Jose Alfredo Galindo v. State of Alaska

Opinion

2026 WL 2427379

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

JOSE ALFREDO GALINDO, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14615

August 19, 2026

Trial Court No. 4FA-17-03015 CI

Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Amy K. Welch, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Olena Kalytiak Davis, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant. Robert Bacaj, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach, Judges.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Star page 1*1 Jose Alfredo Galindo was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree sexual assault and second-degree criminal trespass.¹ He now appeals the superior court's dismissal of his post-conviction relief application. We affirm.

At the trial in his criminal case, Galindo's attorney made two oral motions for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that he committed first-degree sexual assault. The superior court denied both motions, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.²

In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.³ This Court applies the same standard when reviewing a claim on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.⁴

On direct appeal, Galindo renewed his claim that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his sexual assault conviction. He asserted, in particular, that the victim was not credible because of various inconsistencies in her statements. We rejected this claim, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction.⁵

While Galindo's direct appeal was pending, Galindo filed an application for post-conviction relief. This application was stayed pending the resolution of the direct appeal. After the direct appeal was resolved, Galindo filed an amended post-conviction relief application, asserting that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a written motion for judgment of acquittal and instead raising only oral motions. The superior court dismissed the application for failing to state a prima facie case, pointing out (among other things) that Galindo could not prove that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions given that this Court had rejected Galindo's sufficiency claim on direct appeal; a written (as opposed to an oral) motion would therefore not have prevailed.

Galindo now appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction relief application, arguing that his pleadings set forth a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.⁶ We find no merit to this claim. To establish a prima facie case on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Galindo was required to plead facts that, if true, would establish (1) that his attorney's actions fell below the minimum standard of competency required of a lawyer trained in criminal law; and (2) that his attorney's incompetence contributed to the outcome of his case.⁷

Star page 2*2 Here, even assuming arguendo that Galindo could meet the first prong, he cannot meet the second prong. This Court has already determined that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Galindo's conviction, which necessarily means that a written motion for judgment of acquittal at trial would not have fared any differently than an oral motion. Galindo's application therefore did not make out a prima facie case of prejudice.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

1

Former AS 11.41.410(a)(1) (2013) and AS 11.46.330(a)(1), respectively.

2

See Alaska R. Crim. P. 29; Snyder v. State, 661 P.2d 638, 641 (Alaska App. 1983) (citing Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981)).

3

Phornsavanh v. State, 481 P.3d 1145, 1156 (Alaska App. 2021).

4

Id.

5

Galindo v. State, 481 P.3d 686, 688-89 (Alaska App. 2021).

6

See Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Alaska 1974).

7

Id.

End of Document