1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
3 IN RE: CASE NO. 23-02809 (MCF)
4 MARIA DE LOS ANGELES ALBERT SAURI CHAPTER 13
Debtor 6
7 ADVERSARY CASE NO. 24-00013 JOSE ALBERTO DELGADO RODRIGUEZ 8 Plaintiff 9 V. 10 MARIA DE LOS ANGELES ALBERT SAURI 11
12 Defendant
13 OPINION AND ORDER 14
15 The Debtor, Maria de Los Angeles Albert Suri (the “Defendant”), filed a motion to dismiss 16 17 the instant adversary proceeding, which is opposed by the plaintiff, Jose Alberto Delgado 18 Rodriguez (the “Plaintiff”) (Docket Nos. 24 and 34). For the reasons stated herein, the motion to 19 dismiss is denied. 20 In the complaint, the Plaintiff seeks a determination that the Defendant’s debt1 is non- 21 22 dischargeable, pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant’s debt was 23 obtained by means of fraud through a malicious scheme or plan to deceive and defraud the 24 Plaintiff with actual intent to never repay him as required by their contractual terms. The Plaintiff 25 26
27 1 In relation to this debt, the Plaintiff filed a claim in the amount of $322,027.00 in the bankruptcy case (Claim No. 2-2, Case alleges that he extended the Defendant a personal loan to buy an apartment and she violated 1 2 their agreement because she executed a homestead protection deed (Hogar Seguro) after signing 3 a personal note that barred her from doing so. 4 The Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 5 asserting that the right to the homestead protection is unwaivable and any act to the contrary 6 shall be declared null and void as per Article 4 of the Puerto Rico Homestead Act of 2011, as 7 8 amended, 31 L.P.R.A. § 1858a. Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that the Plaintiff has 9 grossly failed to establish a plausible claim under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 10 I. GOVERNING LAW AND ANALYSIS 11 A Rule 12(b)(6)2 motion must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 13 8(a)(2),3 which requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 14 that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 15 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the Rule does call 16 for sufficient factual matter." Surita Acosta v. Reparto Saman Inc., 464 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D.P.R. 17 2012). Therefore, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 18 19 factual matter that, accepted as true, "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell 20 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when the 21 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 22 liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 23 24 court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 25 entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra., at 679. 26
27 2 Civil Rule 12 is applicable to adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b). 3 Civil Rule 8 is applicable to adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that debts obtained by false pretenses, a false 1 2 representation, or actual fraud are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Vechioli-Cruz v. Santos- 3 Onoda, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67090, 2024 WL 1477713, at 20. A "straightforward reading of § 4 523(a)(2)(A) is that it prevents discharge of 'any debt' respecting 'money, property, services, or. 5 . .credit' that the debtor has fraudulently obtained." Vechioli-Cruz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67090 6 at 20. 7 8 II. APPLICATION OF THE LAW 9 Upon review of the complaint in the present case, this court finds that the same contains 10 sufficient factual allegations that accepted as true state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face. Taken as a whole, the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s 12 13 theory that the Defendant had a plan to defraud him for a nondischargeability action under 14 Section 523(a)(2)(A). The amended complaint makes the following averments: 15 1) The defendant was married until July 2013 to Mr. Luis Delgado Rodriguez, an 16 attorney, who was one of the Plaintiff’s older brothers; 2) In July 2013, the Defendant’s husband passed away while under medical care 17 at the hospital where the Plaintiff worked; 3) Soon after the Defendant’s husband’s death, the Plaintiff learned that the 18 Defendant in conjunction with other family members had filed a wrongful 19 death claim against the medical providers. 4) The Plaintiff was not a party to the Defendant’s wrongful death claim but he 20 was aware of the action and of its potential for a favorable resolution in favor 21 of those plaintiffs; therein, and he was also brought in as a witness for the defendants in that action. 22 5) Between July 2013 and December 2013, the Defendant approached the Plaintiff several times seeking assistance in the form of a loan to buy an 23 apartment; 24 6) On December 5, 2013, the parties (Plaintiff and Defendant) signed a credit contract contained in a promissory note for the sum of $322,027.02; 25 7) The loan was interest free and was due in full 24 months after the loan date, or on December 5, 2015; 26 8) The loan expressly required the Defendant not to claim the homestead 27 protection under the P.R. Homestead Act over the apartment; 9) The loan expressly provided that in the event of default, the Plaintiff could 1 collect by any means at his disposal including by foreclosing on the apartment 2 and selling it to collect his claim;4 10) Based on the close familial relationship between the Parties, the Plaintiff fully 3 trusted the Defendant and did not doubt her motives in both wanting to purchase the apartment and in offering the apartment as security for the loan; 4 11) On December 6, 2013, just one day after signing the notarized instrument 5 containing the loan contract, in addition to the deed of purchase, the Defendant also executed a deed of homestead protection under Puerto Rico 6 law to be taken over the apartment; 12) After the loan’s maturity date expired on December 5, 2015, the Plaintiff 7 began his efforts and communications with the Defendant concerning 8 payment of the loan; 13) Aside from reiterating the value of the Apartment securing the note, the 9 Defendant promised and represented that she would pay the debt from the 10 proceeds she expected from the wrongful death action that she had filed; 14) Around March 2018, the Defendant settled the wrongful death suits she had 11 filed in state and federal courts against certain medical entities for the death of her husband. 12 15) After collecting the wrongful death proceeds in April 2018, the Defendant did 13 not offer a single dollar in payment of her debt to the Plaintiff; 16) On April 26, 2018, with knowledge of Plaintiff’s expectation of payment, the 14 Defendant and her son, Mr.
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
3 IN RE: CASE NO. 23-02809 (MCF)
4 MARIA DE LOS ANGELES ALBERT SAURI CHAPTER 13
Debtor 6
7 ADVERSARY CASE NO. 24-00013 JOSE ALBERTO DELGADO RODRIGUEZ 8 Plaintiff 9 V. 10 MARIA DE LOS ANGELES ALBERT SAURI 11
12 Defendant
13 OPINION AND ORDER 14
15 The Debtor, Maria de Los Angeles Albert Suri (the “Defendant”), filed a motion to dismiss 16 17 the instant adversary proceeding, which is opposed by the plaintiff, Jose Alberto Delgado 18 Rodriguez (the “Plaintiff”) (Docket Nos. 24 and 34). For the reasons stated herein, the motion to 19 dismiss is denied. 20 In the complaint, the Plaintiff seeks a determination that the Defendant’s debt1 is non- 21 22 dischargeable, pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant’s debt was 23 obtained by means of fraud through a malicious scheme or plan to deceive and defraud the 24 Plaintiff with actual intent to never repay him as required by their contractual terms. The Plaintiff 25 26
27 1 In relation to this debt, the Plaintiff filed a claim in the amount of $322,027.00 in the bankruptcy case (Claim No. 2-2, Case alleges that he extended the Defendant a personal loan to buy an apartment and she violated 1 2 their agreement because she executed a homestead protection deed (Hogar Seguro) after signing 3 a personal note that barred her from doing so. 4 The Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 5 asserting that the right to the homestead protection is unwaivable and any act to the contrary 6 shall be declared null and void as per Article 4 of the Puerto Rico Homestead Act of 2011, as 7 8 amended, 31 L.P.R.A. § 1858a. Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that the Plaintiff has 9 grossly failed to establish a plausible claim under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 10 I. GOVERNING LAW AND ANALYSIS 11 A Rule 12(b)(6)2 motion must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 13 8(a)(2),3 which requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 14 that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 15 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the Rule does call 16 for sufficient factual matter." Surita Acosta v. Reparto Saman Inc., 464 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D.P.R. 17 2012). Therefore, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 18 19 factual matter that, accepted as true, "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell 20 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when the 21 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 22 liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 23 24 court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 25 entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra., at 679. 26
27 2 Civil Rule 12 is applicable to adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b). 3 Civil Rule 8 is applicable to adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that debts obtained by false pretenses, a false 1 2 representation, or actual fraud are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Vechioli-Cruz v. Santos- 3 Onoda, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67090, 2024 WL 1477713, at 20. A "straightforward reading of § 4 523(a)(2)(A) is that it prevents discharge of 'any debt' respecting 'money, property, services, or. 5 . .credit' that the debtor has fraudulently obtained." Vechioli-Cruz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67090 6 at 20. 7 8 II. APPLICATION OF THE LAW 9 Upon review of the complaint in the present case, this court finds that the same contains 10 sufficient factual allegations that accepted as true state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face. Taken as a whole, the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s 12 13 theory that the Defendant had a plan to defraud him for a nondischargeability action under 14 Section 523(a)(2)(A). The amended complaint makes the following averments: 15 1) The defendant was married until July 2013 to Mr. Luis Delgado Rodriguez, an 16 attorney, who was one of the Plaintiff’s older brothers; 2) In July 2013, the Defendant’s husband passed away while under medical care 17 at the hospital where the Plaintiff worked; 3) Soon after the Defendant’s husband’s death, the Plaintiff learned that the 18 Defendant in conjunction with other family members had filed a wrongful 19 death claim against the medical providers. 4) The Plaintiff was not a party to the Defendant’s wrongful death claim but he 20 was aware of the action and of its potential for a favorable resolution in favor 21 of those plaintiffs; therein, and he was also brought in as a witness for the defendants in that action. 22 5) Between July 2013 and December 2013, the Defendant approached the Plaintiff several times seeking assistance in the form of a loan to buy an 23 apartment; 24 6) On December 5, 2013, the parties (Plaintiff and Defendant) signed a credit contract contained in a promissory note for the sum of $322,027.02; 25 7) The loan was interest free and was due in full 24 months after the loan date, or on December 5, 2015; 26 8) The loan expressly required the Defendant not to claim the homestead 27 protection under the P.R. Homestead Act over the apartment; 9) The loan expressly provided that in the event of default, the Plaintiff could 1 collect by any means at his disposal including by foreclosing on the apartment 2 and selling it to collect his claim;4 10) Based on the close familial relationship between the Parties, the Plaintiff fully 3 trusted the Defendant and did not doubt her motives in both wanting to purchase the apartment and in offering the apartment as security for the loan; 4 11) On December 6, 2013, just one day after signing the notarized instrument 5 containing the loan contract, in addition to the deed of purchase, the Defendant also executed a deed of homestead protection under Puerto Rico 6 law to be taken over the apartment; 12) After the loan’s maturity date expired on December 5, 2015, the Plaintiff 7 began his efforts and communications with the Defendant concerning 8 payment of the loan; 13) Aside from reiterating the value of the Apartment securing the note, the 9 Defendant promised and represented that she would pay the debt from the 10 proceeds she expected from the wrongful death action that she had filed; 14) Around March 2018, the Defendant settled the wrongful death suits she had 11 filed in state and federal courts against certain medical entities for the death of her husband. 12 15) After collecting the wrongful death proceeds in April 2018, the Defendant did 13 not offer a single dollar in payment of her debt to the Plaintiff; 16) On April 26, 2018, with knowledge of Plaintiff’s expectation of payment, the 14 Defendant and her son, Mr. Antonio Luis Delgado Albert, (the “son”) entered into a notarized deed of donation and transfer of the apartment from 15 Defendant to her son; 16 17) The transfer deed from the Defendant to her son was for zero consideration; meaning that the Defendant received nothing for the value of the Apartment 17 transferred to her son; 18) The transfer deed to the apartment freely granted to the Defendant’s son 18 marked the consummation of the Defendant’s scheme and plan to defraud the 19 Plaintiff of the money loaned to her; 19) ….. [B]ased on the calculated, affirmative and purposeful steps taken by the 20 Defendant to violate the loan agreement and deplete her estate, it is clear that 21 the Defendant never intended to pay her debt to the Plaintiff.
22 These allegations meet the threshold for establishing a claim of nondischargeability. The case 23 will proceed to allow the Plaintiff to prove his contentions against the Defendant. 24 The court is not entertaining at this time the issue of whether the contractual clause 25 26 4 Defendant objected the secured classification of Plaintiff’s claim number 2 in Case #23-02809. (Docket No. 66, Case #23- 27 02809). The objection was granted by this court on July 30, 2024, and the claim was allowed as unsecured. (Docket No. 88, Case 1 requiring the Defendant to waive the homestead protection under the Puerto Rico Homestead 2 || Act of 2011 is null and void ab initio or not because the controversy is under the consideration 3 || of the Commonwealth Court in a case that is in an advanced stage.> However, the Plaintiff’ factual allegations of all Defendant’s actions since the origination of the debt, if taken as true, 5 may support the Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendant never intended to pay the loan to the 6 7 Plaintiff; not even at the moment of the origination of the same. At this stage of the proceedings, 8 || the Plaintiff's factual allegations, accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on it 9 face and consequently this amended complaint is not dismissed. 10 . . . . . WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied (Docket No. 11 D 24). The Defendant is ordered to answer the complaint on or before September 30, 2024. The 13 || Initial Scheduling Conference is rescheduled for November 13, 2024, at 9:00 A.M., at the United 14 || States Bankruptcy Court, Jose V. Toledo Federal Building and US Courthouse, 300 Recinto Sur 15 Street, Courtroom 1, Second Floor, San Juan, Puerto Rico. 16 17 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 18 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 30th day of August, 2024.
20 MILDRED CABAN FLORES 21 United States Bankruptcy Judge 22 23 Upon the filing of the bankruptcy case on September 6, 2023, the procedures in case $J2018CV10372 at the Court of Firs Instance, in Carolina, Puerto Rico, which had a trial on the merits scheduled for September 12, 2023, through September 14, 2023 24 || were stayed (Docket No. 12, Case #23-02809). The Defendant filed a motion for continuance of the stay and the same was denie on October 3, 2023. (Docket Nos. 7 and 30, Case #23-02809). Currently there is no automatic stay protection in this case. O 25 || September 13, 2023, the Defendant filed a motion for relief from codebtor stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c) and the same wa: granted by this court (Dockets Nos. 21 and 41, Case #23-2809). The court issued the following order on March 20, 2024: “Th 26 protection of the automatic stay is not in place for the Debtor, Maria de los Angeles Albert Sauri, as per the court's ruling (Docke No. 30). Furthermore, the relief from the automatic stay in favor of co-debtor, Antonio L. Delgado Albert is granted (Docket Nos] 21 and 41). Consequently, there is no protection of the automatic stay for the co-debtor. The litigation in local court against th 27 Debtor, Maria de los Angeles Albert Sauri Angeles and co-debtor, Antonio L. Delgado Albert, may continue.” (Dockets Nos. 6] and 70, Case #23-2809). 5.