Jose Amilcar Benitez Castro v. Pamela Bondi, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: December 23, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-17598
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSE AMILCAR BENITEZ CASTRO,

Civil Action No. 25-17598 (JXN) Petitioner,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAMELA BONDI, et al.,

Respondents.

NEALS, District Judge

Before the Court is Petitioner Jose Amilcar Benitez Castro’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF No. 1) and Respondents’ letter response (ECF No. 6). Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2004 and has remained here since. (Habeas Br. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Over two decades later, on October 16, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id. ¶ 5.) Petitioner has been detained at Delaney Hall, in Newark, New Jersey since his arrest. (Id.) Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention, he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id.) On November 18, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to file an answer and enjoined Respondents from transferring Petitioner from Delaney Hall Detention Center in Newark, New Jersey. (See Mem. Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed a letter response. (Resp., ECF No. 6.) Among other arguments, Petitioner contends he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (See generally Habeas Br.) Respondents do not dispute the salient facts and acknowledge they assert the same position here as in many similar cases in this District, including recently in Fuentes Velasquez v. Noem, No. 25-16797 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2025), a matter before this

Court. In Fuentes Velasquez, Respondents argued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) implemented a new policy interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection and to render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals recently adopted in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See Fuentes Velasquez, slip op. at 4. In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Id. at 6-11. In a factually similar situation, the Court held Fuentes Velasquez was unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and must be treated as being held under the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See id. The Court explained:

The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”). “[T]he provisions at issue here are mutually exclusive—a noncitizen cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226 . . . .” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).

. . . . . . . For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and § 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction, describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively “seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” 583 U.S. at 289. And although the Jennings Court characterizes § 1225(b)(2) as the “catchall” detention provision for noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it identifies § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.

The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado, as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.1 See, e.g., Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners who have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the context and structure of the provisions governing detention of noncitizens who are arriving at the border and those who are already present in the country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at * 3 (noting that “up until July 8 the predominant form of detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25- cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting additional cases].

Id. at 7-10.

1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)). Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Fuentes Velasquez, the Court finds the facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner’s detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2). Accordingly

IT IS, on this 23rd day of December 2025, ORDERED that the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and it is further ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight risk or a danger to the community; and it is further ORDERED that within three (3) days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally

ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying Opinion upon the parties electronically and CLOSE the case.

________________________ JULIEN XAVIER NEALS United States District Judge