1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 JORGE ANTONIO CRUZ, Case No. 1:22-cv-00928-SKO 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 13 FRANK BISIGNANO, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) Commissioner of Social Security1, 14 (Doc. 21) Defendant. / 15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 18 On September 30, 2025, Laura E. Krank (“Counsel”), counsel for Plaintiff Jorge Antonio 19 Cruz (“Plaintiff”), filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 20 (“section 406(b)”). (Doc. 21.) On October 1, 2025, the Court issued a minute order requiring 21 Plaintiff and the Commissioner to file their responses in opposition or statements of non-opposition 22 to Counsel’s motion, if any, in accordance with the Court’s Local Rules. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff and 23 the Commissioner were served with a copy of the motion for attorney’s fees. (See Doc. 21 at 19.) 24 On October 1, 2025, the Commissioner filed a response, indicating that he “neither supports 25 nor opposes Counsel’s request for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).” (See Doc. 23 at 2, 3.) 26
27 1 On May 6, 2025, Frank Bisignano was appointed the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2025/#2025-05-07. He is therefore substituted as the defendant in this action. 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding the 1 Plaintiff did not file any objection to the motion by the deadline, and no reply brief was filed. (See 2 Docket.) 3 For the reasons set forth below, Counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees is granted 4 in the amount of $31,700, subject to an offset of $5,000.00 in fees already awarded pursuant to the 5 Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), on February 28, 2023 (see Doc. 20). 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff brought the underlying action seeking judicial review of a final administrative 8 decision denying his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) The 9 parties stipulated to voluntarily remand the case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on 10 January 19, 2023, and judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against the Commissioner on 11 January 20, 2023. (Docs. 15, 16, 17.) On February 27, 2023, the parties stipulated to an award of 12 $5,000.00 in attorney fees under EAJA, which was entered on February 28, 2023. (Docs. 18, 20.) 13 On remand, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled. (Doc. 21-2.) On September 21, 14 2025, the Commissioner issued a letter to Plaintiff approving his claim for benefits and awarding 15 him $124,672.00 in back payments for April 2019 through May 2025, and a total of $2,536.00 in 16 back payments for his two auxiliary beneficiaries for April 2019 through January 2020. (See Doc. 17 21-3 at 4, 13, 20.) On September 30, 2025, Counsel filed a motion for attorney’s fees in the amount 18 of $31,700 with an offset of $5,000.00 for EAJA fees already awarded. (Doc. 21 at 1.) It is 19 Counsel’s section 406(b) motion for attorney’s fees that is currently pending before the Court. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Pursuant to the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in which 22 they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides the following: 23 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 24 allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess 25 of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . 26 certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits . . . . 27 28 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting 1 provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits 2 awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 3 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The 4 Commissioner has standing to challenge the award, despite that the section 406(b) attorney’s fee 5 award is not paid by the government. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 6 324, 328 (4th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The goal of 7 fee awards under section 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while 8 ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted. Cotter v. 9 Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 10 807. 11 The 25% maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure 12 that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (Section 406(b) does not displace 13 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, section 406(b) instructs courts to 14 review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). “Within the 25 percent boundary . . . 15 the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services 16 rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (holding that section 406(b) “does not 17 specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is reasonable” but “provides only that 18 the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits awarded”). 19 Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 20 § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . ‘looking 21 first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 22 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 JORGE ANTONIO CRUZ, Case No. 1:22-cv-00928-SKO 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 13 FRANK BISIGNANO, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) Commissioner of Social Security1, 14 (Doc. 21) Defendant. / 15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 18 On September 30, 2025, Laura E. Krank (“Counsel”), counsel for Plaintiff Jorge Antonio 19 Cruz (“Plaintiff”), filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 20 (“section 406(b)”). (Doc. 21.) On October 1, 2025, the Court issued a minute order requiring 21 Plaintiff and the Commissioner to file their responses in opposition or statements of non-opposition 22 to Counsel’s motion, if any, in accordance with the Court’s Local Rules. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff and 23 the Commissioner were served with a copy of the motion for attorney’s fees. (See Doc. 21 at 19.) 24 On October 1, 2025, the Commissioner filed a response, indicating that he “neither supports 25 nor opposes Counsel’s request for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).” (See Doc. 23 at 2, 3.) 26
27 1 On May 6, 2025, Frank Bisignano was appointed the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2025/#2025-05-07. He is therefore substituted as the defendant in this action. 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding the 1 Plaintiff did not file any objection to the motion by the deadline, and no reply brief was filed. (See 2 Docket.) 3 For the reasons set forth below, Counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees is granted 4 in the amount of $31,700, subject to an offset of $5,000.00 in fees already awarded pursuant to the 5 Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), on February 28, 2023 (see Doc. 20). 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff brought the underlying action seeking judicial review of a final administrative 8 decision denying his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) The 9 parties stipulated to voluntarily remand the case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on 10 January 19, 2023, and judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against the Commissioner on 11 January 20, 2023. (Docs. 15, 16, 17.) On February 27, 2023, the parties stipulated to an award of 12 $5,000.00 in attorney fees under EAJA, which was entered on February 28, 2023. (Docs. 18, 20.) 13 On remand, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled. (Doc. 21-2.) On September 21, 14 2025, the Commissioner issued a letter to Plaintiff approving his claim for benefits and awarding 15 him $124,672.00 in back payments for April 2019 through May 2025, and a total of $2,536.00 in 16 back payments for his two auxiliary beneficiaries for April 2019 through January 2020. (See Doc. 17 21-3 at 4, 13, 20.) On September 30, 2025, Counsel filed a motion for attorney’s fees in the amount 18 of $31,700 with an offset of $5,000.00 for EAJA fees already awarded. (Doc. 21 at 1.) It is 19 Counsel’s section 406(b) motion for attorney’s fees that is currently pending before the Court. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Pursuant to the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in which 22 they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides the following: 23 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 24 allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess 25 of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . 26 certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits . . . . 27 28 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting 1 provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits 2 awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 3 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The 4 Commissioner has standing to challenge the award, despite that the section 406(b) attorney’s fee 5 award is not paid by the government. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 6 324, 328 (4th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The goal of 7 fee awards under section 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while 8 ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted. Cotter v. 9 Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 10 807. 11 The 25% maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure 12 that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (Section 406(b) does not displace 13 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, section 406(b) instructs courts to 14 review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). “Within the 25 percent boundary . . . 15 the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services 16 rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (holding that section 406(b) “does not 17 specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is reasonable” but “provides only that 18 the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits awarded”). 19 Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 20 § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . ‘looking 21 first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 22 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). The United States Supreme Court has identified 23 several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a contingent-fee 24 agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court: (1) the character of the 25 representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in 26 dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 27 benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 28 attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent 1 cases. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807-08). 2 Here, the fee agreement between Plaintiff and Counsel, signed by both parties, provides: 3 The fee for successful prosecution of this matter is 25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the 4 Social Security Administration. Attorney shall petition for authorization to charge this fee in compliance with the Social Security Act for all time whether 5 exclusively or not committed to such representation. If this matter requires judicial review of any adverse decision of the Social Security Administration, the fee for 6 successful prosecution of this matter is a separate 25% of the past due benefits 7 awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court. Attorney shall seek compensation under the Equal Access to Justice Act 8 and such amount shall credit to the client for fees otherwise payable for that particular work. Client shall endorse such documents as are needed to pay Attorney 9 any amounts under the EAJA and assigns such fee awards to Attorney. 10 (Doc. 21-1 (signed March 2, 2023) (emphasis in original).) 11 The Court has considered the character of Counsel’s representation of Plaintiff and the good 12 results achieved by Counsel, which included an award of benefits. Counsel and her paralegal spent 13 23.1 total hours representing Plaintiff, ultimately gaining a favorable decision in that the 14 Commissioner’s decision was reversed and remanded to the agency for reconsideration. (Doc. 21- 15 2; Doc. 21-4 (time sheets accounting for 19.6 attorney and 3.5 paralegal hours spent representing 16 Plaintiff before this Court).) There is no indication that a reduction of the award is warranted due 17 to any substandard performance by Counsel, as Counsel secured a successful result for Plaintiff. 18 There is also no evidence that Counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in delay. 19 Although the accepted range in the Fresno Division for attorneys like Counsel with twenty 20 or more years of experience (see Doc. 21-6) is between $325.00 to $400.00 per hour in non- 21 contingency cases, and rates for paralegal work in the Fresno Division range from $75.00 to 22 $150.00, see Webb v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, No. 1:19-cv-01716-DAD-EPG, 2022 WL 446050, at *6 23 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2022), here the effective hourly rate requested equals $1,372.29 per hour. (See 24 Doc. 23 at 2.) This hourly rate is not excessive when compared to what the Ninth Circuit has 25 approved in cases involving social security contingency fee arrangements. See Crawford, 586 F.3d 26 1142, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the majority opinion found reasonable effective hourly 27 rates equaling $519, $875, and $902) (J. Clifton, concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 28 Thomas v. Colvin, No. 1:11-cv-01291-SKO, 2015 WL 1529331, at *2−3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) 1 (upholding an effective hourly rate of $1,093.22 for 40.8 hours of work); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 2 1:09CV0490 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) (upholding an effective 3 hourly rate of $1,169.49 for 29.5 hours of work); Palos v. Colvin, No. CV 15-04261−DTB, 2016 4 WL 5110243, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (upholding an effective hourly rate of $1,546.39 for 5 9.7 hours of work); Villa v. Astrue, No. CIV-S-06-0846 GGH, 2010 WL 118454, at *1−2 (E.D. Cal. 6 Jan. 7, 2010) (approving section 406(b) fees exceeding $1,000 per hour for 10.4 hours of work, and 7 noting that “[r]educing § 406(b) fees after Crawford is a dicey business”). Further, attorney’s fees 8 in the amount of $31,700.00 do not exceed—and are in fact less than—25% of the past-due benefits 9 awarded and are not excessive in relation to the past-due award. See generally Ortega v. Comm’r 10 of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-cv-01030-AWI-SAB, 2015 WL 5021646, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) 11 (granting petition for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 406(b) in the amount of 12 $24,350.00); Thomas, 2015 WL 1529331, at *3 (granting petition for an award of attorney’s fees 13 pursuant to section 406(b) in the amount of $44,603.50); Boyle v. Colvin, No. 1:12-cv-00954-SMS, 14 2013 WL 6712552, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013) (granting petition for an award of attorney’s fees 15 pursuant to section 406(b) in the amount of $20,577.57); Jamieson, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 16 (recommending an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 406(b) in the amount of $34,500). 17 In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent-fee nature of this case and 18 Counsel’s assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under such terms. “District courts 19 generally have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases.” Hearn 20 v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Because attorneys like Mr. Sackett 21 contend with a substantial risk of loss in Title II cases, an effective hourly rate of only $450 in 22 successful cases does not provide a basis for this court to lower the fee to avoid a ‘windfall.’” 23 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807)). Attorneys who agree to represent claimants pursuant to a 24 contingent fee agreement assume the risk of receiving no compensation for their time and effort if 25 the action does not succeed. Id. Here, Counsel accepted substantial risk of loss in representing 26 Plaintiff, whose application had already been denied at the administrative level. Plaintiff agreed to 27 the contingent fee. (See Doc. 21-1.) Working efficiently and effectively, Counsel secured a 28 stipulated remand, and ultimately, the award of substantial benefits to Plaintiff. (See Docs. 15, 16, 1 1, 21-2, 21-3.) 2 An award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 406(b) in the amount of $31,700 is, therefore, 3 appropriate. An award of section 406(b) fees, however, must be offset by any prior award of 4 attorney’s fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. As Plaintiff 5 was previously awarded $5,000 in fees pursuant to the EAJA, Counsel shall refund this amount to 6 Plaintiff. 7 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 8 For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the fees sought by Counsel pursuant 9 to section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 10 1. Counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in 11 the amount of $31,700 (Doc. 21) is granted; 12 2. Counsel shall refund to Plaintiff $5,000 of the section 406(b) fees awarded as an 13 offset for the EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Doc. 20); and 14 3. Counsel for Plaintiff shall file on the Court’s docket proof of service of this order 15 upon Plaintiff at his current or last known address. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17
18 Dated: November 7, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19
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