Jorge Juarez Lopez v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 25A-CR-01142
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Oct 23 2025, 9:25 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Jorge Juarez Lopez, Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

October 23, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1142 Appeal from the Steuben Superior Court The Honorable William C. Fee, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 76D01-2306-F1-794

Opinion by Judge Bradford Judges Weissmann and DeBoer concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 1 of 12 Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary [1] Jorge Juarez Lopez was convicted of two counts of Level 1 felony rape, two

counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor counterfeit

government-issued identification, after events that transpired on the night of

June 28 and early morning of June 29, 2023. At trial, Lopez’s victim, M.G.,

had an emotional outburst after testifying, which prompted Lopez to move for a

mistrial. The trial court denied Lopez’s request and instead admonished the

jury. After Lopez was convicted, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate

term of sixty-years of incarceration. Lopez contends that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his request for a mistrial and in sentencing him.

Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] When M.G. came to the United States in 2022, she shared a residence with

multiple individuals, among which were her sister and Lopez. Lopez, who

worked at Miller Poultry under the name “Joel Santana” possessed a fake

Social Security card in order to work, and a fake identification card in the name

of another person. Tr. Vol. III p. 84. Lopez had asked M.G. to be in a

romantic relationship with him, but she had declined. At some point in early

2023, M.G. moved to Texas, but came back to Indiana “a short time later” to

move into a trailer home in Steuben County with her sister, her sister’s

boyfriend, and two others, not Lopez. Tr. Vol. II p. 212.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 2 of 12 [3] On the night of June 28, 2023, while the then-seventeen-year-old M.G. was

home alone and sleeping, Lopez entered her home and knocked on her

bedroom door, saying that he had come to check on her and to see how she was

doing. Lopez stayed for a “few minutes” and then left. Tr. Vol. II p. 215.

Later that night, Lopez entered M.G.’s bedroom again, with something

“[c]overing his face[,]” holding a knife. Tr. Vol. II p. 215. When Lopez “told

[M.G.] not to scream or he was going to kill” her and put the knife to her neck,

M.G. recognized the voice as Lopez’s. Tr. Vol. II p. 216. Lopez forced his

fingers into M.G.’s vagina, “threw [her] in the bed[,]” and then forced his penis

into her vagina. Tr. Vol. II p. 218. Afterwards, Lopez “told [M.G.] that he was

going to come back and he was going to kill” M.G. and her sister if she told

anyone what happened. Tr. Vol. II p. 220. After M.G.’s sister returned from

work and learned what had happened, she took M.G. to the hospital.

[4] At the hospital, it was discovered by sexual assault nurse examiner Kathy

Dirrim that M.G. had “swelling to the right upper part of her lip. She had a

linear mark on her right side of her clavicle area and also on the left side of her

neck she had a linear mark.” Tr. Vol. III p. 33. M.G. also had three “circular

bruises” on her right thigh. Tr. Vol. III p. 33. M.G. disclosed to Dirrim that

Lopez had come into her bedroom, “grabbed her from behind, put his hand

over her mouth and told her he would kill her if she screamed and he put a

knife on her neck.” Tr. Vol. III p. 32. M.G. also disclosed that she had been

raped and that Lopez had “put his penis inside her vagina and he also put his

finger inside her vagina.” Tr. Vol. III p. 32. When police interviewed Lopez

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 3 of 12 on June 29, 2023, he initially denied going to M.G.’s house on June 28th but

later admitted that he had gone to her house after work that night. When asked

whether he had had sex with M.G., Lopez “said specifically I did not have sex

with her.” Tr. Vol. III p. 54. Laboratory testing showed that Lopez’s DNA

was found in the sperm fraction of the DNA collected from M.G.’s

vaginal/cervical swabs, external genital swabs, internal genital swabs, anal

swabs, and on her underwear.

[5] On June 30, 2023, Lopez was charged with two counts of Level 1 felony rape,

two counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony strangulation, and

Class A misdemeanor counterfeit government-issued identification. A jury trial

commenced on February 24, 2025. Lopez testified that he and M.G. had

engaged in consensual sex on the night of June 28, 2023. After M.G. testified,

she engaged in a “loud” and “emotional” outburst in Spanish, directed toward

Lopez, and she “lunge[d] toward [Lopez]’s table and then collapsed at the rail

to the front of the courtroom.” Tr. Vol. III p. 10. The trial court asked the

bailiff to “take the jury out please.” Tr. Vol. III p. 10. The jury left the

courtroom and was returned for separation instructions before a lunch break.

After the court entered recess, Lopez moved for a mistrial, arguing that M.G.’s

“conduct was so prejudicial and inflammatory so as to place [Lopez] in grave

peril[,]” and that she had “biased the jury in her favor[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 12.

The State responded that an admonition would remedy the situation. The trial

court noted that “what the jury saw was limited somewhat visually because she

ended up on the floor between the desk, but obviously extremely distraught,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 4 of 12 angry, loud. I think we can safely assume she was cursing and I don’t […]

know how you unsee that.” Tr. Vol. III p. 14. After the State offered an

admonition, the trial court agreed to give it and denied Lopez’s mistrial motion.

[6] When the jury was returned to the courtroom, the trial court stated the

following:

I want to speak to you about your oath as jurors to decide this case well and truly and fairly and honestly. And I want to talk to you about the oath you took to consider only the evidence in the case. As you all know, there was an outburst by the alleged victim almost immediately after she left the witness stand, and I won’t try to describe it. You saw what you saw and you heard what you heard. Some of you might speak Spanish, I don’t know, but I know that it was an extreme outburst. It was not, however, evidence. You must consider only the evidence in this case, the sworn testimony on direct and cross examination of witnesses, documents, pictures that have been received as evidence. That is evidence. What you saw and heard is not evidence and it is to have no part whatsoever in your deliberations. And I can see each of your eyes fixed on me. It seems that you understand. Do you understand?

Tr. Vol. III pp. 14–15. The jurors nodded to the affirmative, and the trial court

continued:

Okay, we just show for the record, everyone is nodding their head and I hope you take this very seriously. A unique challenge has been presented to you and I am directing you to banish from your minds any consideration of what you saw just before the recess and certainly to consider it in no way when you begin your deliberations. All okay with that. Everyone’s nodding. Thank you very much. We’ll continue.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 5 of 12 Tr. Vol. III p. 15. The State later orally moved to dismiss the strangulation

charge, which motion the trial court granted. At the conclusion of the trial, the

jury found Lopez guilty as charged on the remaining five counts.

[7] At sentencing, the trial court found Lopez’s lack of known criminal history, his

employment, and his lack of drug use as mitigating circumstances, but assigned

them minimal weight. The trial court found as aggravating circumstances that

Lopez had selected a victim “with which he had a level of trust” and that the

emotional distress suffered by M.G. “went beyond the elements of the crime[.]”

Tr. Vol. III p. 189. Ultimately, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of

thirty years on each of the two rape convictions, concurrent sentences of three

years on each of the two intimidation convictions, and a concurrent sentence of

sixty days on the counterfeit identification conviction, resulting in an aggregate

sentence of sixty years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision I. Mistrial Motion [8] Lopez contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his mistrial

motion after M.G.’s outburst. Specifically, Lopez contends that he was “left at

a distinct and perilous disadvantage in the context of the emotional persuasion

directed at the jury” after M.G.’s outburst and that the outburst was

“particularly perilous” to him because “the outcome of the case hinged on the

credibility of the alleged victim compared to the credibility of” Lopez.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 6 of 12 Appellant’s Br. pp. 20, 21–22. For its part, the State points out that the outburst

was just as likely to cast doubt on M.G.’s credibility as it was to bolster it.

[9] We review the denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v.

State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014). “A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is

warranted only when less severe remedies will not satisfactorily correct the

error. A timely and accurate admonition is presumed to cure any error in the

admission of evidence.” Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 2002)

(citation and quotations omitted).

[10] In determining whether a mistrial was warranted, we consider whether the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. The gravity of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision. When a motion for mistrial has been denied, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate both that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected and that no other remedy can cure the perilous situation in which he was placed.

Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations and

quotations omitted), trans. denied. “Moreover, a reviewing court accords great

deference to the trial court’s ruling on a mistrial motion.” Id. “Reversible error

is seldom found when the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a

statement made during the proceedings.” Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880, 895

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (brackets and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[11] Here, after M.G.’s outburst, the trial court carefully admonished the jury,

explaining that M.G.’s behavior was an “an extreme outburst. It was not, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 7 of 12 however, evidence.” Tr. Vol. III p. 15. The trial court further instructed, “You

must consider only the evidence in this case, the sworn testimony on direct and

cross examination of witnesses, documents, pictures that have been received as

evidence. That is evidence. What you saw and heard is not evidence and it is

to have no part whatsoever in your deliberations.” Tr. Vol. III p. 15. After the

jurors nodded to the affirmative, the trial court continued, “[a] unique challenge

has been presented to you and I am directing you to banish from your minds

any consideration of what you saw just before the recess and certainly to

consider it in no way when you begin your deliberations.” Tr. Vol. III p. 15.

[12] Initially, we note that, “[j]urors are presumed to follow a trial court’s

instructions.” Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation

omitted). While Lopez contends that the trial court’s admonition was

insufficient to remedy any prejudice which may have resulted from M.G.’s

outburst, nothing in the record suggests that the jury was unable to follow the

trial court’s instruction to ignore the outburst and consider only the evidence in

the case. The jurors all nodded affirmatively when the trial court gave the

admonition, indicating that they had all understood the instruction to ignore the

outburst.

[13] Case law supports a trial court’s decision to admonish the jury and deny

Lopez’s request for a mistrial under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Underwood

v. State, 535 N.E.2d 507, 518 (Ind. 1989) (affirming the denial of a mistrial and

concluding that the trial court’s admonition to the jury “cured any prejudicial

impact upon appellant’s case” where the victim’s mother “cried in the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 8 of 12 courtroom and then left the room”); Adkins v. State, 524 N.E.2d 1274, 1275

(Ind. 1988) (affirming the denial of a mistrial and concluding that the

admonition of the trial court was a reasonably curative measure after the

victim’s mother, a spectator in the courtroom, “shouted, ‘Why don’t you tell

the truth and stop lying?’”). We conclude that Lopez has not established that

the trial court’s admonition was insufficient to cure any prejudice that might

have resulted from M.G.’s outburst.1

II. Sentencing [14] Lopez also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him,

arguing that the sentence imposed “is a trial penalty.” Appellant’s Br. p. 22.

Specifically, Lopez contends that “because of the broad disparity” between the

sentence offered during plea bargaining and the sentence imposed after trial,

“the resulting sentence is a form of trial penalty.” Appellant’s Br. p. 24. We

disagree.

1 To the extent that Lopez complains that the admonition was not given immediately after M.G.’s outburst, we conclude that any error in the timing of the trial court’s admonition was invited. See Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874–75 (Ind. 2022) (“The invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were fundamental.”) After the outburst, the trial court immediately removed the jury from the courtroom, described the outburst, and then asked, “Does either side […] wish to be heard? Do you need some time to reflect?” Tr. Vol. III p. 10. Lopez responded, “Yes, I do, your Honor[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 10. Lopez also responded that he “understood” when the trial court explained that it would be providing the jury with a separation instruction before lunch and was “not going to address this part of it at this point in time.” Tr. Vol. III p. 11. During recess, Lopez moved for a mistrial, and, after argument, the trial court denied the motion and agreed to give an admonishment. Subsequently, the jury was returned to the courtroom and admonished. As it appears that Lopez had asked for time to reflect after M.G.’s outburst and moved for a mistrial after the jury had been excused, we conclude that any error in the timing the trial court’s admonition was invited. See Miller, 188 N.E.3d at 874–75.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 9 of 12 [15] “Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are

reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218

(Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the

reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is a due process violation of the most basic sort. Moreover, it is constitutionally impermissible for a trial court to impose a more severe sentence because the defendant has chosen to stand trial rather than plead guilty. It is also clear that under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may receive a more severe sentence following his trial than he would receive had he pleaded guilty because the trial may reveal more adverse information about him than was previously known. However, a court may not impose a sentence that conflicts with a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to a jury trial.

Walker v. State, 454 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (quotations and

citations omitted).

[16] In this case, Lopez identifies nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court

imposed his sentence as a penalty for exercising his right to a jury trial, and our

review of the record has revealed none.2 Furthermore, in the trial court’s

2 Lopez also fails to acknowledge the fact that the unaccepted plea offer, which included a thirty-year sentence, required Lopez to plead guilty to only one count of Level 1 felony rape, and that now, subsequent

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 10 of 12 sentencing statement and sentencing orders, the trial court never once referred

to the fact that Lopez had rejected a guilty plea offer, much less identified that

as an aggravating factor. Additionally, Lopez cites no authority for the

proposition that the terms of an unaccepted plea offer can limit the trial court’s

sentencing discretion when a defendant is convicted following a trial, and,

indeed, it is clear that the trial court is not bound by the terms of a plea

agreement unless and until it accepts that agreement. See Ind. Code § 35-35-3-

3(e).

[17] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Lopez.

[18] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Joel C. Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General

Ellen H. Meilaender

to the trial, Lopez has been convicted of two counts of Level 1 felony rape, two counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, and one Class A misdemeanor.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 11 of 12 Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1142 | October 23, 2025 Page 12 of 12