the court for screening. 20 (ECF No. 10.) Because it clearly appears plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief based on the 21 underlying facts, the FAC should be dismissed without further leave to amend for failure to state 22 a claim. 23 I. Screening Requirement 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 26 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 27 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 1 II. Allegations in the Complaint 2 Plaintiff was assigned without his permission or knowledge to “DRP” CBI.602 Life Skills 3 Group was compelled against his will to sign an Assignment Card to participate under duress and 4 threat of disciplinary action. (ECF No. 10 at 23-25.) Plaintiff alleges the course is a Drug 5 Addiction Intervention & Rehabilitation Program administered under the authority of 15 CCR § 6 3040.1 which specifies certain criteria for placement he does not meet. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff does 7 not believe the defendants can require him to take the course and asserts they have refused to 8 provide written proof of authorization to mandate attendance for all inmates. (Id. at 28.) 9 III. Discussion 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a right 11 secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) the violation was 12 committed by a person or entity acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 13 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC do not state a claim under § 1983 for the same 14 reasons the original complaint failed to state a claim. Because plaintiff has not stated any federal 15 claim under § 1983, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law 16 claims. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c). 17 The FAC does not plausibly allege a violation of plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right 18 regarding self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment privileges an individual not to answer official 19 questions put to him in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 20 might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 21 (1976). The FAC does not allege any facts from which the court can infer that participation in 22 DRP group could potentially incriminate plaintiff in future criminal proceedings. 23 The FAC does not state a due process claim. “The requirements of procedural due process 24 apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 25 protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). In the 26 prison context, procedural due process protections apply only where the specific deprivation at 27 issue constitutes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 28 incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 1 Plaintiff alleges he does not meet the criteria for placement set forth in 15 CCR § 3040.1, 2 which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 3 (a)(2) CBI Life Skills eligibility criteria and priority placement shall be for incarcerated persons based upon a health care services referral 4 for incarcerated persons who do not have a specific substance use disorder or for incarcerated persons who have a criminogenic need 5 for any CBI program as identified by the automated risk or needs assessment tools as listed in sections 3375.6 and 3768.1. 6 (b) Assignments and changes within CBI programs can be made 7 based upon a health care services referral without a classification committee action. 8 9 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3040.1. 10 Plaintiff does not allege there is no health care services referral applicable to him, but 11 rather, only that defendants have failed to show him the referral. In any event, the existence of a 12 prison regulation by itself does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 13 Rather, the Due Process Clause applies in this context only where the freedom from restraint 14 “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 15 prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 16 Plaintiff’s alleged deprivation—being mandated to participate in DRP group— does not 17 impose an atypical and significant hardship on plaintiff relative to the basic conditions of life as a 18 prisoner. See, e.g., Williams v. Wilkinson, 51 F. App’x 553, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2002) (being 19 required to participate in a substance abuse program that interferes with an inmate’s ability to 20 earn money does not qualify as a “significant and atypical hardship”); Ross v. Keelings, 2 F. 21 Supp. 2d 810, 815 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“Mandatory participation in the Therapeutic Community 22 program was not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. Indeed, 23 rehabilitation programs are commonplace at all correctional facilities. Otherwise, a facility would 24 never achieve its goal of returning inmates to society as law abiding citizens. Moreover, a large 25 part of prison life for inmates is regimented—or mandatory. Otherwise, the residents at 26 correctional facilities would not be called ‘inmates’ or ‘prisoners.’”); Sanders v. Cohen, No. 09- 27 61451-CIV, 2009 WL 4421265, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009) (“The plaintiff has not set forth a 28 cognizable constitutional claim with regard to forced placement in a substance abuse program.”). 1 Here, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim based on mandatory participation in 2 DRP group. 3 Finally, the FAC does not state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 4 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates with 5 humane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832. (1994). To violate the 6 Eighth Amendment, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal 7 civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 834. A cognizable Eighth 8 Amendment claim requires facts showing: (1) the deprivation alleged is objectively sufficiently 9 serious; and (2) the prison official possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834. 10 Plaintiff’s allegations about being compelled to participate in DRP group do not describe a 11 deprivation that is sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s allegations 12 also do not show any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind to plaintiff’s 13 health or safety to have acted in a deliberately indifferent manner. 14 IV. Leave to Amend 15 Plaintiff was previously advised of the deficiencies in his federal claims based on these 16 underlying facts and the FAC contains substantially the same factual allegations and the same 17 deficiencies. It now clearly appears plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief and the FAC should be 18 dismissed without further leave to amend. See Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. 19 Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be 20 freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). 21 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 22 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English. This summary 23 is not intended as legal advice. 24 The court has screened your first amended complaint. The undersigned is recommending 25 this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If you disagree, you 26 have 14 days to inform the court. Label your explanation “Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 27 Findings and Recommendations.” 28 //// 1 VI. Order and Recommendation 2 In accordance with the above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 3 1. Plaintiffs first amended complaint be dismissed without further leave to amend for 4 failure to state a claim. 5 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. 6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 7 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after 8 | being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with 9 || the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 10 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the 11 || specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 12 | 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 | Dated: March 25, 2026 / ae □□ / a Ly a
15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 8 sant1988.scm.fac. fr 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28