Jordy H. Suljanovic v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00204-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued March 20, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00204-CR ——————————— JORDY H. SULJANOVIC, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1618302

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jordy H. Suljanovic appeals from his conviction for the offense of capital

murder and automatic sentence of life imprisonment without parole. See TEX. PENAL

CODE §§ 19.03(a)(7)(A), (b), 12.31(a)(2). The jury determined that he shot and killed

his wife and her boyfriend after finding them together in the family home. In seven issues on appeal, Suljanovic argues that: (1) the evidence was legally

insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder because the evidence did not

establish that he intentionally or knowingly caused his wife’s death; (2) the trial

court erred by admitting a police officer’s testimony about the truthfulness of another

person; (3) the trial court erred by admitting Suljanovic’s testimony about his prior

extramarital affair; (4) the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial after

the prosecutor made a remark that Suljanovic contends was inflammatory; (5) the

trial court erred by admitting testimony that he physically and verbally abused his

daughter; (6) the trial court erred by admitting victim-impact evidence during the

guilt-innocence phase of trial; and (7) the cumulative errors caused cumulative harm.

We affirm.

Background

Suljanovic and his wife, Adrianna Perez, had four children: Leasly, who was

eighteen years old when Adrianna died; Jordy Jr., who was then seventeen years old;

and two young girls under the age of ten.1 All four children lived with Suljanovic

and Adrianna in Houston.2 Suljanovic and Adrianna shared the primary bedroom in

the family home, and this bedroom had an adjoining bathroom and closet.

1 Suljanovic and Adrianna had a fifth child who died in infancy. 2 Several people relevant to this opinion share the same last name. For ease of reading, this opinion adopts the parties’ practice of referring to everyone except the appellant, law enforcement officers, and expert witnesses by their first names. 2 As Suljanovic acknowledges on appeal, his and Adrianna’s “marriage was not

a happy one.” Suljanovic was born in Bosnia, and Adrianna was born in Mexico.

They met during high school and communicated primarily through broken English.

Leasly and her uncle, Guillermo Renteria, testified that Suljanovic had a temper, and

he physically and verbally abused Adrianna. Guillermo and a family friend testified

that they had seen bruises on Adrianna’s body.

During a family vacation a few months before Adrianna’s death, Suljanovic

and Adrianna were in a bedroom when his gun fired. Adrianna ran out of the room

shouting that he “almost killed” her, although Suljanovic insisted that the gun had

discharged accidentally. A month later, Leasly called Guillermo crying and asked

him to come to her house because Suljanovic had beaten up her and Adrianna.

Suljanovic left the house before Guillermo arrived, and the family called the police

to report the incident. Guillermo testified that Suljanovic liked Jordy Jr. more than

Leasly and treated him more favorably. Leasly testified that her parents’ relationship

was “pretty horrible” and “pretty abusive,” and Suljanovic physically and verbally

abused both her and Adrianna.

At the time of her death, Adrianna was having an extramarital affair with

Omar Nahum Santamaria-Ruiz. Suljanovic suspected that Adrianna was having an

affair, and he spied on her. He once got her intoxicated and recorded Jordy Jr. and

Leasly asking her questions in Spanish about the number of men she had slept with.

3 A witness testified that in September 2018, one month before Adrianna’s death,

Suljanovic was intoxicated in a bar and repeatedly stated that Adrianna was out with

her boyfriend, “if [he] catch[es] them [he] would kill them,” and he “could get rid of

them and they would never find them.” The witness testified that Jordy Jr. had to

help remove Suljanovic from the bar, and Suljanovic repeatedly told Jordy Jr. that

“he was going to kill [Jordy Jr.’s] fucking mom.”

A few weeks before Adrianna’s death, Suljanovic bought a hidden video

camera disguised as an internet router and put it in his and Adrianna’s bedroom. He

was able to view a live stream of the video camera on his cell phone, but the camera

did not store any recorded video.

Suljanovic was employed as a truck driver. Shortly after midnight on October

2, 2018,3 Suljanovic was hauling a load in his tractor-trailer from Houston, Texas,

to Gonzalez, Louisiana. Driving eastbound on I-10, he viewed the live stream of the

video camera in his bedroom more than twenty times. Just after 3:00 a.m. as he drove

through Sulphur, Louisiana, about halfway to his destination and about 140 miles

from home, he pulled his truck to the side of the road. He testified that the camera

angle had changed and that he saw Adrianna walking around naked in their bedroom

when she was supposed to be sleeping, which further raised his suspicion that she

3 A law enforcement officer searched various cell phones belonging to Suljanovic and his children. The officer testified to the timeline presented here. 4 was cheating on him back home. He turned off the GPS tracker in his truck, turned

around, and drove home.

Suljanovic arrived home just before 6:00 a.m. He usually carried a firearm

with him, and he placed it in his waist holster and went inside. He went into his

bedroom and when he exited a few minutes later, both Adrianna and Omar were

lying dead on the floor of the bedroom closet. Suljanovic, Adrianna, and Omar were

the only people present in the bedroom at the time. The events leading up to their

killing were disputed at trial.

Leasly testified that she was asleep on the couch when Suljanovic came home,

and she was awoken by three “rapid fire” gunshots. When Suljanovic exited the

bedroom, he told Leasly that he had “shot” or “killed those bastards.” He led Leasly

into the bedroom, and she saw two bodies on the closet floor. She wanted to call

911, but Suljanovic told her not to because “there was no saving her, he shot her in

the head.” Leasly then went into her sisters’ bedroom to check on the two young

girls.

Suljanovic testified in his own defense. According to his testimony, Leasly

was awake on the couch playing on her cell phone when he got home.4 He spoke

4 A law enforcement officer testified that he searched Leasly’s cell phone and determined that there was no outgoing activity on the phone between midnight and 6:48 a.m., which was consistent with her being asleep and not on her phone during this time. 5 briefly to her and then walked into his bedroom. He did not see Adrianna, but he saw

a man lying on the floor. The man ran past him and exited through a window in the

bedroom.5 Suljanovic then walked into the bathroom where he found a naked man

standing. He later learned that this man was Omar.

According to Suljanovic, Omar angrily said some words in Spanish as he

advanced toward Suljanovic. Suljanovic pulled his firearm out of his holster, but

Omar attacked him causing Suljanovic to drop the firearm. Omar was able to get the

firearm and fire three rounds into the ground. Suljanovic pushed Omar, who fell into

the closet and dropped the firearm. Omar jumped up and advanced towards

Suljanovic again. Suljanovic grabbed the gun and fired a warning shot, but Omar

continued advancing, so Suljanovic fired a second warning shot that hit Omar in the

leg. The wound did not stop Omar, so Suljanovic shot him in the chest or stomach

area, and Omar fell to the ground.

Suljanovic then went into the closet looking for Adrianna. He found her dead

on the floor with a gunshot wound to her head. He denied that he killed her and

testified that Omar accidentally shot her. Suljanovic turned around and shot Omar

several times as he lay on the ground. Suljanovic denied that he told Leasly he had

shot or killed those “bastards.” He testified that he said “bastard” referring to Omar.

5 The record on appeal contains no additional information about this man. 6 He also testified that he wanted to call 911, but Leasly told him not to because he

could go to jail.

The events after Adrianna’s and Omar’s deaths were largely undisputed. Jordy

Jr. helped Suljanovic carry the two bodies and load them into the trunk of Leasly’s

car. Within an hour of his arrival home, Suljanovic and his children left the house

and drove to Gonzalez, Louisiana, to deliver the load Suljanovic was hauling before

his return to Houston. Suljanovic drove his tractor-trailer, and the two young girls

rode with him. Jordy Jr. drove Leasly’s car with the bodies in the trunk and followed

Suljanovic. Leasly rode in the passenger seat of her car. When Suljanovic reached

Sulphur, he turned on the truck’s GPS near where he had turned it off previously.

After delivering the load in Gonzalez, Suljanovic and his children drove to a truck

stop in Louisiana. Suljanovic parked the truck and left Leasly and the two young

girls in it.

Meanwhile, Suljanovic and Jordy Jr. drove in Leasly’s car to Livingston,

Texas, and then back across the border into Louisiana. A Louisiana sheriff’s deputy

stopped them for a traffic violation while the bodies were in the trunk. The deputy

spoke to Suljanovic and obtained his consent to search the car, but the deputy

ultimately decided not to search the car because he did not believe that it contained

narcotics. Suljanovic and Jordy Jr. then drove down a rural road in Louisiana where

they dumped Omar’s body in some woods near the side of the road. Suljanovic

7 decided to return home with Adrianna’s body, so he and Jordy Jr. returned to the

truck stop where Leasly and the young girls had been waiting for more than eighteen

hours.

Suljanovic and the children left the truck stop to drive home. As before,

Suljanovic drove the tractor-trailer with the two young girls in it. Jordy Jr. followed

in Leasly’s car, Leasly sat in the passenger seat, and their mother’s body remained

in the trunk. Before reaching Texas, Jordy Jr. exited the highway and drove down

another rural road where he dumped his mother’s body in some trees near the side

of the road. Jordy Jr. then caught up with Suljanovic on the highway. They returned

home around 1:00 p.m. on October 3, the day after the deaths of Adrianna and Omar.

Suljanovic conceded that he cleaned up blood in the trunk of the car.

On October 2, when Omar did not show up for work or return home, his family

filed a missing person report with the Houston Police Department (HPD). On

October 3 after Suljanovic returned home, some of Omar’s family members went to

Suljanovic’s house looking for Omar. The family members knew that Omar and

Adrianna were in a romantic relationship, and they believed that Adrianna had filed

for divorce. Suljanovic told Omar’s family that Adrianna had left and would not

return for several months.

8 Also on October 3, Suljanovic, Jordy Jr., and Leasly went to a police station

and filed a missing person report concerning Adrianna.6 The case was assigned to

Detective Elena Claburn. She linked the report of Adrianna’s disappearance with the

report of Omar’s disappearance because Omar’s family reported that Omar was in a

relationship with Adrianna and was last seen with her.

Shortly after returning from Louisiana, Suljanovic and his children spent a

night at Guillermo’s house. Suljanovic told Guillermo that Adrianna had run away

and was missing, but Guillermo did not believe him. Guillermo testified that

Suljanovic denied doing anything to her and that he said “it doesn’t matter. Me and

her, we don’t matter” and “we don’t count here.” Suljanovic also said that “[s]he’s

dead or I’m dead, too.” Suljanovic also told Guillermo that he was going to look for

Adrianna in Mexico, but Guillermo did not believe that Adrianna had gone to

Mexico because she would not be able to reenter the United States if she had done

so. Guillermo left for work the next morning and did not see Suljanovic again until

trial.

On October 8, Suljanovic signed a contract for the sale of the family home.

The sale closed on October 15.

6 Leasly testified that Suljanovic told her what to say when reporting her mother missing. 9 Detective Claburn went to Suljanovic’s home on October 12 to follow up on

the missing person reports. Suljanovic told Claburn that Adrianna had broken into

his safe and stolen $20,000 and a gun. Suljanovic also reported, however, that

Adrianna had access to a key to the safe. He initially reported that he left for

Louisiana at 1:30 a.m. on October 2, drove straight to Gonzalez, and arrived there at

noon. But then he said that he had stopped to change a headlight in Sulphur before

reaching Gonzalez.

On October 19, Claburn learned that Suljanovic was planning to leave the

country. She contacted him and asked him to meet with her on October 22.

Suljanovic agreed, but he did not show up for the meeting. Claburn attempted to

contact Suljanovic, but she was unable to reach him. Based on this information,

Claburn then transferred both missing person cases to HPD’s homicide division for

further investigation.

Suljanovic drove to Mexico in Leasly’s car on October 19. He took his two

young daughters, Jordy Jr., and Jordy Jr.’s sixteen-year-old girlfriend.7 They stayed

at a motel in Nuevo Laredo before traveling to Mexico City. On October 24,

Suljanovic went to the Mexico City airport and bought plane tickets to Croatia—the

airport nearest to his hometown in Bosnia—with a layover in London. He bought

tickets for himself and the children.

7 Leasly did not travel to Mexico with the rest of her family. 10 HPD Homicide Detective Eric May interviewed Leasly and Guillermo on

October 22. May learned that Suljanovic had left for Mexico, so he asked Leasly and

Guillermo to drive to Mexico to help locate him. May also enlisted the assistance of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

While Leasly and Guillermo drove towards Mexico on October 24, the FBI

learned that Suljanovic and the children had boarded the plane to Croatia. Agents

called Guillermo and relayed this news to him. They also informed him that

Adrianna was dead and that he and Leasly should return home.

May was concerned that if Suljanovic made it to Croatia, “he was never going

to come back.” So May obtained an arrest warrant for Suljanovic and filed it with

various federal agencies.8 When Suljanovic arrived in London for the layover, police

escorted him and the children off the airplane and detained them. The children were

returned to Houston. Suljanovic was sent to New York City, where he was detained

in a Manhattan jail for five months before he was extradited back to Houston.9

The FBI found Adrianna’s body in a wooded area near a rural road in

Louisiana on October 28. The same day, police obtained a warrant to search the

8 Police also obtained an arrest warrant for Jordy Jr. for tampering with evidence, specifically a human corpse. 9 A Law Enforcement Activity Executive for British Airways, the airline that transported Suljanovic from Mexico City to London, testified that Suljanovic was detained separately from the children because border patrol prohibited his entry into the country. 11 Suljanovic family home. During the search, law enforcement officers found the

house in “complete disarray” with “[f]loors partially ripped up” and all the furniture

removed.10 Officers found bare concrete floors in Suljanovic’s bedroom and closet,

and Leasly testified that green carpeting had been in the closet at the time of her

mother’s death. Agents also found fresh patches in the drywall near where the deaths

had occurred. Agents removed some of the drywall and searched for bullets, but they

were unable to find any. An agent testified that she found a half-empty bottle of

bleach in the bedroom, which she believed had been used to clean up the area after

the deaths. Suljanovic conceded that he had cleaned up the blood in the house. But

agents found no obvious evidence of the shootings.

A separate FBI team travelled to Mexico City to search Leasly’s car, which

had been towed from the airport to the United States embassy. Agents searched the

car and found cell phones, but they were unable to find any blood or hair evidence

related to Adrianna’s and Omar’s deaths.11

Agents found Omar’s body on December 24. Dr. Genesse Listi, a forensic

anthropologist at Louisiana State University, analyzed both Omar’s and Adrianna’s

bodies and determined their identities. Dr. Listi also determined that Adrianna and

10 A later search of Suljanovic’s tractor-trailer revealed that the home’s furniture was stored in a trailer leased by Suljanovic. 11 The parties stipulated that FBI agents found a rag that tested positive for a blood stain, but no DNA results could be obtained from the sample. 12 Omar were each shot once in the head in similar locations. She also found a fragment

of a bullet in Adrianna’s vertebrae, and she testified that this could not have been the

same bullet that caused Adrianna’s head wound. Because Omar’s body was found

later than Adrianna’s body, some of Omar’s bones were not recovered.12 Suljanovic

claimed that he had shot Omar in the leg as a warning, but FBI agents were unable

to locate Omar’s leg bone.

Suljanovic was indicted for capital murder on January 16, 2019. During a six-

day trial, the State called eighteen witnesses, including family and friends of

Adrianna and Omar and numerous law enforcement officers from various agencies,

including HPD, the FBI, the Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office in Louisiana, and the

New York Police Department. Jordy Jr. did not testify, and his prior statements were

not admitted into evidence, but the trial court permitted Detective May to testify

whether he believed Jordy Jr. was truthful in his statements to police. The trial court

also permitted Leasly and Guillermo to testify that Suljanovic verbally and

physically abused both Adrianna and Leasly. The trial court further allowed Leasly

to testify that after her mother’s death, she resigned from the United States Navy

because her superiors’ conduct reminded her of her father’s conduct towards her and

that she later sought therapy. The trial court also allowed the State to ask Suljanovic

about his own extramarital affair.

12 Dr. Listi testified that animals likely scavenged the bones. 13 While cross examining Suljanovic, the State asked whether Jordy Jr. and

Leasly “wanted to get involved in the commission of a crime by driving bodies

across [a] state line[.]” When Suljanovic responded “Yes,” the State commented,

“And you’re father of the year; said, That sounds like a great idea.” The trial court

sustained Suljanovic’s objection on the ground of improper sidebar remark. At

defense counsel’s request, the trial court instructed the jury to “disregard the last

statement made by the State,” but the court denied Suljanovic’s motion for mistrial.

During closing arguments, the State argued that Suljanovic had entered his

bedroom in the early hours of October 2, found Adrianna and Omar asleep in the

closet—out of view of the video camera in the bedroom—and shot them both in the

head. The jury found Suljanovic guilty of capital murder, and the trial court

sentenced him to automatic life imprisonment without parole. This appeal followed.

Legal Sufficiency of Evidence

In his first issue, Suljanovic argues that the evidence was legally insufficient

to support his conviction for capital murder.

A. Standard of Review

In a criminal trial, the State has the burden to persuade the factfinder that the

defendant is guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore v.

State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Evidence is legally sufficient

to support a conviction if a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant

14 committed each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and can suffice alone to

establish guilt. Williams v. State, 606 S.W.3d 48, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2020, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g); see Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004) (stating that standard of review is same for both direct and circumstantial

evidence). A “mere modicum” of evidence is not sufficient to rationally support a

conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 340 (quotation

omitted). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, courts consider “events

occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on

actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the

prohibited act.” Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49 (quotations omitted).

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,

we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury

was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore, 689

S.W.3d at 341 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Williams, 606

S.W.3d at 54. We consider all the evidence in the record, both admissible and

inadmissible. Williams, 606 S.W.3d at 54.

The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be

given their testimony, and the jury may accept or reject all or any part of a witness’s

15 testimony. Id.; accord Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 342. The jury may also draw

reasonable inferences from the trial evidence if each inference is supported by

evidence. Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 342. Juries may not, however, reach conclusions

based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id.

We consider the cumulative force of all the evidence to determine whether the

evidence was sufficient to establish each element of the offense. Id. at 341.

B. Governing Law

A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly

causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1). As relevant here,

a person commits the offense of capital murder if he commits murder and murders

more than one person during the same criminal transaction. Id. § 19.03(a)(7)(A).

Under the multiple-murder theory of capital murder, the State must prove that the

defendant had a discrete, specific intent to kill with regard to each death. Ex parte

Norris, 390 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quotation omitted); Fields v.

State, 515 S.W.3d 47, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).

C. Analysis

Suljanovic contends that the State presented no evidence establishing his

intent to kill his wife Adrianna, and therefore the evidence was legally insufficient

16 to support his conviction.13 Specifically, he argues that no evidence showed what

happened inside the bedroom when Omar and Adrianna were killed except his own

testimony denying that he shot Adrianna and denying that he had specific intent to

kill her. Suljanovic acknowledges Leasly’s testimony that he told her he “shot” or

“killed those bastards” after exiting the bedroom, but he contends that this testimony

was impeached.

The State responds that the jury did not believe Suljanovic’s testimony and

that other circumstantial evidence showed his intent to kill Adrianna. Specifically,

the State argues that Suljanovic had threatened to kill Adrianna because she was

having an extramarital affair, and he told Leasly that he had shot or killed those

“bastards” immediately after Omar and Adrianna were killed. The State also argues

that Omar and Adrianna were shot in similar locations in the head, Suljanovic

attempted to conceal evidence, and he made false statements to police.

Suljanovic correctly argues that his trial testimony was the primary direct

evidence of the events that occurred inside the bedroom when Adrianna and Omar

were killed. At trial, Suljanovic denied shooting or killing Adrianna or having any

intent to do so. He testified that when he returned home immediately before she was

killed, he carried his firearm in a waist holster. He went into his bedroom but did not

13 Suljanovic does not contest that sufficient evidence exists that he specific intent to kill Omar. 17 see Adrianna. So he went into the adjoining bathroom where he encountered Omar.

As Omar approached him, Suljanovic pulled his firearm out of the holster. Omar

attacked him, he dropped the firearm, and Omar grabbed it. Omar fired three rounds

into the floor, and Suljanovic pushed him. Omar fell into the closet, but he jumped

up and advanced on Suljanovic. Suljanovic grabbed the firearm and fired a warning

shot, which did not deter Omar’s advance, so he fired a second warning shot which

hit Omar in the leg. When Omar continued to advance despite the leg wound,

Suljanovic shot him in the chest or stomach area. Omar fell to the ground, and

Suljanovic went to look for Adrianna. He found her dead in the bedroom closet with

a gunshot wound to her head. He then turned around and shot Omar several times as

he lay on the ground. Suljanovic testified that Omar had accidentally shot Adrianna

when he fired the three rounds into the ground, and Suljanovic denied that he had

shot her. He also denied telling Leasly after the incident that he had “shot” or “killed

those bastards.”

The jury was the sole judge of Suljanovic’s credibility, and it was not required

to believe any of his testimony. See Williams, 606 S.W.3d at 54. The jury reasonably

could have disbelieved this testimony because Suljanovic repeatedly testified at trial

that he had lied to police during his custodial interrogations. Moreover, some of his

testimony was contradicted by other witnesses. For example, law enforcement

18 officers testified that they did not find evidence indicating that any bullets had been

fired into the ground.

Moreover, Leasly testified that she was awakened by three “rapid fire”

gunshots in the bedroom. Suljanovic attempted to impeach this testimony with

Leasly’s prior statements to police.14 However, the jury was the sole judge of

Leasly’s credibility at trial, and it reasonably could have accepted her testimony that

she heard only three gunshots in rapid succession. See id. Additionally, other

evidence corroborated Leasly’s testimony and contradicted Suljanovic’s testimony.

For example, Dr. Listi testified that she found evidence of only three gunshot

wounds during her postmortem examination of the bodies, which corroborated

Leasly’s testimony about the number of gunshots she heard.

Furthermore, the State argued during closing arguments that contrary to

Suljanovic’s version of the events inside the bedroom, the evidence indicated that

when Suljanovic returned home, Omar and Adrianna were sleeping on the closet

floor outside the view of the video camera Suljanovic had installed in the bedroom.

Suljanovic found them asleep on the closet floor and shot them as they slept. This

theory of Omar’s and Adrianna’s deaths is most consistent with Leasly’s and Dr.

Listi’s testimony.

14 Defense counsel asked Leasly if she remembered telling police that the shots were spaced out over a minute-long period, but Leasly testified she did not remember saying that. 19 Although the direct evidence of Adrianna’s death and Suljanovic’s specific

intent to kill her is minimal, this is not dispositive of the issue of Suljanovic’s guilt

for the murder of Adrianna. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. Intent may be inferred

from circumstantial evidence such as a defendant’s acts, words, and conduct before,

during, and after the commission of an offense. Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185,

201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49.

Suljanovic’s actions, words, and conduct prior to Adrianna’s death are

circumstantial evidence that he intended to kill her. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49.

In the hours before her early-morning death, Suljanovic was hauling a load in his

tractor-trailer from Houston to Louisiana. While driving, he viewed a live stream

feed from a video camera that he had recently placed inside his bedroom. He viewed

the feed more than twenty times during the drive, and he testified that he believed

Adrianna was cheating on him because he saw her walking around the bedroom

naked while she should have been asleep. So he stopped his truck on the side of the

highway, turned off the GPS tracking device in the truck, turned around, and drove

several hours home.

This was not the first time Suljanovic knew or suspected that Adrianna was

having an extramarital affair. Suljanovic had previously enlisted his older children

to ask an intoxicated Adrianna questions about the number of men she had slept with

while he recorded her answers. A month before her death, Suljanovic was at a bar

20 when a witness heard him repeatedly and loudly state that Adrianna was out with

her boyfriend, he would kill them if he caught them, he could get rid of them, and

they would never be found. When Jordy Jr. was allowed into the bar to take

Suljanovic home, Suljanovic told Jordy Jr. that “he was going to kill [Jordy Jr.’s]

fucking mom.” This evidence that Suljanovic believed Adrianna was cheating on

him establishes a motive to kill her. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 265 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018) (“Marital difficulty can establish a motive for murder.”). Motive

“is a significant circumstance indicating guilt.” Id.; Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860,

870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[P]roof of motive might be the glue that holds the

entire case together.”) (quotation omitted).

In addition to Suljanovic’s suspicions that Adrianna was having an affair,

there was also evidence showing that Suljanovic had physically and verbally abused

Adrianna. Leasly testified that the relationship between Suljanovic and Adrianna

was “pretty horrible” and “pretty abusive,” and Suljanovic acknowledges on appeal

that his “marriage was not a happy one.” Suljanovic’s physical and verbal abuse of

Adrianna is circumstantial evidence that he was willing and capable of causing her

harm. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49.

Opportunity is also a circumstance indicating guilt. Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at

265; Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial

evidence established that Suljanovic had an opportunity to kill Adrianna. The

21 murders occurred around 6 a.m. Suljanovic testified that when he returned home

immediately before Adrianna’s death, Leasly was awake playing games on her

phone. But Leasly disputed this testimony. She testified that she was asleep on the

couch in the living room and that her siblings were asleep in their bedrooms when

Suljanovic returned home. Detective May confirmed Leasly’s version of events

based on a search of her cell phone that showed no outgoing activity from midnight

until after Adrianna’s death. The jury was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility,

and it reasonably could have believed Leasly and May over Suljanovic. See

Williams, 606 S.W.3d at 54. With everyone asleep in the house, Suljanovic had an

unimpeded opportunity to kill Adrianna and Omar.

Suljanovic’s actions, words, and conduct after Adrianna’s death also provide

overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his specific intent to murder Adrianna. See

Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. Leasly testified that when Suljanovic exited the

bedroom after Adrianna’s and Omar’s deaths, he told her that he had “shot” or

“killed those bastards.” Leasly wanted to call 911, but Suljanovic told her not to

because “there was no saving her, he shot her in the head.” Suljanovic denied that

he made these statements to Leasly. He contended that he had said he shot or killed

the “bastard”—singular, not plural—referring only to Omar. Nevertheless, as the

sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, the jury reasonably could have believed

Leasly and disbelieved Suljanovic. See Williams, 606 S.W.3d at 54. Both statements

22 that Leasly recounted directly contradict Suljanovic’s testimony that Omar

accidentally shot Adrianna and that Suljanovic did not intend to kill her.

Moreover, Suljanovic took numerous steps to conceal the evidence of Omar’s

and Adrianna’s killings. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50 (stating that attempts to

conceal incriminating evidence is probative of wrongful conduct and is circumstance

indicating guilt). For example, Suljanovic enlisted Jordy Jr. to remove Adrianna’s

and Omar’s bodies from the closet, place them in the trunk of Leasly’s car, and drive

them to Louisiana. On the way to deliver the now-late load, Suljanovic turned on the

truck’s GPS near the location in Louisiana where he had previously turned it off.

After delivering the load, Suljanovic left his three daughters in his tractor-trailer at

a truck stop for nearly eighteen hours while he and Jordy Jr. drove the bodies across

the border to Texas and back to Louisiana before dumping Omar’s body in some

trees along a rural road.

Suljanovic also testified that after he and his children returned home from

Louisiana, he cleaned the trunk of the car where the bodies had been located. He also

removed the carpet in the closet where Adrianna (and likely Omar) had been killed,

and he cleaned up the blood in the closet. Law enforcement officers later found

bleach in the bedroom that could have been used to clean the blood. The evidence

also indicated that the drywall had been recently patched, possibly to repair damage

caused by bullets.

23 Suljanovic also filed a missing person report for Adrianna after he returned

from Louisiana. He acknowledged at trial that he had lied when filing this report.

See id. (stating that inconsistent statements and implausible explanations to police

are probative of wrongful conduct and are circumstances indicating guilt). After

Detective Claburn requested a meeting with Suljanovic to discuss the missing person

reports, Suljanovic agreed to meet with her, failed to show up to the meeting, and

then fled to Mexico with all his children except Leasly. See Bigby v. State, 892

S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“Evidence of flight or escape is admissible

as a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.”). Before going

to Mexico, Suljanovic obtained passports for his youngest daughters on an expedited

basis. He drove the children to the Mexico City airport, where he bought airplane

tickets to Eastern Europe. Then he boarded the plane and made it to London before

he was arrested. See id.

In sum, there was significant circumstantial evidence of Suljanovic’s specific

intent to kill Adrianna and his guilt for the offense. Suljanovic’s words, conduct, and

actions before, during, and after her killing showed that he had a motive and

opportunity to kill Adrianna. Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 201; Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at

49. We therefore hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s

findings that Suljanovic had specific intent to kill Adrianna and that he was guilty

of the offense of capital murder.

24 We overrule Suljanovic’s first issue.

Denial of Mistrial

In his fourth issue, Suljanovic argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion for mistrial after the prosecutor made an improper sidebar remark while

cross-examining him.15

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

A mistrial is the remedy for improper conduct that is “so prejudicial that

expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Hawkins v.

State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quotation omitted). Ordinarily, a

prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question

and answer. Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). A

mistrial is required only when an impropriety was “clearly prejudicial to the

defendant” and was “of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing

the impression produced on the minds of the jurors.” Perez v. State, 695 S.W.3d 843,

851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. ref’d) (quotation omitted).

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Perez,

695 S.W.3d at 851. Under this standard, we do not substitute our judgment for that

15 Suljanovic’s remaining issues concern evidentiary rulings and cumulative error. We therefore consider his fourth issue out of order. 25 of the trial court; rather, we ask whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or

unreasonable. Becerra, 685 S.W.3d at 127. A trial court abuses its discretion when

no reasonable view of the record could support the challenged ruling. Id.; McDonnell

v. State, 674 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). We

will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at 699 (quoting Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d

695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In determining whether a trial court abused its

discretion by denying a motion for mistrial, we balance three factors: (1) the severity

of the misconduct (including its prejudicial effect); (2) the effectiveness of any

curative measures taken; and (3) the certainty of the conviction or punishment

assessed absent the misconduct. Id.

B. Analysis

During cross-examination, the State questioned Suljanovic about taking his

children to Louisiana to dispose of Omar’s and Adrianna’s bodies in the following

exchange:

State: Okay. You didn’t want to leave your children behind while you did the load? Suljanovic: They want[ed] to come. State: They voluntarily wanted to come with you? Suljanovic: Leasly, Jordy [Jr.], yes, they want[ed] to come. The little ones, no. But I put them in the cab with me.

26 State: So Jordy [Jr.] and Leasly wanted to get involved in the commission of a crime by driving bodies across [a] state line? They agreed to that? Suljanovic: Yes. State: And you’re father of the year; said, That sounds like a great idea. Defense Counsel: I object to the father-of-the-year comment. That’s a sidebar remark. Trial Court: Sustained. Sustained. Defense Counsel: Instruction to disregard. The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, please disregard the last statement made by the State. Defense Counsel: Motion for mistrial. Trial Court: Denied

Concerning the severity of the misconduct, Suljanovic argues that the State’s

father-of-the-year remark was “derisive[]” and “inflammatory,” and it supported the

State’s theme of the case that “Suljanovic was not just a murderer, but a bad husband

and a bad father.” We agree with Suljanovic that the comment was derisive, although

the record is less clear whether the comment was inflammatory. The record indicates

that the State’s remark was intended to impeach Suljanovic’s testimony that he

allowed Leasly and Jordy Jr. to commit crimes because they wanted to do so, even

though their actions were against their best interests. As discussed below, however,

we conclude that any prejudicial effect from the comment was cured.

27 Concerning the effectiveness of any curative measures taken, Suljanovic

argues that the severity of the State’s remark was not cured by the trial court’s

“cursory” instruction to disregard, which he argues had “little to no curative effect.”

To support this argument, Suljanovic contrasts the trial court’s instruction to

disregard in this case with an instruction that this Court previously determined was

a “strong” instruction:

Ladies and gentlemen, I sustained the objection to [the witness’s] last statement. You are instructed to disregard anything that is said about [it]. It’s not a part of this case and not anything for you to consider and you are instructed not to consider it.

See Glauser v. State, 66 S.W.3d 307, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.

ref’d). We find no meaningful substantive distinction between the two instructions.

Although the instruction in Glauser contained more sentences than the one at

issue here, the instruction in this case effectively conveyed the same material

information: the jury must disregard the State’s remark. Moreover, Suljanovic offers

no analysis showing how the instruction here had little or no curative effect. An

instruction to disregard ordinarily cures error associated with an improper question

and answer, and we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction.

Sandoval, 665 S.W.3d at 529; Rankin v. State, 617 S.W.3d 169, 187 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). This is particularly true where, as here, the

improper remark was isolated. See Sandoval, 665 S.W.3d at 529 (“An instruction to

disregard is more likely to cure prejudice when the improper reference is isolated.”);

28 Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 597–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that

prosecutor’s improper remark calling defendant “a sociopath” was isolated and any

error in denying mistrial was cured by prompt instruction to disregard). The

appellate record does not support the argument that the instruction did not cure any

harm resulting from the remark.

Concerning the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct, Suljanovic

argues that his testimony was the only direct evidence of what happened in the

bedroom when Omar and Adrianna were killed; most of the State’s evidence

concerned the nature of the relationship between Suljanovic and Adrianna and what

happened to the bodies; and Suljanovic’s testimony was of “critical importance.”

This argument ignores the circumstantial evidence discussed above. We find no

support in the record for Suljanovic’s contention that the State’s remark caused a

guilty verdict.

After balancing the factors, we cannot conclude that no reasonable view of

the record could support a denial of the motion for mistrial. See Becerra, 685 S.W.3d

at 127; Perez, 695 S.W.3d at 851; McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at 699. The trial court’s

instruction to disregard cured any harm resulting from the State’s remark, and the

record does not support an argument that Suljanovic would have been acquitted

absent the remark. See Perez, 695 S.W.3d at 851. We therefore hold that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Suljanovic’s motion for mistrial.

29 We overrule Suljanovic’s fourth issue.

Evidentiary Issues

In his second, third, fifth, and sixth issues, Suljanovic contends that the trial

court abused its discretion by admitting various testimonial evidence.

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Hart

v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Perez, 695 S.W.3d at 850.

We will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless there was a clear abuse of discretion

that was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Hart,

688 S.W.3d at 891; Perez, 695 S.W.3d at 850.

B. Witness Testimony About Another Person’s Truthfulness

In his second issue, Suljanovic contends that the trial court erred by overruling

his objection when the State questioned a law enforcement officer about whether

Jordy Jr. lied during his interviews with police. Suljanovic argues that one witness

may not opine on another witness’s truthfulness. The State responds that the trial

court did not err because Jordy Jr. was not a trial witness.

At trial, the State asked Detective May whether Jordy Jr. was “fully honest or

was he lying” during his interviews with police. Defense counsel objected on the

grounds of speculation, hearsay, and seeking an improper personal opinion. The trial

court held a bench conference and admonished the State to “stay away from hearsay,

30 unless there’s an exception.” The court then directed the State to rephrase its

question and stated that it would rule on any subsequent objections. When testimony

resumed, the following exchange occurred:

State: At this point [when you spoke to Jordy Jr. after his return from London,] had you developed knowledge, facts, [some] sort of basis as you were doing the investigation? Witness: Yes. State: All right. Without going into what Jordy Junior specifically told you, were there things that Jordy Junior lied about? Defense Counsel: Objection; personal opinion, hearsay, and speculation. Court: State, can you be more specific as far as your question? State: Without getting into the hearsay, that’s the— Court: Okay. All right. Overruled. Go ahead. You may answer the question. Witness: Yes, he lied.

As Suljanovic points out, a witness may not opine on the truthfulness of

another witness or a complainant. E.g., Strahan v. State, 617 S.W.3d 198, 204–05

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d); see TEX. R. EVID. 608. The jury

is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony.

Williams, 606 S.W.3d at 54. “Direct opinion testimony about the truthfulness of

another witness, without prior impeachment, is inadmissible, as it does more than

‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’”

31 Strahan, 617 S.W.3d at 204 (quoting Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140–41 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011)). It “decides an issue for the jury.” Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d

706, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The rule applies to expert testimony and lay

witness testimony alike. Strahan, 617 S.W.3d at 204.

Jordy Jr. was not a complainant or a trial witness, and his prior statements

were not introduced into evidence at trial. Thus, the prohibition on testimony about

another witness’s or a complainant’s truthfulness does not apply to Jordy Jr. See id.

Moreover, the jury was not required to assess his credibility in determining

Suljanovic’s guilt, and his statements were not evidence or a fact in issue at trial. See

Yount, 872 S.W.2d at 709; Strahan, 617 S.W.3d at 204; Williams, 606 S.W.3d at 54.

We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the

objection to the State’s question about Jordy Jr.’s truthfulness in his statements to

the police. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891; Perez, 695 S.W.3d at 850.

We overrule Suljanovic’s second issue.

C. Questions to Suljanovic About His Extramarital Affair

In his third issue, Suljanovic contends that the trial court erred by allowing

the State to cross-examine him about his extramarital affair because the testimony

was not relevant, and it constituted prohibited character-conformity evidence.

During cross-examination, the State asked Suljanovic whether he had

“cheated on [his] wife before[.]” After he answered “No,” defense counsel objected

32 on the grounds of relevance and improper character-conformity evidence. The trial

court held a bench conference and overruled the objection. The State then asked

Suljanovic about whether he had ever cheated on Adrianna with a “waitress.”

Suljanovic eventually conceded that he had had sexual relations with a “stripper”

shortly after Jordy Jr. was born in 2001, but he testified that he and Adrianna were

separated at the time.

1. Relevancy

Suljanovic argues that evidence of his extramarital affair was not relevant

because it was neither material to nor probative of any fact issue. He argues that the

State did not allege that his affair was a motive for killing Adrianna, and the affair

occurred more than twenty years before trial. The State responds that this evidence

was admissible under Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.36 because it showed

the nature of the relationship between Suljanovic and Adrianna, particularly that

their marriage was not good.

Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless barred by other laws or the

Rules of Evidence, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible. TEX. R. EVID. 402.

Evidence is relevant if (1) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence; and (2) the fact is of consequence in

determining the action. TEX. R. EVID. 401. Evidence is relevant if it is both material

33 and probative. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Code of

Criminal Procedure article 38.36(a) provides:

In all prosecutions for murder, the state or the defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing between the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36(a).

We agree with the State that evidence of Suljanovic’s extramarital affair was

admissible under article 38.36. See id. The relationship between Suljanovic and

Adrianna was central to the State’s theory of the case and the offense itself. See

Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[T]he relationship

between the Appellant and the victim was itself a material issue.”). Indeed, the State

contended that the primary motive to kill Adrianna was that Suljanovic caught her

cheating in their bedroom. Numerous witnesses testified about multiple aspects of

their relationship, including Adrianna’s extramarital affairs and Suljanovic’s

physical and verbal abuse of Adrianna. Moreover, as the State points out, evidence

that Suljanovic had an extramarital affair is relevant to show that he did not value

his relationship with Adrianna and that his response to her affair was “hypocritical

and reflected a controlling attitude toward their marriage.” This evidence supported

the State’s theory of the case that he would rather kill Adrianna than mend the

relationship or divorce her.

34 “Evidence does not need to prove or disprove a particular fact by itself to be

relevant; it is sufficient if the evidence provides a small nudge toward proving or

disproving a fact of consequence.” See Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018). In this case, the evidence was both material and probative of the

marital relationship, which is admissible under article 38.36(a). See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36(a); Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 83. The marital relationship in turn

provided a “small nudge” toward proving or disproving that Suljanovic had a motive

to murder Adrianna. See Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 370; see also Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d

at 265 (stating that motive can indicate guilt).

That Suljanovic’s affair occurred twenty years before trial does not change

this analysis. Suljanovic does not point to any authority establishing that a twenty-

year-old affair is irrelevant in a prosecution for murder of a defendant’s spouse.

Article 38.36(a) does not limit the time period of admissible evidence. TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36(a). To the contrary, it makes admissible “all relevant facts

and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing

between the accused and the deceased.” Id. (emphasis added). We cannot conclude

that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling the objection to the extent the

evidence was too remote in time. We therefore conclude that Suljanovic’s

extramarital affair was admissible under article 38.36.

35 2. Character-conformity evidence

Suljanovic also argues that the testimony constituted prohibited character-

conformity evidence because it was elicited to show that he was “a bad person.” He

further argues that the line of questioning was inflammatory because the State

emphasized that he had an extramarital affair with a “stripper.” The State responds

that evidence of extraneous acts is admissible for any relevant purpose other than

conformity with character, and when an inference of character conformity can be

drawn from admissible extraneous-act evidence, the proper remedy is a limiting

instruction—not exclusion—which Suljanovic did not request.

Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s

character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in

accordance with the character. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be

admissible for another purpose, however, such as proving motive, opportunity,

intent, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). When a trial

court admits evidence for a limited purpose and the defendant requests a limiting

instruction, the court must instruct the jury to consider the evidence only for the

permitted purpose and only if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed the bad acts. TEX. R. EVID. 105(a); Dukes v. State, 486 S.W.3d 170, 181

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). If the defendant does not request a

limiting instruction when the evidence is admitted, it is admitted for all purposes.

36 TEX. R. EVID. 105(b)(1); Dukes, 486 S.W.3d at 181; accord Hammock v. State, 46

S.W.3d 889, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

As discussed above, evidence of Suljanovic’s extramarital affair was relevant

to the relationship between Suljanovic and Adrianna. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 38.36(a). We therefore disagree that the evidence was relevant only to show that

he was a bad person. As the State points out, the proper remedy in this circumstance

was for Suljanovic to request a limiting instruction, not to request exclusion of the

evidence entirely. See TEX. R. EVID. 105(a); Dukes, 486 S.W.3d at 181. To the extent

that this evidence established that Suljanovic killed Adrianna and Omar in

conformity with his character for being a bad person, he was required to request a

limiting instruction when the State sought admission of the testimony. Because he

did not do so, the testimony was admissible for all purposes. See TEX. R. EVID.

105(b)(1); Dukes, 486 S.W.3d at 181.

Moreover, we disagree with Suljanovic that the State inflamed the jury by

referring to his affair partner as a stripper. The prosecutor asked Suljanovic whether

he had an affair with a “waitress,” and Suljanovic volunteered that the partner was a

“stripper.” Thus, Suljanovic himself introduced the term “stripper” at trial, and the

State then repeated the term. The record does not support the contention that the

State’s repetition of this term inflamed the jury. We therefore hold that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by overruling Suljanovic’s objections to the State’s

37 questions about his extramarital affair. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891; Perez, 695

S.W.3d at 850.

We overrule Suljanovic’s third issue.

D. Evidence of Suljanovic’s Physical and Verbal Abuse of Leasly

In his fifth issue, Suljanovic contends that the trial court erred by admitting

testimony from two witnesses that he had physically and verbally abused Leasly

because the testimony was inadmissible under Code of Criminal Procedure article

38.36 and Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. The State responds that Suljanovic did

not preserve this issue for appellate review because he did not object on these

grounds or object to testimony that he abused Leasly, and therefore his appellate

complaints differ from his objections at trial.

Two witnesses testified that Suljanovic physically and verbally abused

Leasly. Guillermo, Leasly’s uncle, testified that Leasly called him in February 2018

“upset” and “crying,” and she asked him to come to her house. The State then asked

what Leasly was asking him to do, and defense counsel objected to hearsay. The trial

court overruled the objection after finding that the question elicited an excited

utterance, which is an exception to hearsay under Rule of Evidence 803. See TEX.

R. EVID. 803(2). Guillermo testified that Leasly asked him to come to her house

because Suljanovic “beat them up, beat Leasly and Adrianna,” and they had called

the police.

38 Leasly also testified that Suljanovic had physically and verbally abused her.

She first testified that her parents’ relationship was “pretty abusive.” When the State

asked whether she personally witnessed abuse, defense counsel objected based on a

previously filed motion in limine concerning extraneous offenses. The trial court

held a bench conference, during which the State argued that evidence of the nature

of Adrianna and Suljanovic’s relationship was admissible under article 38.36. The

State denied that it sought to introduce the testimony under Rule 404(b), and the

court overruled the objection. At defense counsel’s request, the trial court gave the

jury a limiting instruction concerning evidence of extraneous crimes, wrongs, or

other bad acts.

Leasly then testified that when she was seventeen, her parents got into an

argument and “were getting physical in their bedroom and [Jordy Jr.] had to

intervene[.]” Suljanovic then “came toward [Leasly] and took his aggression out on

[her] and he hit [her] on multiple parts of [her] body” before returning to the bedroom

to continue the argument with Adrianna. Leasly “ran out of the house” and “called

the police.” She also testified that she called Guillermo, and he went to her house.

Suljanovic verbally abused her by calling her “a whore,” “a slut,” and “a bitch” and

by making her feel unimportant and unloved. Suljanovic did not object to any of

Leasly’s testimony concerning his physical or verbal abuse towards her.

39 To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that:

(1) the complaint was timely made to the trial court with sufficient specificity to

make the court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent

from the context; and (2) the trial court ruled or refused to rule on the complaint.

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also Wood v. State, 693 S.W.3d 308, 323 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2024) (“Most complaints are forfeited by a failure to object; that is, they have

to be preserved.”). “The purpose for requiring a timely, specific objection is twofold:

(1) it informs the judge of the basis of the objection and affords him an opportunity

to rule on it[;] and (2) it affords opposing counsel an opportunity to respond to the

complaint.” Null v. State, 690 S.W.3d 305, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (quotations

omitted). Preservation of error is a systemic requirement. Id. (quotations omitted).

Moreover, to preserve error, the complaint at trial must match the issue raised on

appeal. Wood, 693 S.W.3d at 323; Veal v. State, 682 S.W.3d 577, 584 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. ref’d) (“Making an argument to the appellate court

that was not raised to the trial court usurps the trial court’s function[.]”) (quotations

omitted).

Suljanovic did not object to any of the State’s questions or witness testimony

about his physical and verbal abuse towards Leasly. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

Defense counsel did object on hearsay grounds when the State asked Guillermo what

Leasly had told him during a telephone conversation in February 2018. Defense

40 counsel also objected when the State asked Leasly about her parents’ “pretty

abusive” relationship. However, neither of these objections match Suljanovic’s

complaint on appeal that the trial court erred under article 38.36 and Rules 404(b)

and 403 by admitting testimony about the abuse towards Leasly. See Wood, 693

S.W.3d at 323. Accordingly, we hold that Suljanovic did not preserve this issue for

appellate review.

We overrule Suljanovic’s fifth issue.

E. Victim-Impact Evidence During the Guilt-Innocence Phase of Trial

In his sixth issue, Suljanovic contends that the trial court erred by admitting

Leasly’s testimony concerning why she resigned from the Navy after her mother’s

death and concerning why she was in therapy. He argues that this testimony “was

akin to victim-impact testimony, which is irrelevant at the guilt-innocence phase of

a trial . . . .” The State argues that the testimony was admissible to rebut defense

counsel’s opening argument that Leasly was responsible for covering up her

mother’s death. According to the State, Leasly’s reasons for resigning from the Navy

and seeking therapy showed that “she was traumatized by her relationship with her

father and the murders,” which “made it less likely that she was the one calling the

shots when it came to covering up her mother’s death.”

At trial, the State asked Leasly whether “any part of [her] time in the Navy

[was] difficult for [her.]” Defense counsel objected on the ground of relevance. At a

41 bench conference, the State argued that the testimony was relevant to rebut the

defensive theory that Leasly did not allow Suljanovic to call 911 after the murders.

Defense counsel responded that Leasly would testify she experienced “a triggering

mechanism and a thought back to the abuse and all the yelling from [Suljanovic]”

and that she “had to get in counseling because of [Suljanovic’s] abuse,” and therefore

such testimony was not relevant and constituted inadmissible character-conformity

evidence. The trial court overruled the objections, but it limited the State to the two

questions about the reasons Leasly left the Navy and sought counseling. When

testimony resumed, Leasly testified that she resigned from the Navy because her

superior officers spoke to her in a manner that “was triggering” and “reminded [her]

of [her] dad.” She also testified that she sought counseling, which “has helped a lot.”

Victim-impact evidence in a homicide case is “evidence concerning the effect

that the victim’s death will have on others, particularly the victim’s family

members.” Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006, pet. ref’d) (quoting Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002)); accord Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Such

evidence is irrelevant at the guilt-innocence phase of trial because it does not tend to

make more or less probable the existence of any fact of consequence with respect to

guilt or innocence. Love, 199 S.W.3d at 456–57; see also TEX. R. EVID. 401(a);

Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

42 Here, Leasly’s challenged testimony did not relate to the effect that

Adrianna’s death had on Leasly. See Love, 199 S.W.3d at 456 (stating that victim-

impact evidence concerns effect victim’s death had on others). Rather, it related to

the effect that Suljanovic’s physical and verbal abuse had on Leasly. Prior to

introducing this testimony, Leasly testified about Suljanovic’s physical and verbal

abuse of her and the relationship she had with Suljanovic. She then testified that she

resigned from the Navy because her superior officers spoke to her in a “triggering”

manner that “reminded [her] of [her] dad.” Importantly, Leasly did not testify that

she resigned from the Navy because of the effect her mother’s murder had on her.

See id. Defense counsel acknowledged this at the bench conference before the trial

court by arguing that Leasly would testify about “a triggering mechanism and a

thought back to the abuse and all the yelling from [Suljanovic].”

After testifying about resigning from the Navy, Leasly also testified that she

sought therapy, which “helped a lot.” In isolation, this statement is ambiguous about

whether the counseling addressed the effect of her mother’s murder, the effect of her

father’s physical and verbal abuse, or both. In its proper context, however, the

testimony about seeking therapy occurred immediately after Leasly testified about

Suljanovic’s abuse towards her, his relationship with her, and her resignation from

the Navy due the “triggering” effect of her superior officers’ conduct which

reminded her of Suljanovic. This context helps resolve the ambiguity and indicates

43 that her testimony about therapy concerned Suljanovic’s conduct towards Leasly and

their relationship rather than her mother’s murder. See id. Again, defense counsel

acknowledged this by arguing at the bench conference that Leasly’s anticipated

testimony was irrelevant because it concerned Leasly seeking “counseling because

of [Suljanovic’s] abuse.”

We note that Suljanovic did not expressly object to Leasly’s testimony on the

ground that it would constitute impermissible victim-impact evidence. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). To some degree, this failure to object hinders the Court’s ability

to resolve this issue. See Null, 690 S.W.3d at 318 (stating that purpose of requiring

specific objection is to inform trial court of basis for objection, afford opportunity

for ruling, and allow opposing counsel opportunity to respond). Nevertheless, we

conclude that the trial court reasonably could have determined that Leasly’s

testimony was relevant to whether Suljanovic physically and verbally abused Leasly,

which in turn was relevant to rebut the defensive theory that Leasly—and not

Suljanovic—was at least partially responsible for covering up Adrianna’s murder.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling

the objection to the testimony. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891; Perez, 695 S.W.3d at

850.

We overrule Suljanovic’s sixth issue.

44 Cumulative Error and Harm

In his seventh issue, Suljanovic argues that the cumulative error presented in

his prior appellate issues resulted in cumulative harm.

Multiple errors may be harmful in their cumulative effect. Gamboa v. State,

296 S.W.3d 574, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). However, the Court of Criminal

Appeals has “never found that ‘non-errors may in their cumulative effect cause

error.’” Id. (quoting Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999)); see also Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 613, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(stating that where appellant failed to show error, “there is no error to cumulate”).

We have already determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to

support Suljanovic’s conviction for capital murder and that the trial court did not err

by denying the motion for mistrial and overruling the various evidentiary objections

challenged on appeal. Therefore, because we find no error, we hold that there was

no cumulative error or cumulative harm. See Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 613, 620;

Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585.

We overrule Suljanovic’s seventh issue.

45 Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

David Gunn Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Gunn.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).