Jorge Ordonez Hernandez v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 25-3226
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0574n.06

Case No. 25-3226

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 10, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) JORGE ORDONEZ HERNANDEZ, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ) THE DECISION OF THE BOARD v. ) OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, ) OPINION Respondent. ) )

Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Jorge Ordonez Hernandez (“Hernandez”), a native and citizen of

Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) decision affirming

the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1). Because the agency applied the correct legal framework and reasonably concluded

that Hernandez failed to establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his qualifying

relatives, we deny the petition for review.

I.

Hernandez first entered the United States without inspection in 1998, departed in 2000, and

reentered without admission in 2003, where he has resided since. In 2016, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, asserting No. 25-3226, Ordonez Hernandez v. Bondi

hardship to his U.S.-citizen son, Alex, and three U.S.-citizen stepchildren—Brayson, Jonathan,

and Emily.

At his merits hearing in 2020, Hernandez testified that he married Eva Ledesma Castro in

2016 and became stepfather to her children, but that he and Eva had separated about two years

earlier and lived apart. He maintained regular contact only with his stepdaughter Emily, taking

her to church weekly and paying her cellphone expenses. He had limited contact with the two

stepsons.

Hernandez also testified about his U.S.-citizen son, Alex, who lives with his mother, Laura

Hernandez, an unemployed U.S. citizen who relies on food stamps to support her five children.

Hernandez has no custody order and sees Alex only occasionally, providing roughly $100 on about

ten occasions. He stated that Laura suffers from a brain tumor and that he might try to take Alex

to Mexico if removed, though he acknowledged the difficulty of doing so without custody rights.

He submitted no medical records for Laura. Hernandez works steadily and filed taxes but admitted

that he had used fraudulent identification documents purchased in 2008.

The IJ found Hernandez credible but concluded that he failed to establish the required

hardship to a qualifying relative under § 1229b(b)(1). The IJ found that he had lived apart from

the stepchildren for two years, provided minimal financial assistance, and none of the children had

serious medical or educational needs. The IJ denied cancellation of removal but granted voluntary

departure.

The Board affirmed the IJ decision. By the time of the Board’s decision, two stepchildren

were over the age of 21 and, according to the Board, no longer “children” under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(b)(1). The Board nonetheless considered hardship to all children and agreed with the IJ

that the evidence, even when aggregated, did not rise to “exceptional and extremely unusual

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hardship.” The Board also noted that while it was sympathetic to Laura’s health issues, those

issues did not implicate a qualifying relative.

Hernandez timely sought review.

II.

The court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s factual findings underlying a

cancellation decision but retains jurisdiction to review the ultimate hardship determination as a

mixed question of law and fact. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217, 222 (2024); Singh v.

Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1154–55 (6th Cir. 2021). Our review of that mixed question is deferential.

Singh, 984 F.3d at 1154–55.

To qualify for cancellation of removal, a nonpermanent resident must demonstrate, among

other elements, that removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a

qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The Board has described this standard as a “high

threshold,” requiring hardship “substantially beyond that which would normally be expected” from

removal. In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468, 470 (B.I.A. 2002); In re Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001). This court has consistently recognized the

demanding nature of this requirement. Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir.

2024).

III.

A.

Hernandez argues that the IJ and Board failed to conduct a proper cumulative hardship

analysis and undervalued evidence regarding Laura’s medical condition and economic

circumstances. But the agency cited and applied the correct legal framework. The IJ relied on

Monreal-Aguinaga and Gonzalez Recinas and expressly evaluated hardship “in the aggregate.”

3 No. 25-3226, Ordonez Hernandez v. Bondi

The Board adopted the IJ’s analysis and cited Monreal-Aguinaga in reaffirming the correct

standard. Because both adjudicators applied the proper test, Hernandez’s legal challenge fails.

B.

Hernandez argues that his financial and emotional support for Emily and Alex, combined

with Laura’s medical condition, suffices to demonstrate exceptional hardship. But the record

supports the Board’s contrary determination.

Hernandez had lived apart from the stepchildren for two years. He maintained regular

involvement only with Emily. He provided limited and sporadic financial support to Alex—about

$100 on 10 occasions. He lacked custody rights. No medical records substantiated Laura’s brain

tumor. And none of the children had documented medical issues or special needs.

The IJ and Board permissibly concluded that these circumstances—while difficult—reflect

the ordinary consequences of removal. See Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422.

C.

Hernandez next argues that we should consider his two stepsons children under 8 U.S.C. §

1101(b)(1), even though they aged out during his appeal to the Board. Under binding precedent,

we determine the age of a qualifying “child” on the date the immigration judge issues his decision.

Perez v. Bondi, No. 25-3146, 2025 WL 3251134, at *1 (Nov. 21, 2025 6th Cir. 2025). Hernandez’s

stepsons therefore qualify as children because they were under the age of 21 when the immigration

judge adjudicated Hernandez’s application. Although the Board incorrectly stated that

Hernandez’s stepsons were no longer qualifying relatives, it nonetheless evaluated hardship to all

Hernandez’s children —including his stepsons—and reached the same conclusion as the

immigration judge.

4 No. 25-3226, Ordonez Hernandez v. Bondi

IV.

Because the Board applied the correct legal standard and reasonably determined that

Hernandez failed to establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying

relative, we DENY the petition for review.