Jorge Luis Castillo v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 24, 2005
• Docket: 13-02-00019-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-02-019-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JORGE LUIS CASTILLO,                                                            Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                             Appellee.

On appeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Castillo, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

          On October 31, 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Jorge Luis Castillo, pleaded nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance, less than one gram of cocaine, after the trial court denied his original and supplemental motions to suppress. The trial court placed him on two years’ deferred adjudication community supervision and imposed a $1,000 fine. This appeal ensued.

          The trial court has certified that this case is a plea-bargain case, but matters were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial and not withdrawn or waived. The defendant has the right of appeal.

          As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it.

          By various issues, appellant contends generally that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) the search of his person exceeded the scope of the search warrant, and (2) his initial detention and the search of his person were unconstitutional. We affirm.

Standard of Review

          At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. The appropriate standard for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the trial court’s application of the law. Mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of a witness shall be reviewed de novo. Where the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, the reviewing court must assume that the trial court made implicit findings that support its ruling, so long as those implied findings are supported by the record. The reviewing court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

          By his second issue, appellant generally argues that his initial detention was unconstitutional because (1) the arresting officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain him, and (2) he did not consent to being searched. According to appellant, the cocaine retrieved from his pocket should have therefore been suppressed as the “fruit” of an unlawful search and seizure.

          Both the federal and state constitutions protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. When a police officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot, he may detain a person for a brief time for questioning and may, in the interest of safety, pat down the person’s outer clothes to search for weapons. An investigative detention not based on reasonable suspicion is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Facts that do not show reasonable suspicion in isolation may do so when combined with other facts. During an investigative detention, an officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to accomplish the goal of the stop, whether it be investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer safety. We examine the reasonableness of a temporary detention in terms of the totality of the circumstances in each case.

Detention

          In his first sub-issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Ramirez did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain him. We first address whether Officer Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant.

          The record reflects that appellant was at a residence where narcotics were sold during a police raid. Prior to appellant’s arrest, Carlos Ramos, a DPS narcotics investigator, successfully obtained a search warrant for the residence based on reliable information from a confidential informant that narcotics trafficking occurred on a regular basis at the residence. The record also reflects that officers successfully negotiated a “controlled buy” of approximately two grams of cocaine prior to the execution of the search warrant.

          Officers conducted surveillance on the house for approximately two weeks before executing the search warrant. During surveillance, Officer Ramirez and other officers observed numerous vehicles drive up to the home, conduct a quick transaction with a Hispanic male on the home’s driveway, and quickly reverse out of the driveway. Officer Ramirez testified that appellant’s presence at the residence was consistent with the officer’s previous observations of other vehicles engaged in trafficking activities at the residence. Ramirez further testified that he detained appellant during the execution of the search warrant as part of his effort to secure the premises during the raid and because of his prior observation of narcotics activities.

          Based on the totality of the circumstances, Ramirez articulated specific facts that led him to believe that appellant was or soon would be engaged in criminal activity. We therefore conclude that Ramirez’s initial detention of appellant was supported by reasonable suspicion.  

Arrest and Search

          Appellant also claims that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. The record reflects that the arresting officers did not obtain a warrant to arrest appellant.

          An arrest conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable. However, this rule has various exceptions. An officer may make a warrantless arrest if probable cause exists and the arrest falls within the provision of one of the statutes authorizing a warrantless arrest. Under article 14.01(b), a peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view. The court of criminal appeals has repeatedly held that probable cause under article 14.01(b) may be based upon the officer’s personal knowledge coupled with personally observed behavior. In Stull, the court stated the following: “[T]his court has previously upheld arrests under Article 14.01(b) when police officers personally observed behavior that although not overtly criminal, was, when coupled with the officers’ prior knowledge, sufficient to establish probable cause that an offense was then occurring.”    Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that, more likely than not, a particular suspect has committed a crime. In determining whether an offense has been or is being committed, the officer is not restricted solely to information or facts which he has personally observed. An officer may rely on reasonably trustworthy information provided by another person in making the overall probable cause assessment. Whether probable cause exists is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances.

          In this case, the record shows that Ramirez knew the following: (1) an informant notified authorities that drug trafficking occurred at the residence regularly; (2) subsequent to notifying the authorities, the informant engaged in a successful controlled drug buy at the residence days before officers procured a search warrant for the residence; (3) officers witnessed an unusual amount of activity at the residence; and (4) during the raid, Ramirez personally observed appellant’s truck reversing down the driveway consistent with prior drug activity at the residence observed by other officers. The record also reflects that after Ramirez asked appellant why he was at the residence, he allegedly told Ramirez, “Well, you guys just caught me at a bad time. It was bad timing on my part.” Ramirez testified that after appellant’s remark, he advised appellant of his rights and then asked whether appellant had “anything” on him. Appellant then stated, “Yes, it’s in my pants pocket.”

          Although appellant disputes Ramirez’s account of the facts, we must give almost total deference to the trial court’s evaluation of the historical facts and assume the trial court made implicit findings that support its ruling. Based on appellant’s statement to Ramirez, combined with the objective facts known to Ramirez during the drug raid, we conclude that probable cause existed for Ramirez to believe appellant had committed a crime.

          Finally, when a valid arrest has been made, the arresting officer may conduct a search of the arrested person that is not limited to searching only for weapons. A search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification. Because appellant’s arrest was legal, the subsequent search of appellant’s pockets was proper as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Appellant’s first issue is therefore overruled.

          Because we have already determined that the arrest and search of appellant was proper, it is unnecessary for us to address appellant’s remaining issues on appeal.           The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                               LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ

                                                                           Justice

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed this the

24th day of February, 2005.